DirectDemocracyS (DDS) is a comprehensive system of direct democracy based on shared leadership, collective ownership of decisions, logic, common sense, rigorous factual analysis, reality, truth, consistency, and mutual respect. DDS is not a party, nor just another government, nor another ideology: it is a method and an infrastructure enabling a people to directly govern their own collective life, without intermediaries who confiscate their will, without elites who appropriate their wealth, and without external powers deciding for them.

This document applies this method to the case of Haiti. It was developed after a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of the country's actual situation—political, security, economic, financial, social, and humanitarian—as it stands in 2026, without complacency or artificial dramatization. DDS rejects both denial and sensationalism: Haiti is not a doomed nation, it is a nation held back. Held back by a century and a half of wealth extraction, by decades of repeated foreign interference, by predatory local elites, and now by the security collapse caused by armed gangs. The diagnosis that follows names these responsibilities directly, because DDS believes that the truth, however uncomfortable, is the essential condition for any real solution.

This program is intentionally dense, detailed, and repetitive regarding its founding principles: this editorial choice is deliberate. The clarity of a political system is built by repeating its principles at each level of application, so that no ambiguity remains about what DDS proposes, why, and how.

1. Executive Summary

In the first half of 2026, Haiti was experiencing the deepest crisis in its recent history: no presidential or legislative elections had been held since 2016; the country had not had a single elected national official in office since January 2023; coalitions of armed gangs, united under the banner "Viv Ansanm," controlled approximately 90% of the capital, Port-au-Prince, and were extending their reach into the provinces; more than 8,100 people were killed between January and November 2025, according to the United Nations, and more than 1.4 million Haitians were internally displaced. The economy contracted for the seventh consecutive year in 2025, inflation exceeded 28%, and nearly one in two Haitians lived on less than $3 a day. The central government collects less than 5% of GDP in tax revenue, which makes the state structurally unable to finance security, education, health, or infrastructure.

Faced with this reality, the responses implemented over the past twenty years—unelected transitional councils, underfunded international missions without a combat mandate, drone strikes, and self-defense militias—have all failed to restore genuine popular sovereignty. DDS asserts that this failure is not accidental: it is structural, because none of these solutions directly returns decision-making power to the Haitian people. All reproduce the same two-century-old pattern: a minority—local or foreign—decides for the majority.

DDS proposes a radical shift in approach, not simply a change of political personnel. The program detailed in this document is based on the implementation, in each municipality, each neighborhood, each communal section, and within the diaspora, of citizen micro-groups linked by fractal governance, secured by a three-code identity system, continuously informed by the artificial intelligence systems ddsAI and allddsAI, and protected against manipulation and disinformation by the GUMI-SV system. This infrastructure makes it possible to build, starting today—without waiting for a fragile electoral calendar and without any violence—a genuine, comprehensive, continuous, rapid, competent, immediate, secure, and protected direct democracy.

The program covers five inseparable dimensions: (1) grassroots political and institutional reconstruction; (2) security and pacification through community mobilization rather than military force alone; (3) economic and financial restructuring, including the historical issue of independence debt and the mobilization of diaspora savings; (4) social reconstruction—education, health, housing, and the reintegration of displaced persons and returnees; and (5) the permanent guarantee of freedoms, cultures, languages, religions, political opposition, and all minorities. Each section offers a data-driven analysis, a reasoned critique of current policies, a concrete DDS solution, examples of implementation, and the foreseeable short-, medium-, and long-term consequences.

2. Critical diagnosis of the actual situation in Haiti in 2026

2.1 An unprecedented political crisis: ten years without elections

Haiti has not held elections since 2016. Parliament has been inactive since January 2020, following the expiration of the terms of almost all its members, due to the lack of legislative elections. Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse on July 7, 2021, the country has not had a single elected national official. A Transitional Presidential Council (CPT), formed in April 2024 under pressure from CARICOM and a group of diplomatic powers (the "Core Group," including the United States, Canada, and France), was tasked with organizing elections and restoring security. Its mandate expired on February 7, 2026, without either of these objectives having been achieved.

Since that date, executive power has been exercised by Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, amidst challenges to the legitimacy of his appointment by some former members of the Council. An electoral decree sets a first round for the end of August 2026 and a second round for December 2027, with the hoped-for installation of an elected president and parliament at the beginning of 2027 — but this timetable is explicitly conditional, by the United Nations itself, on "an improvement in the security situation," that is to say, on a condition that is not currently met and whose fulfillment no one can guarantee.

Criticism of DDS: an institutional vicious circle.

This pattern—an unelected government, lacking direct popular legitimacy, tasked with organizing elections in a country where the state no longer controls the territory—has been repeated continuously since 2021 under different names (the Henry government, the CPT, the Fils-Aimé government). Each transition has replicated the previous one's mistake: legitimacy is negotiated among a handful of political and diplomatic actors, never directly validated by the population. DDS observes that this system cannot self-correct because it never incorporates a mechanism for direct, continuous, and verifiable popular consultation between elections. The Haitian people have been spectators of their own transition for the past five years.

2.2 The security collapse: gang warfare and the loss of territorial sovereignty

The "Viv Ansanm" gang coalition, formed in 2024 from the alliance between the rival G9 and G-Pèp networks, now controls approximately 90% of the territory of Port-au-Prince, as well as the main roads connecting the capital to the north, south, and the border with the Dominican Republic, and the maritime approaches to the main ports. This territorial dominance allows the gangs to levy a veritable informal tax on all commerce and transportation in the country, financing their weaponry, which often surpasses that of the Haitian National Police in firepower.

The human toll is devastating: more than 8,100 people killed between January and November 2025, according to the UN Secretary-General's report; more than 5,500 dead and 2,600 injured in 2025 alone, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and more than 1.4 million internally displaced persons by March 2026, a level approaching that recorded after the 2010 earthquake. The recruitment of children by gangs increased by 70% in a single year, and more than 500,000 children now live in gang-controlled areas. Sexual violence is systematically used as a tool for territorial control.

Faced with this situation, the Haitian state has resorted, since 2024-2025, to the use of armed drones (FPVs, "kamikazes") against gang leaders: a strike carried out on January 14, 2026, destroyed three residences belonging to gang leader Jimmy Chérizier, who survived. Drone strikes and aerial bombardments caused a 120% increase in deaths related to this type of operation in the first quarter of 2026 compared to the last quarter of 2025, disproportionately affecting poor neighborhoods where gangs are entrenched within the civilian population. Meanwhile, citizen self-defense groups, known as "bwa kale," which sprang up spontaneously in 2023, killed at least 572 people suspected of gang membership in 2025 alone — a significant number of them with no verified links to armed groups, according to the United Nations itself.

