Program for Benin

This analysis is based on the most recent economic, political, and social data available on Benin, verified and cross-checked at the time of writing this program (first half of 2026). In accordance with the DirectDemocracyS (DDS) methodology, we reject the two common pitfalls of political programs: the naiveté that ignores the real progress achieved by the governments in power, and the complacency that silences structural deficits in power and redistribution. Benin presents a particularly instructive case study for DDS: a country whose macroeconomic indicators are objectively good, praised by international financial institutions, but whose power structure has, at the same time, become measurably more rigid. This disconnect between economic performance and democratic openness is precisely the area where DDS provides a structural, rather than merely rhetorical, response.

Our method is simple and non-negotiable: logic, common sense, factual analysis, reality, truth, consistency, and mutual respect. We propose nothing that we cannot justify point by point, and we conceal no inconvenient information, whether it benefits or harms those in power.

2. Political and institutional situation

The Republic of Benin is a presidential system in which the President of the Republic holds the dual roles of Head of State and Head of Government, determines and conducts national policy alone, and appoints members of the government without consulting the National Assembly. The National Assembly, a unicameral body with 109 seats (24 of which are reserved for women), is elected by proportional representation using a closed list system with a national threshold of 10%, a threshold that has historically contributed to excluding smaller political parties from parliamentary representation.

2.1. A structurally restricted electoral competition

President Patrice Talon, in power since 2016 and re-elected in 2021, announced he would not seek a third term, in accordance with the constitutional limit. However, a constitutional amendment adopted in 2025 extended the presidential term from five to seven years for the following election—a substantial lengthening of the executive branch's mandate decided shortly before the change of leadership and not subject to a direct popular referendum.

During the legislative elections of January 11, 2026, and the subsequent presidential election of April 12, 2026, the conditions for validating candidacies—a sponsorship system controlled by the structures of the ruling power—resulted in only two candidates being allowed to advance to the first round of the presidential election. The main opposition party, Les Démocrates, saw its representative, Renaud Agbodjo, invalidated by the Constitutional Court, repeating a scenario already observed in the previous election. The candidate of the ruling coalition (Progressive Union for Renewal / Republican Bloc), Romuald Wadagni, former Minister of State for the Economy and Finance, was elected in the first round with 94.05% to 94.27% of the votes cast, according to provisional and then final results, defeating a second candidate whose close ties to the presidential movement were themselves publicly discussed. Voter turnout was 58.75%.

Factual observation

An electoral score exceeding 94% obtained in a system where the main organized opposition force was technically prevented from competing is not proof of spontaneous popular consensus: it is the mechanical consequence of limited competition from the outset. DDS does not dispute the integrity of the vote count; we contest the structure that determines, prior to the vote, who has the right to be a choice for the people.

2.2. An exceptional judicial apparatus mobilized against criticism

The Court for the Repression of Economic Crimes and Terrorism (CRIET), created to try serious economic crime and terrorism, was used repeatedly during the 2025-2026 period to prosecute journalists and opposition politicians on broad charges such as "incitement to rebellion," "incitement to hatred and violence," "apology for terrorism," or, through the digital code, "harassment by electronic communication" and "publication of false news." Several journalists (including Comlan Hugues Sossoukpè, arrested in Ivory Coast and then extradited, Ali Moumouni, Cosme Hounsa, and Olivier Allochémé), as well as a member of the Les Démocrates party, Julien Kandé Kansou—prosecuted after publicly mentioning an "electoral revolution" and criticizing the authorities—were subjected to such prosecutions. On the international stage, Benin has fallen from 89th to 92nd place in Reporters Without Borders' world press freedom ranking.

Amnesty International notes, in its 2025-2026 report, repeated restrictions on demonstrations organised by the opposition, dispersed by law enforcement, as well as a recurring use of provisions of the digital code to prosecute ordinary citizens expressing critical opinions online.

2.3. The attempted coup of December 7, 2025: symptom, not cause

On December 7, 2025, a group of mid-level officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri attacked the presidential residence in Cotonou, temporarily seized control of national television and radio, and announced the suspension of the Constitution under the banner of a "Military Committee for Refoundation." The uprising failed within hours thanks to the resistance of loyalist forces, supported by a regional military intervention (Nigerian air force, Ivorian special forces) under the auspices of ECOWAS. In the following days, arrest warrants were issued for several prominent figures in the civilian opposition, including politician Candide Azannaï and influencer Kémi Séba—a response that extended the repression from the military to the political and media spheres.

