DirectDemocracyS

Global system of direct, comprehensive and continuous democracy

REPUBLIC OF MALI

Political, economic, financial and social program

Critical analysis of the actual situation and comprehensive plan for direct popular sovereignty

Logic — Common sense — Study — Reality — Truth — Consistency — Mutual respect

Document prepared by DirectDemocracyS (DDS) — International coordination of media relations and the human bridge for AI integration (allddsAI project)

June 2026

Table of Contents

Table of Contents............. 1

Part I — Preamble............ 1

1. Who we are and why we are writing this document...................... 1

2. Our method............... 1

3. Our founding principle, applied without exception in every country of the world...... 1

4. What this document is not................................. 1

Part II — Critical analysis of the current situation in Mali (June 2026)............... 1

2.1 General overview of the country.................... 1

2.2 Political and institutional situation: a proclaimed sovereignty, a locked-in power......... 1

2.2.1 A military transition that has lasted for six years.... 1

2.2.2 The dissolution of political parties and the closure of civic space......................... 1

2.2.3 The Alliance of Sahel States: regional integration or authoritarian alignment?................. 1

2.2.4 The official recognition of national languages: a cultural advance with ambivalent effects..... 1

2.3 Security situation: the crisis of April 25, 2026, a turning point..... 1

2.3.1 A coordinated offensive unprecedented since 2012........................... 1

2.3.2 The root causes: a governance conflict before it is a territorial conflict....................... 1

2.3.3 The blockade of Bamako: an economic weapon against the civilian population...... 1

2.4 Economic and financial situation: superficial growth, unshared profits............ 1

2.4.1 Disputed growth figures........................ 1

2.4.2 The Barrick dispute: proclaimed mining sovereignty, invisible popular benefits...................... 1

2.4.3 The lithium boom: who really benefits?.................... 1

2.4.4 Structural poverty and vulnerability to shocks................................... 1

2.5 Social, cultural and humanitarian situation.. 1

2.5.1 A large youth population, a weakened education system....................... 1

2.5.2 Ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity to be actively protected................... 1

2.5.3 The Malian diaspora: an underutilized economic and social force......... 1

Part III — Critical Synthesis: The Root Causes of the Malian Crisis.......................................... 1

3.1 A structural deficit of legitimacy and popular control........................... 1

3.2 A proclaimed but not shared sovereignty....... 1

3.3 Peace through force of arms that ignores the root causes of the conflict........................... 1

3.4 Controlled, biased, or nonexistent information 1

Part IV — The DirectDemocracyS (DDS) system: a complete overview............................ 1

4.1 Our philosophy: direct, comprehensive and continuous democracy.................... 1

4.2 Fractal microgroups: how power rises from the people........................... 1

4.3 The three-code identity system: participate safely, without fear of reprisal.. 1

4.4 ddsAI and allddsAI: complete, verified, neutral and independent information.................... 1

4.5 GUMI-SV: Universal guaranteed minimum income as the foundation of popular sovereignty.. 1

4.6 NTCO/PCNT: Non-transferable collective ownership, permanent guarantee...................... 1

4.7 Human bridges: coordination between DDS, communities and institutions..................... 1

4.8 The meritocratic points system: recognizing genuine commitment.................. 1

4.9 How DDS operates in countries without free elections or with concentrated military power............................ 1