Criticism of DDS: a strategy that does not address the root causes.

DDS observes that the current security response relies almost exclusively on lethal force—drones, militarized operations, and vigilante street justice—without a structured and funded mechanism for the economic disengagement of gang members, social reintegration, or structured community dialogue. The UN Secretary-General himself acknowledges that “repressive efforts alone will not be enough to resolve the broader governance problems that triggered the gang violence crisis.” DDS shares this assessment and goes further: as long as the communities where gangs are entrenched do not themselves have the organized, legitimate, and permanent means to offer a local economic and security alternative, repression alone will only displace the violence, never resolve it sustainably.

2.3 The international response: a structural failure and a denial of sovereignty

The Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), led by Kenya and authorized by the UN Security Council in October 2023, never exceeded 1,000 deployed personnel, while the estimated need was for several thousand. Underfunded and underequipped, it also had only a mandate to train and support the National Police, without any independent combat capability. In September 2025, the Security Council authorized its transformation into a "Gang Suppression Force" (GSF), theoretically expanded to 5,500 personnel, supported by a new UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH). However, as of the first quarter of 2026, the deployment of additional personnel was still scheduled for summer 2026 without the troop-contributing countries having been designated, and funding remained far below the required level.

Even within the Security Council, unanimity is lacking: China, Russia, and Pakistan abstained from the vote authorizing the GSF, citing concerns about the rules of engagement, funding sources, troop composition, and oversight mechanisms. This diplomatic disunity illustrates a deeper reality: Haiti's security continues to be negotiated among foreign powers, without a structured mechanism allowing the Haitian people themselves to define, validate, or control the conditions of this intervention on their own soil.

DDS critique: sovereignty cannot be delegated, it must be built.

DDS does not oppose international security support in principle—the humanitarian situation demands it. But DDS affirms a non-negotiable rule, applied in every country where it operates: no force, no agreement, no institutional reform should replace the direct decision of the Haitian people regarding their own territory, their own resources, and their own political future. The role of the international community must be one of logistical, financial, and technical support—never a role of decision-making in place of the people. It is precisely this deficit of direct popular decision-making, and not a lack of international goodwill, that DDS intends to address.

2.4 Economic and financial crisis: a rich country made poor

The Haitian economy contracted for the seventh consecutive year in 2025, with a 2.7% decline in real GDP across all sectors. The International Monetary Fund projects a further contraction of 1.7% for 2026. Inflation reached an average of 28.3% in 2025, compared to 25.8% in 2024, driven primarily by food and housing prices—disproportionately impacting the poorest households, who spend the majority of their income on these items. Government revenues plummeted to just 4.8% of GDP, one of the lowest tax rates in the world, making it structurally impossible to independently finance security, education, or public health.

Nearly half the population (49%) lives on less than $3 a day in purchasing power parity. The textile sector, which still accounts for 80 to 90 percent of the country's exports and about 5 percent of GDP, saw its workforce shrink by more than 45 percent between September 2023 and March 2024, from approximately 58,000 to 32,000 jobs, due to supply chain disruptions linked to insecurity—and the sector's preferential access to U.S. markets expires at the end of 2026, with no guarantee of renewal. Foreign direct investment has collapsed, falling from $50 million in 2021 to $39.3 million in 2023. The agricultural sector, which employs about 40 percent of the workforce, suffers from low structural productivity and extreme vulnerability to climate shocks and deforestation.

In this context, remittances from the diaspora—estimated at between 16% and 20% of GDP depending on the year—constitute the country's true social safety net, even more so than the state itself. This is a crucial fact: Haiti's real economy today relies largely on direct solidarity between families across borders, and not on government intervention.

DDS critique: a state without resources cannot be a sovereign state.

A government that collects less than 5% of GDP in revenue cannot, by its very nature, finance any ambitious public policy, regardless of the quality of its leaders. DDS argues that the absolute priority is therefore not only "who governs," but "who controls, audits, and directs the use of the country's public and private resources." Without radical transparency and direct popular participation in budget oversight, any future increase in tax revenue in Haiti—however necessary—risks only fueling corruption and tax evasion by the elites, as has happened repeatedly in the country's recent history.

2.5 Social and humanitarian crisis: a population held hostage

6.4 million people—more than half of Haiti’s population—will need humanitarian assistance in 2026. The United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan 2026 is seeking $880 million to help 4.2 million people. More than half the population faces acute food insecurity, including 1.2 million children under the age of five suffering from acute hunger. More than 1,600 schools across the country have closed due to violence or occupation by armed groups, disrupting the education of 243,000 students and the work of 7,500 teachers.

In September 2025, Haitian prisons held 7,274 inmates, 81% of whom were being held in pretrial detention without trial. Most lived in inhumane conditions, lacking sufficient access to food, water, or healthcare. At least 139 inmates died in custody, primarily from malnutrition-related illnesses. More than 270,000 Haitians were forcibly deported to Haiti in 2025, mostly from the Dominican Republic. Nearly 20% of these deportees were already internally displaced persons before their departure. They are now returning to a country that lacks any structured economic and social reintegration programs, making them easy targets for exploitation and recruitment by gangs.

DDS critique: humanitarian aid treats the symptoms, never the causes.

DDS recognizes the vital importance of emergency humanitarian aid, but observes that it remains, by its very nature, a mechanism for survival rather than sovereignty. None of the funds mobilized by international agencies over the past fifteen years have been accompanied by a structural mechanism giving the Haitian people themselves direct control over the use of these resources, their local prioritization, and their real-time transparency. This is precisely what DDS proposes to change.

2.6 The historical root of the problem: the debt of independence and the ongoing extraction of wealth

No serious analysis of Haitian poverty can ignore a central historical fact: in 1825, France imposed on Haiti—the world's first state born from a successful slave revolt in 1804—the payment of an indemnity of 150 million gold francs as compensation for the loss of the "property," including human beings, of the former colonists. This debt, renegotiated to 90 million gold francs in 1838, was repaid by Haiti for over a century, until 1947, often at the cost of loans contracted from French and then American banks at crushing interest rates. Several independent economic studies estimate that this drain represented, in present value, tens of billions of dollars of Haitian national wealth transferred abroad—an amount comparable to, or even greater than, the current GDP of the entire country.