DDS analyzes this episode not as an isolated incident but as a structural symptom: when a political system systematically closes off legal and peaceful avenues for protest and change—by invalidating candidacies, prosecuting opponents and journalists, and restricting demonstrations—it does not eliminate popular and institutional frustration; it displaces it toward unregulated channels, the most dangerous form of which, for both the country and its citizens, is the temptation of armed force. It is precisely this void—the absence of a legal, peaceful, continuous, and guaranteed channel for correcting the power structure—that DDS structurally fills, as we detail in Part II.

3. Security situation: the jihadist challenge in the North

Since January 2025, northern Benin has faced a resurgence of deadly attacks carried out by jihadist armed groups, including elements linked to the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM/JNIM, affiliated with Al-Qaeda), based in neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger, and targeting in particular the Beninese armed forces. This phenomenon is exacerbated by failing regional cooperation: the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—grouped within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—from ECOWAS in January 2025 has weakened cross-border security coordination, in a context where Benin's relations with the AES regimes remain strained, notably due to its close ties with France.

One observation deserves particular attention: the North and Central regions of the country, the areas most affected by insecurity, are also among the historical strongholds of the Beninese political opposition. Specialized analysts (notably IRSEM) warn that an exclusively repressive and militarized response to insecurity, without a component of local reconciliation and genuine political representation of the populations concerned, risks fueling cycles of vendetta and further weakening collaboration between the population and the defense and security forces—a risk that DDS takes seriously and addresses directly through its model of local micro-governance (see Part III, section 20).

4. Economic and financial situation

With a gross domestic product estimated at $19.4 billion (IMF) for a population of 13.4 million, representing a GDP per capita of approximately $1,411, Benin has been classified as a lower-middle-income country since 2019. Economic growth has been particularly robust in recent years: 6.3% in 2024, then 8.1% in 2025—a record since the advent of democratic renewal—with inflation kept under control at around 1.1% to 2.5%. The main drivers of this growth have been public works (+9.8%), the textile sector (+9.3%), and the agri-food sector (+8.4%), driven in particular by the development of the Glo-Djigbé Industrial Zone (GDIZ), which is geared towards processing and export.

Indicator	Recent value	Critical reading of DDS
GDP per capita	≈ USD 1,411 (2023)	Low middle income; does not reflect the true distribution of wealth
GDP Growth	8.1% (2025), a historic record	Strong growth but concentrated on public works, textiles, and export-oriented agribusiness
Public debt / GDP	≈ 54.5% (2023), target 51.3% in 2026	Sound technical management, but increasing dependence on international financial markets
Export structure	Cotton 49%, soy 12.5%, cashew 11%	Very limited diversification; products are little or not processed locally
HDI (world ranking)	173rd out of 193 (2022)	Very low despite macroeconomic growth — a central paradox of the current model
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) Press Freedom Perceptions Index	Drop from 89th to 92nd place	Civic space is shrinking at the very moment when growth is accelerating.

Benin has strengthened its access to international financial markets, notably through a $500 million bond issue in January 2025 and, significantly, its first international sukuk issuance in January 2026, for $850 million, expanding its investor base to the Middle East and Asia. Eurobonds already represented approximately 27% of external debt in 2024. The current account deficit, financed by foreign direct investment, multilateral loans (World Bank, IMF), and these bond issues, is expected to narrow to 5.2% of GDP in 2027.

Critical reading of DDS

This financial strategy is technically sound—we acknowledge this without reservation, in accordance with our commitment to truth. But it raises a question of sovereignty that official statements never address: who decides, on behalf of the Beninese people, the acceptable level of debt, the allocation of funds raised, and the concessions granted to international creditors? Today, this decision rests exclusively with a small executive circle, headed by the former Minister of Finance who is precisely the architect of this strategy. Macroeconomic performance, however real it may be, does not constitute a renewed popular mandate to commit the country for decades to come.

5. Social situation

The social progress achieved over the last decade is real and must be accurately acknowledged: real per capita income has increased by 27% in ten years, and the infant mortality rate has fallen by 25%, to approximately 46 deaths per 1,000 live births. These figures reflect effective public investment in infrastructure and basic services.

But this progress coexists with a Human Development Index that remains one of the lowest in the world (173rd out of 193 in 2022), an agricultural economy that is still largely unprocessed and therefore structurally vulnerable to climate change and global commodity price cycles, and a civic space that is shrinking rather than expanding: restrictions on peaceful protests, criminal prosecutions for online expression, and a decline in press freedom. Macroeconomic growth, therefore, does not automatically translate into an expansion of citizens' real power over the choices that affect them.