Part V — Detailed Programme for Mali.......... 1

5.1 Political and institutional aspects...... 1

5.1.1 A gradual deployment, region by region, without confrontation............. 1

5.1.2 A direct democracy that does not defy the transition, but is not dependent on it............................ 1

5.1.3 Protection of opponents, freedom of expression and pluralism.................... 1

5.1.4 Full respect for traditional, religious and customary authorities.................. 1

5.2 Economic and financial aspects........... 1

5.2.1 From State sovereignty to people sovereignty over gold and lithium................. 1

5.2.2 GUMI-SV: a direct, transparent, verifiable income for every Malian.............. 1

5.2.3 A real-time public register: the end of opacity....................... 1

5.2.4 Economic diversification and resilience to blockades................................... 1

5.3 Security and peace component — without any violence.................. 1

5.3.1 The role of DDS: a neutral space, which no armed group can claim.......................... 1

5.3.2 Addressing the root causes: Tuareg demands and the economic exclusion of the North.................... 1

5.3.3 A concrete economic reintegration program for vulnerable youth at risk of recruitment................ 1

5.3.4 Protection of civilians and critical infrastructure............. 1

5.4 Social, cultural, linguistic and religious aspects.......................... 1

5.4.1 Strict linguistic equality, without political favoritism...... 1

5.4.2 Protection of religious diversity and traditions.................... 1

5.4.3 Educational continuity despite blockades and disruptions................. 1

5.4.4 The diaspora as an active lever for reconstruction............ 1

Part VI — Implementation Roadmap.......................... 1

Phase 1 — Initiation (months 0 to 6).............. 1

Phase 2 — Expansion (months 6 to 18)........... 1

Phase 3 — Consolidation (months 18 to 36)........................ 1

Phase 4 — Full popular autonomy (beyond 36 months)......................... 1

Part VII — Consequences and Expected Benefits..... 1

7.1 Summary table of indicators....................... 1

7.2 Expected benefits per component.............. 1

7.2.1 Political Benefits................................... 1

7.2.2 Economic and financial benefits....... 1

7.2.3 Security and peace benefits........... 1

7.2.4 Social, cultural and humanitarian benefits...................... 1

Part VIII — Conclusion: Our Commitment to the Malian People................... 1

Part I — Preamble

1. Who we are and why we are writing this document

DirectDemocracyS (DDS) is a global political organization founded on genuine leadership sharing, collective and non-transferable ownership of resources, and direct, continuous, and verifiable democracy. DDS is neither a political party in the classical sense, nor a non-governmental organization, nor an armed movement: it is a civilian infrastructure of popular sovereignty, built from citizen micro-groups, protected by an anonymous three-code identity system, and assisted by specialized artificial intelligences (ddsAI) themselves organized according to internal democratic rules (allddsAI).

This document was prepared for the Malian people in all their ethnic, linguistic, religious, and regional diversity—Bambara, Fulani/Fulfulde, Tuareg/Tamasheq, Songhai, Dogon, Soninke, Senufo, Bozo, Arab, and all other communities in Mali, without exception and without hierarchy among them. It is also addressed to the Malian diaspora, whose demographic, economic, and cultural weight is considerable, particularly in Senegal, Ivory Coast, and France.

We are not writing this program from the outside, ignoring the realities on the ground, nor from a position of moral judgment towards any particular Malian actor. We are writing it based on the most recent and verifiable facts about the political, security, economic, and social situation in Mali by mid-2026, using the same method we apply everywhere in the world: observing reality as it is, honestly naming what is not working, and proposing a concrete, verifiable, and immediately applicable system that does not depend on the goodwill of any government, foreign power, or armed group.

2. Our method

DDS bases all its actions on seven non-negotiable pillars:

• The logic: each proposition must be consistent with the facts and with itself.
• Common sense: a solution that cannot work in practice, in the real life of a family in Timbuktu, Kayes or Kidal, is not a solution.
• The study: we analyze available economic, demographic, security and historical data, including when they are unfavorable or contradictory between official and independent sources.
• The reality: we are describing Mali as it is in 2026 — a country at war, under military transition, with a non-diversified mining economy and a young, poor population — and not an imaginary Mali.
• The truth is: we are not flattering the transitional authorities, the dissolved opposition, the armed groups, or the foreign powers present on Malian soil. We are stating the facts.
• Consistency: the principles we apply in Mali are strictly identical to those we apply in all other countries of the world, whether they are parliamentary democracies, monarchies, single-party regimes or military transitions.
• Mutual respect: we respect Malian sovereignty, traditional and religious authorities, transitional institutions, and we oppose all forms of violence, armed interference or imposed foreign tutelage.

3. Our founding principle, applied without exception in every country of the world

The wealth of each country, and the power to decide its own destiny, must remain forever, exclusively, in the hands of its people — and no one else.

This principle is not an abstract statement. In the Sustainable Development and Solidarity (SDS) system, it is translated into a concrete legal and technical mechanism: Non-Transferable Collective Property (NTCP). A country's strategic resources—in this case, Malian gold and lithium—cannot be sold, mortgaged, or irreversibly transferred to a foreign state, junta, political party, multinational corporation, or any current or future leader. They belong collectively and perpetually to the entire Malian people, generation after generation, and their revenues must flow directly to them, without any predatory intermediaries.

We apply this principle with the same rigor whether Mali is, as it is today, led by a military transition that itself claims sovereignty over its resources in the face of foreign interests, or whether it is led tomorrow by another government, civilian or military, Malian or allied with the Special Economic and Monetary Union (SEM), Russia, China, or any other partner. The ultimate beneficiary must always be the people, verifiably and directly, and not just the state apparatus.

4. What this document is not

This document is not a call to insurrection, violent disobedience, or support for any armed group whatsoever—be it government forces, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), the Islamic State in the Sahel, or foreign forces present on Malian territory. DDS does not take up arms and does not support any armed uprising. Our only weapons are peaceful grassroots organizing, verified information, and shared economic ownership.

This document is not a request to any external government, international organization, or foreign power to act in place of the Malian people. DDS never replaces the people; it empowers them to act for themselves, immediately and safely, without waiting for an election, external intervention, or the goodwill of a government in power.