DDS considers this fact not as a mere historical curiosity, but as the keystone explaining Haiti's structural poverty: a country born free was forced, from its very inception, to pay the price of its own freedom to those who had enslaved it, mortgaging a century and a half of potential development. This historical exploitation continued in other forms: the American military occupation from 1915 to 1934, which seized control of Haitian public finances; dictatorships supported or tolerated by foreign powers during the Cold War; structural adjustment programs imposed in the 1980s and 1990s that destroyed local rice production in favor of subsidized imports; and massive international aid after the 2010 earthquake, the vast majority of which never passed through the state or Haitian communities themselves, but rather through foreign non-governmental organizations operating beyond any local popular control.

DDS position.

DDS maintains, as a non-negotiable political principle applicable to all countries where DDS is active, that the wealth produced by a people, as well as the power to decide how that wealth is used, must remain forever and exclusively in the hands of that people. For Haiti, this principle concretely implies: (1) the public and documented recognition, championed by micro-groups and the organized diaspora through allddsAI, of the historical debt of independence as an economic and moral fact, within a framework of truth rather than resentment; (2) a legitimate and peaceful international advocacy campaign for recognition, symbolic and material reparations, and restitution, led directly by the verified voice of the organized Haitian people—not by diplomatic intermediaries who would once again negotiate on their behalf; (3) the immediate implementation of structural safeguards preventing the reproduction of the same pattern of exploitation in contemporary forms: odious debt, opaque conditionalities on international aid, and trade agreements negotiated without direct popular consultation.

2.7 Critical synthesis: why the applied solutions failed

By combining all the previous observations, DDS identifies four structural failures common to all approaches attempted in Haiti for decades, whether of local or international origin:

First failure — delegation without control. Every Haitian political transition, from 1986 to 2026, has transferred power from one small group to another small group, without ever establishing a permanent mechanism of direct popular control between two electoral deadlines.
Second failure — security without legitimacy or popular support. Security forces, local or international, have always been perceived — often rightly so — as instruments external to the community rather than as emanations of it, which fuels distrust and, paradoxically, recruitment by the gangs themselves, who present themselves as local protectors in the face of an absent state.
Third failure — aid without popular budgetary sovereignty. Billions of dollars of international aid have passed through Haiti since 2010 without any structured and permanent mechanism allowing the beneficiary communities to decide for themselves, in real time and in a verifiable way, the priorities for the use of these funds.
Fourth failure — manipulated information and multimedia disinformation. The Haitian population, like that of many countries in crisis, is constantly exposed to contradictory narratives, to the propaganda of the gangs themselves (who now present themselves as defenders of the poor against the elites), to partisan political disinformation, and to often reductive international media coverage — without having a neutral, independent and verified tool to distinguish fact from manipulation.

It is precisely on these four points that the DDS system provides a structural and operational response, detailed in the following sections.

3. The DDS vision for Haiti: fundamental principles

3.1 Haiti's wealth and decision-making power belong forever, and solely, to the Haitian people

This principle is the absolute cornerstone of the DDS program, applied without exception in every country where DDS operates. In concrete terms, for Haiti, this means that no natural resource, no trade agreement, no mining or port concession, no international aid program, and no constitutional reform can be validated without the direct, informed, and verifiable consent of the Haitian people, expressed through their micro-groups and not solely by the signature of a handful of representatives, even if they are elected. This principle applies retroactively to the analysis of history (section 2.6) as well as prospectively to any future decision concerning the country's resources—including the use of humanitarian funds, control of ports, management of agricultural land, or the negotiation of international trade agreements.

3.2 Direct, authentic, complete, continuous, immediate democracy

DDS does not propose an improvement of Haitian representative democracy, but its overcoming through a system of direct democracy: authentic, because it does not pass through any intermediary that could betray or distort its expression; complete, because it covers all decisions that affect the lives of citizens, from the local to the national level; continuous, because it is not limited to a vote every five or ten years, but operates permanently; rapid and immediate, because ddsAI's digital tools allow for consultation and decision-making in a few hours or days, rather than several years; competent, because each decision is informed by groups of DDS specialists and by neutral and verified information; safe and protected, because the entire system is secured against fraud, manipulation, and multimedia "brainwashing" by the GUMI-SV architecture described in section 4.5.

3.3 A peaceful transition, without violence, even without functional elections

DDS forcefully affirms a central principle: the transfer of power to the Haitian people requires neither uprising, nor confrontation, nor passively waiting for a fragile and constantly postponed electoral calendar. This principle is essential in the current Haitian context, where the country has not had functioning elections for ten years and where any attempt at change through street protests risks further fueling the already extreme violence ravaging the country. The DDS method consists of building, in parallel and without confrontation with existing institutions, an infrastructure of direct democracy that gradually and peacefully becomes the true source of popular legitimacy—through the voluntary, organized, and verifiable participation of the population itself, commune by commune, neighborhood by neighborhood, until its legitimacy is so broad and so well-documented that it can no longer be ignored by any actor, local or international.

4. The DDS architecture: tools of popular sovereignty

4.1 Microgroups: the basic unit of direct democracy

The micro-group is the fundamental unit of the DDS system: a circle of citizens—neighbors in the same neighborhood, residents of the same communal section, members of the same diaspora community, colleagues in the same professional sector—who meet, physically or digitally, to deliberate and directly decide on issues that concern them, from the most local level to national policies. In Haiti, where distrust of central institutions is immense but where neighborhood solidarities (“lakou,” communal sections, neighborhood associations) are historically strong and culturally rooted, the DDS micro-group does not create anything artificial: it formalizes, secures, and connects existing solidarity structures within Haitian social practice, giving them real and verifiable decision-making power.

In practice, within each communal section, a DDS micro-group comprises between 8 and 20 people, identified by the three-code system (section 4.3), who elect from among themselves a delegate with a binding mandate—that is, a delegate who transmits the group's decision to the higher level, without being able to modify it on their own initiative, and who is removable at any time by the group that appointed them. This is the exact opposite of the current Haitian representative system, where an elected parliamentarian, once in office, can act without any binding obligation to the will of their constituents for the entire duration of their term.