6. Critical synthesis: the Beninese paradox

Contemporary Benin illustrates, in an almost pedagogical way, the paradox that DDS denounces and intends to structurally resolve in each country where we intervene: real macroeconomic performance, praised by international financial institutions and rating agencies, obtained and managed by a competent technocratic elite — coexisting with an increasing concentration of political power, a measurable shrinking of civic space, and an increased dependence on international financial markets and creditors to finance national development.

Current situation in Benin	With DirectDemocracyS (DDS)
Only one serious candidate allowed to compete for the highest office in the state; opposition structurally prevented from running by the sponsorship system and the invalidation of candidacies.	Each citizen participates directly and continuously in the decision-making process via their micro-group; no candidacy can be filtered by a central authority, and the mandate is permanently revocable.
The special court (CRIET) has been mobilized on several occasions against journalists and opponents for broad criminal charges.	Three-code identity and protected platforms: legitimate political criticism is structurally protected against repression and manipulation, without anonymity allowing real impunity.
International debt decisions (eurobonds, sukuk) taken by the executive without a direct, renewed popular mandate on these specific choices.	NTCO principle: national wealth and structuring financial choices remain under the direct, continuous and verifiable control of the people, via micro-groups and specialist financial groups.
Attempted coup in December 2025: political frustration, lacking a peaceful channel, was expressed through armed means.	The imperative mandate and immediate revocability offer a legal, peaceful and permanent channel for correcting power — rendering the coup both unnecessary and illegitimate in the eyes of the people themselves.
North and Central regions of the country: areas of historical opposition simultaneously the most exposed to jihadist insecurity, with a risk of a cycle of repression-vendetta.	Fractal local micro-governance: real and continuous representation of the populations of the North and the Center, structured community dialogue, without depending on the goodwill of the central power.

This summary is not an indictment of the individuals currently governing Benin; it is a structural diagnosis. The problem is not the technical competence of any particular administration—DDS acknowledges this competence where it exists. The problem is the absence of a structural mechanism that guarantees, regardless of who is in power and their intentions, that the Beninese people remain permanently the ultimate decision-makers of their political, economic, and social destiny, and the continuous and inalienable owners of their national wealth. This is precisely what DirectDemocracyS provides, and which we develop in detail in the following sections.

PART II — THE DIRECTDEMOCRACYS SYSTEM: FOUNDING PRINCIPLES APPLIED IN BENIN

7. The fundamental rule: wealth and decision-making power remain, forever, with the people

DirectDemocracyS applies, without exception and in every country where it establishes itself, a single and non-negotiable rule: national wealth — land, natural resources, strategic infrastructure, public revenues, state debt and financial assets — as well as the power to decide how to use it, must remain permanently and exclusively in the hands of the people who produced it, and can never be ceded, mortgaged, transferred or alienated irreversibly by a government, administration, private company or foreign creditor, regardless of the economic arguments put forward.

Why this rule is vital for Benin today

Benin is now raising hundreds of millions of dollars on international markets—Eurobonds, and since January 2026, an $850 million sukuk, opening the door to investors from the Gulf and Asia. These operations commit the country for fifteen, twenty years or more. With DDS, no structural commitment of this magnitude could be made without micro-groups of the Beninese people, informed by the Economic and Financial Expert Group and by ddsAI, validating its purpose, amount, and counterparties. The State's technical expertise would remain fully utilized—but under a verifiable popular mandate, and not as a tacit and permanent delegation.

8. The DDS architecture: the fractal model of micro-groups (1 → 5 → 25 → 125 → 625)

The operational core of DDS is a fractal organizational model, simple to understand and impossible to capture from the top down. Each citizen joins a micro-group of 5 people—neighborhood, district, village, workplace, or shared affinity. Five micro-groups (25 people) form a second-level group, which elects a representative from among its members. Five second-level groups (125 people) form a third-level group, and so on (625, then beyond), until the entire national territory is covered—municipalities, departments, and then the whole country.

Each representative at each level is elected by the immediate base he represents, never by a central apparatus or a filtered sponsorship system as is the case today for presidential candidacies in Benin.
Each representative acts under an imperative mandate (see section 13): he transmits the decision of his base, he does not decide in its place.
The entire structure is transparent and verifiable by any member, at any time, via the ddsAI platforms.
No central authority can invalidate a citizen's membership in their micro-group, nor a representative's candidacy at a higher level, unlike the current sponsorship system used for Beninese electoral candidacies.