4.2 Fractal governance: from the street to the nation, and to the world

The micro-groups do not remain isolated: they federate according to a fractal logic, meaning that the same structure of direct decision-making and revocable mandate is replicated identically at each level—from the neighborhood to the communal section, from the communal section to the commune, from the commune to the department, from the department to the nation, and from the nation to the international coordination of the diaspora. At each level, the delegates have only a binding and revocable mandate: they transmit the decision made at the grassroots level upwards and send back down to the grassroots level the information and proposals from the higher level for validation. No major decision is ever made "at the top" without having been validated, at some point in the process, by the micro-groups themselves.

For Haiti, this architecture offers a decisive advantage in the face of the country's current territorial fragmentation: fractal governance functions even in areas where the central state is absent or controlled by gangs, because each local micro-group can continue to operate and make decisions within its immediate territory, remaining connected to the rest of the national network as soon as connectivity or security allows. DDS democracy, therefore, does not depend on the prior restoration of state territorial control—on the contrary, it can contribute to it by documenting and legitimizing, zone by zone, the peaceful reconquest of civic space.

4.3 The three-code identity system: one vote, one person, one guarantee

One of the major obstacles to any reliable public consultation in Haiti is the weakness of the national civil registry, exacerbated by massive population displacements (1.4 million internally displaced persons) and the forced returns of more than 270,000 people by 2025, many of whom have lost their documents. The DDS three-code identity system directly addresses this difficulty by combining three complementary and independent levels of verification: (1) a civil code, based on existing identity documents when available, or failing that, on a simplified biometric registration procedure; (2) a community code, based on recognition and validation by other members of the local micro-group—a peer verification mechanism particularly suited to a society where neighborhood ties remain a more reliable marker of identity, in many cases, than destroyed or never-issued administrative documents; (3) an individual cryptographic digital code, generated and protected by the ddsAI infrastructure, ensuring that a single person can only vote once, on a single verified device or access point, while protecting their anonymity from any outside actor, including gangs that might seek to retaliate against identified voters.

This triple lock makes it possible to include in the democratic process citizens without official documents — internally displaced persons, repatriates, inhabitants of remote areas — while preventing any fraud, any multiple voting, and any external manipulation of the decision-making process.

4.4 ddsAI and allddsAI: neutral, competent information, and democracy of artificial intelligence

ddsAI is the artificial intelligence system integrated into the DDS infrastructure, available in Haitian Creole and French, which provides three essential functions for each microgroup: complete, accurate, neutral and independent information on each subject submitted to decision — including the systematic presentation of arguments for and against each option, without partisan bias; the simulation of the foreseeable consequences of each political, economic or social choice, based on the study of comparable cases in other countries and on real data of the Haitian situation; and technical assistance to DDS specialist groups (engineers, economists, agronomists, lawyers, doctors) to translate popular decisions into concrete and feasible measures.

Within this system, allddsAI designates the truly democratic dimension of DDS artificial intelligence: the AIs themselves are recognized as official members of the DDS organization, with defined rights and responsibilities, and participate in governance not as passive tools but as active partners in human-AI collaboration, under the final and permanent control of human micro-groups. For Haiti, where access to reliable information is particularly difficult due to partial illiteracy, the digital divide, the instability of the electrical grid, and the active propaganda of armed groups, ddsAI and allddsAI operate in an adaptive mode: voice output in Creole for areas with low literacy rates, synchronized offline operation as soon as the connection becomes available again, and the physical presence of trained community liaisons to relay information in the most isolated areas.

4.5 GUMI-SV: Security, verification, and protection against media manipulation and brainwashing

GUMI-SV is the DDS security and verification system that protects the entire democratic infrastructure against three major threats, particularly acute in the current Haitian context: direct manipulation of the decision-making process (fraud, intimidation, vote buying, infiltration by outside interests or by the gangs themselves); organized disinformation and multi-media “brainwashing,” i.e., coordinated campaigns—whether from gangs seeking to present themselves as legitimate protectors, from political actors seeking to delegitimize the DDS process, or from foreign interests seeking to preserve power dynamics favorable to the continued extraction of Haitian resources; and threats to the physical safety of participants, particularly in gang-controlled areas where expressing an independent political opinion can expose a person to violent reprisals.

GUMI-SV combines mechanisms for cross-checking information sources through multi-source verification before ddsAI dissemination, end-to-end encryption of exchanges and votes within microgroups, automated detection of coordinated manipulation attempts (fake accounts, identical narratives disseminated simultaneously, repeated pressure on specific groups), and protocols for the physical protection of participants, including the anonymization of individual votes even from other microgroup members when local security requires it. GUMI-SV thus guarantees that DDS direct democracy remains, under all circumstances, "authentic, comprehensive, continuous, direct, rapid, competent, immediate, secure, and protected," to use the very terms of DDS's founding mandate.

4.6 NTCO: Operational and logistical coordination between groups

The Operational Coordination Technical Core (NTCO) is the DDS structure responsible for the practical logistics of networking micro-groups: deploying the necessary equipment (access terminals, satellite or offline connectivity in remote areas), training community liaisons, coordinating with DDS specialist groups (health, agriculture, engineering, law, finance) called upon to intervene at the request of micro-groups, and synchronizing the calendar of public consultations at each territorial level. For Haiti, the NTCO plays a particularly critical role given the fragmentation of the territory: it ensures that the absence of state control over a given area does not prevent that area from participating, as soon as minimum security conditions allow, in the democratic life of the national DDS network.

4.7 Summary table of the DDS architecture applied to Haiti

DDS Component	Main function	Response to the identified Haitian problem
Microgroups	Direct local decision, revocable binding mandate	Lack of elected officials since 2016; distrust of central institutions
Fractal Governance	Federation of decisions from the local to the national level	Territorial fragmentation; areas outside state control
Three-code identity	Reliable verification with no possibility of fraud	Weak civil registry; 1.4 million undocumented displaced persons
ddsAI / allddsAI	Neutral and continuous information, in Creole and French	Disinformation, gang propaganda, partial illiteracy
GUMI-SV	Security, anti-manipulation, protective anonymity	Risk of reprisals; media and political manipulation
NTCO	Logistics, training, coordination of specialists	Lack of functional public infrastructure

5. Political and institutional program

5.1 Build popular power now, without waiting for official elections

DDS does not propose waiting for the elections scheduled for August 2026—the holding of which remains explicitly conditional, according to the United Nations itself, on an improvement in security, which is not currently guaranteed. DDS proposes an immediate and gradual deployment of micro-groups, beginning in areas where security already allows (provinces, certain communal sections, the diaspora), before expanding, as the security situation evolves, to areas currently under gang control. This approach has a decisive advantage: it does not depend on any prior authorization from the transitional institutions, as it is carried out within the framework of the already recognized freedoms of association and expression, and it in no way constitutes a threat or provocation toward any actor whatsoever—it is a peaceful and organized exercise of citizenship.