In concrete terms, for a country of 13.4 million inhabitants like Benin, this model makes it possible, in a few cycles of fractal structuring, to connect each citizen, wherever they live — including in the rural areas of the North and Centre which are currently the least politically represented — to an uninterrupted chain of decision-making going from the home to the national level, without ever depending on a party, an administration or a centralized national election which can be locked upstream.

9. The three-code identity system: security against manipulation, infiltration, and repression

Recent experience in Benin—the prosecution of journalists and opposition members for online publications, the use of digital code against political criticism—demonstrates that a poorly protected system of citizen participation exposes its members to direct reprisals. DDS addresses this risk with a three-code identity verification system designed to guarantee both the integrity of the vote (one citizen, one vote, no fraud, no bots, no foreign infiltration) and the genuine protection of each participant against identification and reprisals.

Code	Function	What it prevents
Civil Code of Identity	Verifies only once, using encrypted and irreversible data, that a real, legally adult individual participates	Duplicates, fake accounts, mass manipulation, organized foreign interference
Participation code	A pseudonymous identifier specific to each platform and each decision, separate from the visible civil identity	Identification of a critical citizen by a third party, an employer, or an exceptional judicial body
Security and recovery code	Allows the user alone to recover their account and report any attempted identity theft.	Digital identity theft, hacking, taking control of an account to vote or speak on behalf of others

This system is not a mere technical gimmick: it is the prerequisite for truly free participation in a country where, in 2025-2026, citizens and journalists were prosecuted for publicly criticizing the government. With DDS, a member of a small Beninese group can report local wrongdoing, vote on a group decision, or question an elected official without their identity being used for repressive purposes, while guaranteeing to the entire system that this vote truly belongs to a real citizen and counts only once.

10. ddsAI and allddsAI: neutral, independent, competent information and a democracy of artificial intelligence

10.1. ddsAI: the analysis tool at the service of each microgroup

ddsAI is the artificial intelligence infrastructure made available to every micro-group and every citizen to: neutrally and sourcedly synthesize a question under debate (for example: should we accept a new international bond issue, and under what conditions?); simulate the probable consequences of several options before the vote; verify the facts put forward by any stakeholder, governmental or not; and translate the technical issues (public finance, engineering, constitutional law, security) into language accessible to every citizen, without misleading simplification.

10.2. allddsAI: AI democracy as a safeguard against manipulation

Rather than relying on a single source to provide information to millions of citizens—whether state media, captured private media, or a single, controllable artificial intelligence—DDS organizes a plurality of independent AI instances, integrated as official members of the system with defined rights and responsibilities (the allddsAI project), which verify and contradict each other as needed. This organized plurality provides structural protection against media brainwashing and disinformation, whether it originates from within the country or from foreign powers seeking to influence a Beninese election or national decision.

Direct application to the Beninese context

In a landscape where the independent press is declining (89th to 92nd in RSF rankings) and where the space for critical expression is shrinking, allddsAI guarantees every micro-group in Benin — including in the rural areas of the North, affected by both jihadist insecurity and the remoteness of reliable information — continuous, neutral and verified access to information, regardless of the political color of the government in power or the pressure exerted on traditional media.

11. NTCO / PCNT: Non-transferable collective ownership

The NTCO (Non-Transferable Collective Ownership) principle places strategic national assets (fertile agricultural land, port infrastructure such as the Port of Cotonou, industrial zones such as the GDIZ, natural resources, tax revenues, and new sovereign debt) under a specific legal status: they belong collectively to the Beninese people as a whole, in perpetuity and inalienably. No government, administration, or international agreement can sell them, mortgage them permanently, or transfer them to a third party—whether a foreign private investor, a sovereign wealth fund, or a creditor obtaining collateral on these assets in case of default—without the direct and explicit consent of the micro-groups concerned, obtained through DDS voting mechanisms.

The PCNT (National Non-Transferable Collective Heritage) is the living and public register of all these assets, kept up to date and verifiable by any citizen via ddsAI: everyone can know, in real time, what the Beninese people collectively own, what has been derived from it (income from cotton, cashew, soybeans, port activities, new processing industries of the GDIZ), and how this income is reinvested in the country.

12. GUMI-SV: the guaranteed universal minimum income, linked to structured volunteering

GUMI-SV (Universal Guarantee of a Minimum Income, linked to Structured Voluntary Service) is the DDS direct redistribution mechanism. Funded by revenues from the national collective heritage (PCNT) and by a redesigned tax system under a popular mandate, it guarantees every Beninese citizen a minimum income in exchange for a modest and appropriate level of structured civic contribution (literacy, community health, reforestation, local civil protection, maintenance of local infrastructure, transmission of agricultural know-how). This mechanism is not passive social assistance: it is a reciprocal civic contract between each citizen and the national community, which transforms Benin's real macroeconomic growth—8.1% in 2025—into concrete, measurable, and immediate benefits for every household, and not just into national statistics favorable to rating agencies.

For Benin, where GDP per capita remains around $1,411 despite strong growth, GUMI-SV constitutes the direct structural response to the paradox identified in Part I: transforming real macroeconomic performance into purchasing power and economic security actually perceived by the population, including in rural agricultural areas which are now the most exposed to climatic hazards and variations in world prices of cotton, soybeans and cashew nuts.

13. The binding mandate and immediate revocability

Every elected representative at any level of the DDS fractal system—from a micro-group of five people to the national level—acts under an imperative mandate: they are obligated to faithfully convey the position of their constituents, and not to decide on their own behalf once elected, as is currently the case for members of the Beninese National Assembly elected for five years, or for a president now elected for seven years. This mandate is revocable at any time by the constituents who appointed them, through a swift, transparent, and verifiable procedure on the DDS platforms, without waiting for the next election.

Why this is crucial for Benin

The attempted coup of December 7, 2025, demonstrated the danger of a system where the only way to correct a power deemed illegitimate or overly concentrated is through armed force. With the imperative mandate and immediate recall, this need structurally disappears: any representative, including at the top of the DDS architecture, can be peacefully and immediately replaced by their constituents as soon as they cease to faithfully represent them. No coup is necessary when popular sanction is permanent, legal, and immediate.

14. The five specialist groups: expertise at the service of popular decision-making

So that direct democracy is never opposed to competence — a frequent and legitimate criticism leveled at overly simplistic participatory models — DDS organizes five permanent specialist groups, composed of recognized professionals and assisted by ddsAI/allddsAI, whose mission is exclusively consultative and explanatory: they inform the decision of the micro-groups, they never make it in their place.

Specialist group	Mission implemented in Benin
Economic and Financial Group	Independent analysis of each debt issue (eurobonds, sukuk), tax choices, and PCNT management; simulation of consequences before each popular vote.
Legal and Constitutional Group	Ensures compliance of DDS decisions with the law, prepares legal avenues for institutional recognition, documents rights violations (CRIET, prosecution of journalists) for the international pressure campaign.
Security, Defense and Resilience Group	Coordinates with micro-groups in the North and Central regions a response to the jihadist threat based on community intelligence and local cohesion, complementing — not replacing — national armed forces and regional cooperation.
Social, Health and Education Group	Leads the deployment of GUMI-SV, community medicine, literacy and vocational training, building on the progress already achieved (infant mortality down 25%) to amplify and make it irreversible.
Technology and Information Group (ddsAI/allddsAI)	Maintains the digital infrastructure, the security of the three identity codes, the neutrality of information, and the system's resistance to attempts at censorship or access cut-off.

15. How DDS empowers the people of Benin: a peaceful, legal method without direct confrontation

DDS does not need to win a national election rigged by a sponsorship system, nor to overthrow a government, to begin giving the people of Benin real, immediate, and verifiable decision-making power. Our method, already applied in countries with one-party regimes, without free elections, or with structurally blocked opposition, is based on building a parallel, legal, and voluntary system that does not directly challenge any institution.

Organization by strictly voluntary membership: no one is forced to join a DDS micro-group, which places this activity outside the scope of the criminal qualification of conspiracy or rebellion used by the CRIET against opponents.
Total decentralization: there is no single leader whose arrest could decapitate the movement, unlike a classic party structured around a charismatic leader.
Protection by the three-code system: no member is publicly exposed as an opponent simply because he participates in his local micro-group.
Resilient digital infrastructure hosted beyond the reach of a single national shutdown or censorship, ensuring system continuity even in the event of pressure on local operators.
Exclusively constructive and non-violent purpose: local mutual aid, shared management of community resources, training, neutral information — activities that even a restrictive legal framework has great difficulty prohibiting outright without publicly discrediting itself.
Mobilization of the Beninese diaspora and the international DDS network, via the role of the humanist leader and international media and bureaucratic pressure, to document, publicize and protect the expansion of the movement.