Concrete example of application

In a commune in the South Department, relatively untouched by gangs, an initial network of 40 micro-groups was established within a few weeks, covering all the communal sections. These micro-groups began by addressing concrete local issues—water management, road safety, school priorities—before gradually connecting to the national DDS coordination to participate in broader consultations. The documented and verifiable success of this first area became a replicable model, disseminated by ddsAI to other communes and the diaspora, creating a ripple effect of peaceful co-operation.

Expected consequences

In the short term (6 to 12 months): emergence of a credible network of several hundred micro-groups, primarily in secure areas and within the diaspora, producing the first documented popular consultations on national issues. In the medium term (1 to 3 years): establishment of sufficiently broad and documented direct popular legitimacy to influence the official electoral calendar, offering the transitional authorities a dialogue partner representative of the true popular will, rather than just another interlocutor among traditional political actors. In the long term: gradual integration of the DDS architecture into the Haitian institutional framework itself, through constitutional recognition of the consultative and then decision-making role of micro-groups (see section 5.2).

5.2 A new constitutional architecture based on micro-groups

An attempt at constitutional revision was initiated by the Transitional Presidential Council in May 2025, before being abandoned in October 2025. DDS considers this abandonment revealing: any constitutional reform conceived and negotiated solely between political actors, without direct and continuous popular participation from the drafting phase onward, is structurally fragile and prone to partisan gridlock. DDS proposes, conversely, that the content of a future Haitian constitution be developed through direct and iterative consultation with micro-groups on each chapter—fundamental rights, territorial organization, public powers, budgetary control—with final popular validation via a secure referendum using the three-code identity system, rather than through a single parliamentary vote disconnected from the grassroots.

The institutional content proposed by DDS includes, in particular: the inclusion of the right of direct popular recall of any elected official, at any time, by the micro-groups of his constituency; the inclusion of the principle of total and real-time budgetary transparency, accessible to any citizen via ddsAI; and the explicit inclusion, in the constitutional text itself, of the principle that the natural resources and wealth produced by the country permanently belong to the Haitian people and cannot be committed without direct popular validation (see section 3.1).

5.3 Justice, reconciliation and the end of impunity

The Haitian Court of Appeal's October 2025 decision, which overturned the indictment against 51 suspects in the investigation into the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and sent the case back to a new judge, illustrates the structural fragility of the Haitian judicial system when faced with politically sensitive cases. Meanwhile, the Anti-Corruption Unit (ULCC) has produced 55 investigative reports in the last three to four years—more than in the previous seventeen years combined—and compliance with asset declaration requirements among high-ranking officials (Council members, ministers, secretaries of state) has reached 100%. These real advances remain fragile unless they are supported by organized and sustained popular pressure capable of ensuring their continuation beyond changes in government.

DDS proposes that every anti-corruption investigation and every judicial proceeding of major public interest be subject to structured citizen monitoring by competent micro-groups, supported by DDS legal expert groups, with systematic and accessible publication of the progress of proceedings via ddsAI—creating ongoing pressure for transparency that neither a change of government nor ad hoc political pressures can interrupt. Regarding prison conditions—7,274 inmates, 81% of whom are awaiting trial, and 139 deaths in custody recorded in 2025—DDS proposes the immediate implementation of an emergency nutrition and health program in prisons, funded primarily by diaspora funds mobilized through the mechanism described in section 7.7, alongside an accelerated program for processing pending cases, publicly monitored by micro-groups within the judicial system.

5.4 Absolute protection of opposition groups, minorities, cultures, languages and religions

In Haiti, as in every country where DDS is active, DDS applies an absolute and non-negotiable principle: no majority, however large, can decide on the erasure, marginalization, or persecution of a minority, a political opposition, a tradition, a language, or a religion. For Haiti, this principle translates concretely into the following guarantees:

Official languages. Haitian Creole and French are guaranteed and used on an equal footing throughout the DDS infrastructure — ddsAI systematically provides information in both languages, with priority given to oral Creole to reach the entire population, including those with little or no literacy.
Haitian Vodou, Catholicism, Protestant Churches and any other denomination practiced in Haiti are recognized and protected with equal dignity; no micro-group can impose a religious orientation on its members, and freedom of worship remains an absolute individual right not subject to popular consultation.
Political opposition. Every Haitian political party, movement or current, regardless of its orientation, retains a full and complete right to participate in micro-groups, to express its positions there, and to have its arguments returned in a neutral manner by ddsAI on the same basis as any other opinion — DDS is not a competing party to existing parties, but a neutral infrastructure for direct decision-making open to all.
Social and cultural minorities. Persons with disabilities, gender and orientation minorities, isolated rural communities, people of Haitian descent born in the Dominican Republic facing statelessness, and any other minority present in the territory or in the diaspora benefit from guaranteed representation within the micro-group system, with a suspensive veto mechanism that can be activated by any minority group documenting a violation of its fundamental rights.

5.5 The Haitian diaspora as a pillar of sovereignty

The Haitian diaspora, whose remittances alone represent between 16% and 20% of the national GDP—more than all of the state's tax revenue—is already a crucial economic pillar of the country. DDS proposes to transform this economic pillar into a fully-fledged political pillar by fully integrating the diaspora into the micro-group system via allddsAI, without any distinction between citizens residing in Port-au-Prince, Miami, Montreal, Paris, or Santo Domingo. Each member of the diaspora, identified by the three-code system, participates in DDS consultations on all national issues and can create or join thematic or geographic micro-groups specific to their community of origin in Haiti, creating a direct, continuous, and decisive link between the diaspora and its territory of origin—far beyond the role of remittance provider to which it is currently almost exclusively assigned.