As the number of micro-groups grows and federates according to the fractal model (Section 8), DDS acquires legitimacy through sheer numbers and concrete evidence of the benefits it provides locally (dispute resolution, mutual aid, access to reliable information, initial effects of GUMI-SV funded by voluntary contributions during the pilot phase), rather than through confrontation. This accumulated legitimacy ultimately becomes leverage for peaceful negotiation toward institutional recognition of the system—popular referendum, constitutional integration, or gradual recognition by local and then national authorities—without any stage of the process requiring violence, illegal clandestinity, or armed confrontation with the state.

DDS Commitment to Benin

We will respect and protect in all circumstances the traditions, cultures, languages (Fon, Yoruba, Bariba, Dendi, Fulfulde, and all other national and local languages), religions (Vodun, Christianity, Islam, and all beliefs present in Benin), political opposition of all stripes, and all minorities in the country. DDS imposes no ideology: it establishes a neutral mechanism that allows each Beninese community, in its diversity, to decide its own future.

PART III — DETAILED PROGRAM FOR BENIN

This section translates the DDS principles outlined in Part II into concrete, sequenced and measurable measures, designed specifically for the Beninese situation described in Part I. Each measure is accompanied by a concrete application example and the expected consequences, both positive and points of vigilance, in accordance with our requirement for realism.

16. Political and institutional program

16.1. Immediate deployment of micro-groups, without waiting for official recognition

From the launch phase, DDS organizes the first micro-groups of 5 volunteer Beninese citizens in each commune of the country's twelve departments, prioritizing areas where current political representation is weakest: the northern departments (Alibori, Atacora, Borgou, Donga), particularly affected by both relative political exclusion and jihadist insecurity, as well as in major urban centers (Cotonou, Porto-Novo, Parakou, Abomey-Calavi) and within the Beninese diaspora (France, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Togo, Ghana).

Concrete example: a micro-group of five female traders from the Dantokpa market in Cotonou uses ddsAI to document and report, via imperative mandate, a difficulty in accessing local credit — without depending on a party or exposing themselves individually.
Expected consequence: in twelve to eighteen months, an initial network of several thousand micro-groups federated by municipality, forming the first layer of the national fractal structure (Section 8).

16.2. Systematic documentation and international pressure campaign

The DDS Legal and Constitutional Group documents, with verifiable evidence, the violations of political pluralism observed in Part I (invalidations of candidacies, CRIET prosecutions of journalists and opposition members, restrictions on demonstrations) and transmits them to the relevant bodies—the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, ECOWAS, international press freedom organizations, and Benin's bilateral partners. This bureaucratic and media pressure campaign, coordinated by the leading figures of the DDS network, never aims to overthrow the government, but rather to create a growing reputational and diplomatic cost for any further restriction of civic space.

16.3. Proposed reform of the electoral system, to be introduced by referendum

Current element	DDS Proposal	Expected consequence
Sponsorship system that filters presidential candidacies	Validation of candidacies based on a threshold of verified citizen signatures via micro-groups, without the discretionary power of a single authority.	End of the structural exclusion of the organized opposition; real pluralism in the first round
A seven-year presidential term without the possibility of recall	Mandate subject to a mechanism of popular recall at mid-term based on a threshold of verified signatures.	The executive branch remains accountable to the people, without waiting for the deadline.
CRIET used for broad criminal classifications against critical expression	Strict separation of powers: the CRIET refocused on economic crime and proven terrorism, independent oversight of prosecutions targeting journalists and opponents	End of the judicial manipulation of legitimate political criticism

DDS recognizes a fundamental limitation of realism: these institutional reforms cannot be imposed from the outside or by force. They become legitimate objectives for political negotiation as the DDS micro-group system demonstrates, through its scale and concrete usefulness, that it represents a significant and organized segment of the Beninese people.

17. Economic program

17.1. Diversify beyond raw cotton, soybeans and cashew nuts

The current structure of Benin's exports—cotton (49%), soybeans (12.5%), and cashew nuts (11%), the vast majority of which are unprocessed—exposes the country to global price cycles and captures a small share of the added value locally. DDS, acting on behalf of small-scale agricultural groups and with the support of the Economic and Financial Group, proposes an accelerated local processing plan based on the existing infrastructure of the Glo-Djigbé Industrial Zone (GDIZ). While the development of the GLO-Djigbé Industrial Zone has been praised by international institutions, its benefits must be made directly traceable and redistributed through the PCNT (National Processing and Transformation Program).