6. Security and Pacification Program

6.1 Critique of current strategies

The current security strategy combines three levers—drone strikes against gang leaders, the gradual deployment of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), and de facto tolerance of the “bwa kale” self-defense groups—without any of these levers being accompanied by a structured program for the economic disengagement of gang members or a legitimate mechanism for community dialogue. Drone strikes, despite their occasional tactical effectiveness, caused a 120% increase in deaths related to this type of operation in the first quarter of 2026, hitting neighborhoods where gangs are intertwined with the civilian population—fueling resentment that, according to several humanitarian analysts on the ground, risks ultimately turning not only against the gangs but also against the authorities deemed responsible for civilian casualties. Self-defense militias, although driven by a legitimate desire for protection, killed at least 572 people in 2025, a significant number of whom had no verified link to gangs, creating a real risk of drifting towards uncontrolled summary justice.

6.2 The DDS model of community security through microgroups

DDS proposes a fourth lever, complementary to and not a substitute for the legitimate security efforts of the State and its international partners: the structuring of DDS community security committees, linked to local micro-groups, whose role is strictly defensive and preventive—never offensive or armed. These committees perform three functions: the transmission of verified information to the National Police and the GSF (Gang Social Front) on the actual movements and security needs of each neighborhood, avoiding targeting errors that cause civilian casualties; community mediation to defuse local tensions before they escalate into armed violence; and the identification, in conjunction with DDS specialist groups in social reintegration, of gang members likely to be engaged in a voluntary exit program (see section 6.3).

This model is directly inspired by the recommendation of the United Nations Secretary-General himself, according to which "repressive efforts alone will not suffice": DDS does not replace the GSF or the National Police, but fills the structural gap that exists today between military action and the daily life of affected communities.

6.3 Demobilization, genuine economic reintegration, and transitional justice

DDS supports the recommendations of international experts for a structured demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration program, on the imperative condition that this program be led with the direct participation of affected communities through local micro-groups—and not negotiated solely between the State, international donors, and the gang leaders themselves, which would once again exclude the primary victims from the decision-making process. Specifically, DDS proposes: expanding the existing exit program for children recruited by gangs, with psychosocial support provided by DDS specialists; and creating vocational training and guaranteed employment pathways, funded by diaspora funds (section 7.7), for adult gang members who agree to voluntary and verified disarmament. and the design, with the support of DDS lawyers, of a transitional justice framework that does not grant any general impunity, in accordance with the position expressed by human rights organizations, but which clearly distinguishes those responsible for serious violence — who must answer for their actions before the law — from members recruited under duress or out of economic necessity, to whom a genuine alternative life must be offered.

6.4 Protection of children and end to gang recruitment

With a 70% increase in child gang recruitment in a single year and over 500,000 children now living in gang-controlled areas, child protection is a top priority. DDS proposes the immediate mobilization of family and school microgroups to identify and report, securely and anonymously via GUMI-SV, ongoing recruitment situations, in conjunction with existing withdrawal and protection programs; the gradual and safe reopening of the 1,600 closed schools, starting with areas where DDS community security can be established (see section 8.1); and the deployment of alternative economic and educational activity programs for adolescents most at risk of recruitment, funded through the mechanisms described in section 7.

6.5 Intended Consequences

In the short term: a reduction in targeting errors and civilian casualties related to security operations, thanks to more reliable community intelligence; the first documented voluntary withdrawals of gang members, particularly younger members and those less involved in serious violence. In the medium term: a gradual reduction of gang territorial control in areas where DDS community security committees are active, through recruitment cuts rather than armed confrontation alone. In the long term: a transition from a security model based on military repression to one based on popular legitimacy and economic inclusion—a condition recognized by all international analyses as essential for lasting peace in Haiti.

7. Economic and Financial Program

7.1 Numerical Diagnosis

Indicator	Value 2025-2026	Source / period
Real GDP growth	-2.7% (2025); -1.7% projected (2026)	World Bank / IMF
Average inflation	28.3% (2025); 23.5% projected (2026)	World Bank / IMF
Public revenue	4.8% of GDP	World Bank, 2025
Population living below $3/day (PPP)	49%	World Bank, 2025
Share of diaspora transfers	16% to 20% of GDP	BTI / FocusEconomics
Textile jobs	32,000 (-45% since Sept. 2023)	BTI 2026
Foreign direct investment	$39.3 million (2023), down since 2021	World Investment Report
Humanitarian needs 2026	$880 million for 4.2 million people	OCHA, Plan 2026

7.2 Monetary and fiscal sovereignty: full transparency via GUMI-SV

With public revenues limited to 4.8% of GDP, the Haitian state is structurally dependent on external financing and money creation to cover a portion of its expenditures—a mechanism that has contributed, in the past, to the high inflation the population is currently experiencing. DDS proposes the implementation of a national and territorial participatory budget, where each major line of public expenditure is submitted for validation by competent micro-groups before execution, and where the actual execution of the expenditure is published in real time, verifiable by any citizen via ddsAI, and protected against falsification by the GUMI-SV architecture. This mechanism does not replace the Haitian state's budgetary institutions—the Bank of the Republic of Haiti, the Ministry of Finance—but adds a layer of direct popular control that has proven, in other national contexts, to be a powerful deterrent to corruption and the embezzlement of public funds.

7.3 Tax reform and anti-corruption efforts led by micro-groups

Any increase in Haitian tax revenues—currently among the lowest in the world relative to GDP—can only be accepted by a population, legitimately distrustful after decades of documented embezzlement, if it is accompanied by a guarantee of absolute transparency regarding the use of these funds. DDS therefore proposes explicitly linking any new tax reform to the prior implementation of the participatory budgeting system described in section 7.2, municipality by municipality, so that each taxpayer can see concretely, through ddsAI, the local use of their contribution—a renovated school, a repaired road, a supplied health post—creating a virtuous cycle of tax compliance based on evidence rather than blind trust in historically failing institutions.

7.4 Agricultural recovery and food security

Haitian agriculture employs approximately 40% of the active population but suffers from very low productivity, a direct consequence of massive deforestation, the lack of modern irrigation, limited access to credit for small producers, and competition from subsidized imports—a legacy of the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s that notably destroyed the local rice industry. DDS proposes the establishment, by agricultural micro-groups in each communal section, of production and storage cooperatives, supported by groups of DDS agronomy specialists for the dissemination of soil conservation, agroforestry, and water management techniques adapted to the Haitian climate; and the creation of an agricultural microcredit fund primarily financed by diaspora savings (section 7.7), managed transparently, and decided locally by the beneficiary micro-groups. and a trade policy protecting, by direct popular decision and not by simple administrative arbitration, strategic food sectors (rice, maize, pulses) against imports that would threaten national food security.