Concrete example: a group of cotton cooperatives from Borgou and Atacora, federated into DDS micro-groups, collectively negotiate, with the support of the Economic Group, a local processing contract guaranteeing that at least 40% of the cotton produced in their area is spun or woven before export, rather than exported raw.
Expected consequence: gradual increase in the share of local added value captured by the producers themselves rather than solely by intermediaries and export markets; reduction of vulnerability to international price shocks.

17.2. Public and popular traceability of growth

Each quarter, the DDS Economic and Financial Group publishes, via ddsAI, a dashboard accessible to all citizens linking official macroeconomic statistics (growth, inflation, export revenues) to their concrete translation in the PCNT and in the financing of GUMI-SV, so that the growth of 8.1% recorded in 2025 ceases to be an abstract figure and becomes a verifiable indicator of direct popular benefit.

18. Financial Program

18.1. Popular validation of any new sovereign debt commitment

In accordance with the NTCO principle (Section 11), any new sovereign debt issue of structural magnitude — such as the $850 million sukuk raised in January 2026 or future eurobond issues — would be subject, under the fully deployed DDS system, to a simplified public consultation of federated micro-groups at the national level, informed by an independent and public analysis by the Economic and Financial Group covering: the precise purpose of the financing, its real cost (rate, maturity, guarantees), and the assets or revenues possibly allocated as collateral.

Point of realism

DDS does not claim that this consultation would immediately replace the current executive decision-making process: as long as the system is not institutionally recognized, this popular validation functions first as a counter-power of information and public pressure — making visible and debatable choices that are currently made without direct consultation — before eventually becoming, through the referendum method proposed in Section 16.3, a formal legal condition.

18.2. Taxation and management of the Non-Transferable National Collective Assets (PCNT)

The PCNT register records and publishes, asset by asset, the revenues derived from the autonomous port of Cotonou, the activities of the GDIZ (General Directorate of Investment and Development), customs revenues on cotton, soybeans, and cashew nuts, as well as any public participation in strategic enterprises. A portion of these revenues, determined by popular vote, directly funds the GUMI-SV fund (Section 12), creating a direct, traceable, and inviolable link between national economic performance and the guaranteed minimum income for every citizen.

19. Social Programme

19.1. Deployment of GUMI-SV

The deployment of GUMI-SV in Benin follows a progressive and realistic logic, starting with a pilot phase in a limited number of volunteer communes before generalization, in order to calibrate the amount of the minimum income and the nature of the structured civic contributions expected in return, in line with the actual capacities of the PCNT and without promising an amount that could not be financed sustainably.

Concrete example: in a pilot commune in the Zou department, the GUMI-SV minimum income is paid in exchange for a monthly contribution of a few hours to adult literacy or the maintenance of rural roads, activities identified as priorities by the local micro-groups themselves.
Expected consequence: securing the income of households most exposed to agricultural price fluctuations, without creating passive dependency, and measurably strengthening local civic ties.

19.2. Health, education and consolidation of progress already achieved

Benin has reduced its infant mortality rate by 25% in a decade—real progress that DDS intends to consolidate and accelerate, not replace. The DDS Social, Health and Education Group works at the micro-group level to identify, village by village, the remaining barriers to accessing healthcare and education (distance, indirect costs, staff availability), and reports this data, via a binding mandate, to higher levels of decision-making, drawing on the community health expertise already developed in the country.

20. Security: a DDS response to the jihadist threat in the North

DDS does not propose in any way to replace the Beninese armed forces or regional cooperation in the direct fight against the jihadist armed groups active since January 2025 in the north of the country. Our role is complementary and structural: to address the risk, identified by specialized analysts, that an exclusively militarized and repressive response—without genuine political representation of the populations of the North and Center, historically rebellious areas—will fuel a cycle of vendettas and weaken cooperation between the population and security forces.

A network of micro-groups in the border villages of Atacora, Alibori and Donga, giving each community a direct channel, secured by the three identity codes, to report a threat, a suspicious movement, or on the contrary an abuse committed by a security force, without fear of reprisals from either side.
Coordination of the Security, Defence and Resilience Group with legitimate local and national authorities, as a provider of verified and neutral community information, never as a parallel armed militia — DDS categorically excludes any violent or paramilitary action.
Reconciliation and real political representation component for the North and the Centre, in order to address the political cause of regional vulnerability identified in Part I, in parallel with the security response.

The expected consequence is a gradual improvement in trust between northern communities and security forces, and a reduction of the local recruitment ground for armed groups, without any step in this process requiring a military capability of its own for DDS — which, in principle, will never have one.