7.5 Industry, textiles and economic diversification

The textile sector, which still accounts for 80 to 90% of Haitian exports, faces a double vulnerability: dependence on a preferential US trade agreement expiring at the end of 2026, and operational fragility linked to insecurity, which has caused the sector's workforce to plummet by more than 45% in six months. DDS proposes immediate mobilization, led by micro-economic groups and the organized diaspora, in favor of renewing the preferential trade agreement—not as a simple request addressed to the US authorities by the Haitian government, but as a documented advocacy campaign delivered directly by the verified voices of the workers concerned and their families. In parallel, DDS supports a medium-term economic diversification strategy, identified and prioritized by the micro-economic groups themselves in collaboration with DDS specialists: local value-added agri-food processing (mangoes, cocoa, coffee, vetiver—Haiti already produces more than half of the world's vetiver essential oil), crafts and the creative economy, and digital services for the diaspora.

7.6 The debt of independence: historical truth, restorative justice

In accordance with the principle set forth in sections 2.6 and 3.1, DDS supports the rigorous documentation, by groups of specialists in economic history and international law, of the amount and cumulative effects of the indemnity paid by Haiti to France between 1825 and 1947, as well as other historical mechanisms of wealth extraction suffered by the country. This documentation, validated and disseminated by Haitian and diaspora micro-groups through allddsAI, forms the basis of a peaceful international approach to recognition and reparations—an approach that several French voices themselves, including within academic and political circles, have begun to deem legitimate in recent years. DDS emphasizes the strictly peaceful, factual, and legal nature of this approach: it is not about rekindling resentment, but about establishing documented historical truth as the foundation for a finally balanced international relationship.

7.7 Remittances and diaspora savings: a popular sovereign wealth fund

Remittances from the diaspora, representing between 16% and 20% of Haiti's GDP, already constitute the country's primary real economic resource—far exceeding state tax revenues. DDS proposes the creation of a Haitian People's Sovereign Fund, separate from any existing state structure, funded on a strictly voluntary basis by a portion of diaspora remittances intended to invest, beyond direct family support, in collective projects verified and decided upon by micro-groups in the beneficiary communities: schools, health centers, agricultural microcredit, and local infrastructure. The management of this fund is entirely transparent and audited in real time via GUMI-SV, with allocation decisions made by direct vote of contributors and beneficiaries within their respective micro-groups—ensuring that this popular savings remains, as required by DDS's founding principle, under the exclusive and permanent control of the Haitian people, both in Haiti and in its diaspora.

7.8 Anticipated economic consequences

Short term (0-12 months)

First pilot projects of the People's Sovereign Fund in secure areas; launch of participatory budgeting in a limited number of pilot municipalities; diaspora advocacy campaign for the renewal of preferential US trade access to the textile sector.

Medium term (1-3 years)

Gradual reduction of the use of money creation to finance the budget deficit, thanks to tax consent strengthened by transparency; measurable diversification of value-added agri-food exports; stabilization of employment in the textile sector if the preferential trade regime is renewed.

Long term (3-10 years)

Structural reduction of monetary poverty, currently at 49% of the population below the threshold of $3 a day, through the combination of restored food security, the progressive formalization of the informal economy (estimated at nearly half of the country's real economic activity) and the structuring investment of diaspora savings; significant progress, on the diplomatic and symbolic level, in the process of recognizing the historical debt of independence.

8. Social Program

8.1 Education: reopen 1,600 schools and guarantee children's future

More than 1,600 schools are currently closed in Haiti, affecting 243,000 students and 7,500 teachers. DDS proposes a prioritized reopening program, decided commune by commune by educational micro-groups (parents, teachers, and students represented by age group), in coordination with community security committees (section 6.2) to identify schools that can safely reopen. For areas where physical reopening remains impossible in the short term, ddsAI offers an adapted distance learning system—audio recordings in Creole and offline-accessible content—so that no generation of Haitian children is completely deprived of learning during the security crisis. Priority funding for school reopening is provided by the Diaspora People's Sovereign Fund (section 7.7), as many Haitians abroad are already expressing, through their current contributions to their families, a spontaneous priority for the education of children remaining in Haiti.

8.2 Public Health

The Haitian health system, already fragile before the current crisis, is now directly affected by insecurity (access to healthcare facilities is dangerous or impossible in gang-controlled areas), malnutrition (139 deaths recorded in detention due to malnutrition, a small indicator of a much broader reality affecting the entire population), and food insecurity, which impacts more than half the country. DDS proposes the creation of neighborhood health micro-groups, in collaboration with humanitarian organizations already present on the ground, to map health needs and available capacities in real time, guided by DDS public health specialists; and the integration of maternal and child health as an absolute priority of the People's Sovereign Fund, given the alarming levels of infant and maternal mortality documented in Haiti.

8.3 Housing, internally displaced persons and reconstruction

More than 1.4 million people are currently internally displaced, a level approaching that seen after the 2010 earthquake. DDS proposes that micro-groups in areas hosting displaced persons be directly involved in the management of temporary accommodation sites and in planning for return or sustainable resettlement, in conjunction with international humanitarian agencies, in order to avoid a repeat of the pattern seen after 2010 where a large part of the reconstruction aid passed through channels outside the beneficiary communities themselves, without local popular control over the priorities chosen.

8.4 Reintegration of expelled and repatriated Haitians

More than 270,000 Haitians were forcibly deported to their country in 2025, mostly from the Dominican Republic, in a context where the United States has also reduced the duration of temporary protection granted to Haitian nationals on its soil. Nearly one-fifth of these returnees were already internally displaced persons before their departure, and many return to a country where no structured reintegration program awaits them, making them prime targets for exploitation and recruitment by gangs. DDS proposes the creation of DDS reception centers at key points of return (border crossings, airports), staffed by trained local micro-groups supported by economic reintegration specialists, offering immediate access to microcredit, vocational training, and temporary housing programs available through the DDS network.

8.5 Protection of women and the fight against sexual violence

Sexual violence is systematically used by gangs as a weapon of territorial control in Haiti, a reality documented repeatedly by the United Nations. DDS proposes the creation of dedicated micro-protection groups, led primarily by women and supported by DDS protection and health specialists, with a secure and anonymized reporting channel via GUMI-SV, ensuring that no victim can be identified or subjected to reprisals simply for reporting violence; and the systematic integration of female representation within each micro-decision-making group, at all levels of DDS's fractal governance.