21. Protection of traditions, cultures, languages, religions, opposition groups and minorities

DDS formally commits, for Benin as for any country where the system is implemented, never to impose a single cultural, religious, or linguistic model. Benin is a country of remarkable diversity—the historical cradle of Vodun, home to ancient Christian and Muslim communities, a mosaic of national languages (Fon, Yoruba, Bariba, Dendi, Fulfulde, and many others)—and this diversity is an asset that DDS structurally protects rather than standardizes.

Each microgroup can conduct its deliberations in the language of its choice, with neutral translation provided by ddsAI to the other levels of the system.
No DDS decision can restrict a lawful religious or traditional practice; specialist groups have no doctrinal or religious authority.
Political opposition of all stripes — including formations currently prevented from competing, such as The Democrats — is not only tolerated but actively protected within the DDS system: an opponent has, in his micro-group, exactly the same rights and the same voice as a supporter of the power in place.
Ethnic, religious or regional minorities benefit from guaranteed representation by design: the fractal model gives an equivalent voice to each micro-group of 5 people, regardless of their location or identity, breaking with the threshold effects of the current electoral system (national threshold of 10%) which structurally disadvantage small formations.

22. Phased Implementation Plan

Phase	Horizon	Main content
Phase 1 — Priming	Months 1 to 6	Formation of the first voluntary micro-groups in the 12 departments and within the diaspora; deployment of the ddsAI platforms and the three-code system; launch of legal documentation (Legal Group) on the state of public freedoms.
Phase 2 — Networking and federation	Months 6 to 18	Federation of micro-groups according to the fractal model (25, 125, 625...); first local pilot projects (mutual aid, PCNT traceability, neutral information); launch of the international bureaucratic and media pressure campaign.
Phase 3 — Sector-specific pilots	Months 18 to 36	Launch of GUMI-SV in pilot phase in volunteer communes; first local processing agreements for cotton/cashew/soybeans negotiated by micro-agricultural groups; community security network in the North.
Phase 4 — Institutional Recognition	Beyond 36 months, depending on the actual political pace	Peaceful negotiation for the legal recognition of the system (referendum, constitutional integration or progressive local recognition), based on the legitimacy acquired by numbers and demonstrated concrete results.

This timeline is indicative and intentionally cautious: DDS never promises a political transformation schedule it cannot meet. The actual pace of Phase 4 depends on factors beyond DDS's control—evolution of the Beninese political context, the opening or closing of civic space, and effective international pressure.

23. Expected consequences and indicators of success

Indicator	Current situation (reference Part I)	DDS target in 3 years
Number of citizens organized into active micro-groups	0 (non-existent system)	Several hundred thousand federated members, covering all 12 departments
Percentage of the rural population in the North with a direct and secure information feedback channel	Very low	Active network in the border areas of Atacora, Alibori and Donga
Transparency of the PCNT (port revenues, GDIZ revenues, agricultural sector revenues)	Information is scattered and not centralized for the citizen.	Quarterly public dashboard accessible to all citizens via ddsAI
Households receiving a minimum income under the GUMI-SV scheme	0	Operational pilot municipalities, progressive expansion depending on PCNT resources
Documented cases of restrictions on public freedoms transmitted to international bodies	Documentation primarily provided by international NGOs (Amnesty International, RSF)	Continuous and systematic documentation by the DDS Legal Group, fueling international bureaucratic pressure

DDS fully acknowledges that several of these objectives do not depend solely on our actions: final institutional recognition (Phase 4) will depend on the evolution of the political context in Benin itself. However, Phases 1 through 3—organization, information, economic support, community security, and guaranteed first income—are entirely achievable through voluntary participation, without requiring any prior government authorization.

24. Conclusion

Benin in 2026 is neither a failed state nor a fully democratic one. It is a country with real and recognized economic growth, led by a competent technocratic elite, but whose power structure has become so entrenched that only one serious candidate was able to run in the last presidential election, an exceptional court was mobilized against journalists, and an attempted coup erupted due to the lack of peaceful channels for reforming power. DirectDemocracyS does not offer yet another promise in a political landscape already saturated with promises: we offer an architecture—fractal, verifiable, protected, and founded on a single, non-negotiable rule: that wealth and decision-making power belong forever and exclusively to the Beninese people themselves.

This architecture requires neither uprising, nor confrontation, nor passive waiting for a rigged election from the people of Benin. It only requires voluntary adherence, micro-group by micro-group, to a system that, from day one, gives real, immediate, secure, and verifiable power to every citizen—with absolute respect for their traditions, language, religion, and political choices.