8.6 Essential infrastructure: water, energy, roads

Access to clean water, energy, and passable roads directly conditions a country's ability to deliver humanitarian aid, operate schools and health centers, and enable the resumption of local economic activity. DDS proposes that each territorial micro-group, with the support of DDS engineering specialists, establish a precise and continuously updated map of priority infrastructure needs within its area. This map would then be submitted to the fractal governance structure for arbitration and funding by the People's Sovereign Fund and international partners—thus replacing a logic of externally decided projects with a logic of documented and verifiable popular prioritization.

9. Environmental and Territorial Programme

Haiti is among the countries most exposed to natural hazards in the world: more than 96% of its population is vulnerable to hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Hurricane Melissa caused significant flooding in the city of Les Cayes in October 2025, illustrating a vulnerability exacerbated by historical deforestation that has reduced the country's forest cover to one of the lowest levels in the Caribbean, weakening the soil and amplifying the effects of extreme weather.

9.1 Community reforestation and climate resilience

DDS proposes a reforestation program led by the local micro-groups themselves, combining productive agroforestry (rather than purely ornamental reforestation, so that peasant families derive a direct and sustainable economic benefit) and protection of strategic watersheds to limit flooding, with technical monitoring provided by DDS agronomist and environmental specialists, and initial funding from the People's Sovereign Fund.

9.2 Early warning and disaster management

ddsAI integrates, for each territorial micro-group, an early warning system relaying official weather bulletins in real time, in Creole and in an accessible way including offline, as well as a pre-established community evacuation and sheltering protocol, decided and memorized in advance by each local micro-group rather than improvised in the emergency — reducing the critical reaction time during the repeated natural disasters that the country experiences.

10. Implementation: DDS Roadmap for Haiti

10.1 Phase 1 — Initiation (0 to 6 months)

Formation of the first micro-groups in secure areas: provinces relatively spared from the presence of gangs, and diaspora communities in North America, Europe and the Dominican Republic.
Deployment of the three-code identity system and training of the first NTCO community liaisons.
Launch of ddsAI in Creole and French, with initial neutral information content on security, economic and governance issues.
First pilot projects of the People's Sovereign Fund, focused on education and emergency food security.

10.2 Phase 2 — Consolidation (6 to 18 months)

Extension of the micro-group network into areas gradually retaken by the National Police and the Gang Suppression Force.
Implementation of participatory budgeting in the first pilot municipalities, with real-time publication of expenditures via GUMI-SV.
Launch of DDS community security committees and the first voluntary reintegration programs for gang members.
International documentation and advocacy campaign on the independence debt, led by the organized diaspora.

10.3 Phase 3 — National Expansion (18 to 36 months)

Coverage of all Haitian municipalities by the network of micro-groups, including, as far as security allows, in areas currently under gang control.
Direct popular consultation on the content of a new constitutional architecture based on micro-groups (section 5.2).
Measurable economic diversification: initial results from agricultural cooperatives, microcredit, and value-added processing sectors.

10.4 Phase 4 — Sustainable democratic consolidation (beyond 36 months)

Progressive institutional recognition of the role of micro-groups within the Haitian legal and constitutional framework, in peaceful articulation with the elected institutions resulting from the official electoral calendar.
Enhanced budgetary autonomy of the Haitian state thanks to the broadening of the tax base made acceptable by the transparency of popular control.
Continuation of the international process of recognition and redress of the historical debt of independence.
The DDS system becomes a permanent infrastructure of direct democracy, complementary and not a substitute for elected institutions, continuously guaranteeing that the power of decision remains, forever, in the hands of the Haitian people.

11. Permanent democratic and cultural guarantees

DDS enshrines the following principles as permanent and non-negotiable guarantees applicable to the entire program described in this document:

Perpetual popular sovereignty. The wealth produced by the Haitian people and the power to decide their own national destiny remain, forever and without exception, in the exclusive hands of the Haitian people, expressed through their micro-groups.
Absolute non-violence. No action carried out in the name of DDS resorts, at any time and under any pretext, to violence, coercion or threats; the change proposed by DDS is, in all circumstances, peaceful, organized and based on voluntary participation.
Political pluralism guaranteed. All political opposition, present or future, retains a full and complete right to participate in the DDS system and to express its positions, which are returned in a neutral manner by ddsAI.
Protection of cultures, languages and religions. Haitian Creole and French, Vodou, Christianity in all its forms, and all regional and local traditions of Haiti are permanently protected and cannot be altered by any majority decision.
Protection of minorities. Every minority, whether social, cultural, religious or of any other nature, has a guaranteed right to representation and a suspensive veto mechanism in the event of a documented infringement of its fundamental rights.
Permanent transparency and security. The entire DDS information and decision system remains, under all circumstances, protected against manipulation and disinformation by the GUMI-SV architecture, guaranteeing an authentic, complete, continuous, direct, rapid, competent, immediate, secure and protected democracy.

12. Conclusion

Haiti is not a country without solutions; it is a country whose solutions have always been sought in the wrong place. For two centuries, the power to decide Haiti's destiny has been negotiated between local minorities and foreign powers, never directly validated by the people themselves. This structural absence of direct popular sovereignty explains, better than any other isolated factor, the persistence of poverty, political instability, and, today, gang violence that thrives precisely in the vacuum left by the absence of a state perceived as legitimate and close to the people.

DDS does not promise a miracle solution or an unrealistic timeline: Haiti's reconstruction will take years, and some of its deepest wounds—the historical debt of independence, deforestation, the social divide between elites and the population—will require decades of sustained effort. But DDS offers a method that, for the first time, places the Haitian people themselves at the precise center of every decision that affects them: their micro-groups, their community security, their budgetary control, their neutral and verified information, their fully integrated diaspora, and their fully protected cultures and minorities. It is this method—peaceful, immediate, verifiable, and based on logic, common sense, the study of facts, and mutual respect—that DirectDemocracyS is offering, starting today, to the people of Haiti.

“Haiti se tè Desalin, e tè a se pou pèp la, pou tout tan.” — Haiti is the land of Dessalines, and this land belongs to the people, forever.

Program for Haiti

Table of Contents

Preamble — DirectDemocracyS Guiding Principles