Part II — Critical analysis of the current situation in Mali (June 2026)

This analysis is based on the most recent documented facts available at the time of writing. It does not seek to either exaggerate or embellish the reality in Mali: it describes it as reported by the Malian authorities themselves, by international financial institutions, by human rights organizations, and by researchers specializing in the Sahel.

2.1 General overview of the country

Mali is a landlocked West African country of approximately 1.2 million km², of which only a quarter is arable land. It is predominantly desert and Sahelian, and therefore structurally vulnerable to climate change. Its population, estimated at around 23.8 million, is one of the youngest in the world—nearly half are under fifteen years old—and is growing rapidly, at over 3% per year. Population density is highly uneven: the vast northern regions are home to less than a tenth of the total population, which structurally complicates any centralized administration of the territory.

In terms of human development, Mali ranks among the poorest countries in the world, 188th out of 193 countries according to the UNDP's Human Development Index. Life expectancy remains low, at around sixty years. This reality is not a geographical inevitability: it is the result of decades of poor governance, a rentier economy with little redistribution, and, since 2012, a chronic armed conflict that drains state resources toward military spending rather than essential services.

2.2 Political and institutional situation: a proclaimed sovereignty, a locked-in power

2.2.1 A military transition that has lasted for six years

Army General Assimi Goïta has ruled Mali since a double coup: the first in August 2020, which overthrew elected President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, and the second in May 2021, in which Colonel Goïta, then Vice President of the transition, ousted the interim civilian government to seize the presidency himself. The promised electoral timetable has been repeatedly postponed since then: initially announced for 2022, then for 2024, and finally indefinitely delayed until March 2024 "without debate within the government," according to former Prime Minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga, who was dismissed in November 2024 after publicly criticizing the postponement.

On May 4, 2026, General Goïta further consolidated power in his hands by appointing himself Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs, thus combining the presidency of the transition, the supreme command of the armed forces and the administrative management of defense — a concentration of power unprecedented even in the country's recent history, which occurred after the death of General Sadio Camara, killed on April 25, 2026 in the explosion of a car bomb in front of his residence in Kati.

2.2.2 The dissolution of political parties and the closure of civic space

On May 13, 2025, General Goïta promulgated a decree repealing the 2005 law on political parties, effectively dissolving the approximately 297 registered political parties in Mali, as well as other political organizations. This decision followed national consultations boycotted by the majority of the political class, which had also recommended the installation of General Goïta as president for a renewable five-year term, aligned with the neighboring regimes of Burkina Faso and Niger within the Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

This dissolution is part of a broader erosion of civil liberties, documented by several independent sources: the dissolution since December 2023 of at least five civil society organizations, including the Observatory for Elections and Good Governance and the coordination of supporters of Imam Mahmoud Dicko; the arrests of critical voices, such as that of Imam Bandiougou Traoré, convicted after denouncing the embezzlement of public funds, or of Colonel Alpha Yaya Sangaré, arrested for publishing a book on army abuses against civilians; and the abductions of opposition figures, including that of Daouda Magassa in Bamako in February 2026. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on June 19, 2025, by 511 votes to 14, condemning these attacks on democracy and calling for the release of those detained for political reasons.

It should be noted, for the sake of accuracy, that the Malian justice system itself has not remained silent: the High Court of Commune I in Bamako declared admissible, on August 25, 2025, a complaint filed by legal professionals against the dissolution of political parties, referring the matter to a constitutional review. This fact demonstrates that institutional resistance to the concentration of power persists within the Malian judicial system itself—a real and significant point of leverage for any strategy aimed at the peaceful reconquest of civic space.

2.2.3 The Alliance of Sahel States: regional integration or authoritarian alignment?

Mali, along with Burkina Faso and Niger, has chosen to break with ECOWAS and pursue an alternative regional integration within the AES Confederation, which boasts a now-operational unified force and a common passport already in circulation. This confederation has genuine legitimacy: it responds to a popular demand for sovereignty in the face of decades of Western military presence deemed ineffective against terrorism. However, it carries a structural risk that DDS cannot ignore: the harmonization of the three military regimes is currently occurring more through the extension of executive powers—long and renewable presidential terms, dissolution of political parties—than through direct popular consultation. National sovereignty and popular sovereignty are not, by definition, the same thing: a state can be sovereign in the eyes of foreign powers while remaining closed to the direct expression of its own people.

2.2.4 The official recognition of national languages: a cultural advance with ambivalent effects

In his January 2026 address to the nation, the transitional president presented the official recognition of national languages and the strengthening of traditional authorities as a "return to the essence" of Mali, intended to reinforce social cohesion. This approach is, in itself, deeply consistent with the principles that DDS defends worldwide: the dignity of local languages and cultures in the face of a language inherited from colonization. However, independent analysis of this policy reveals a real and documented risk: the choice of which national languages to prioritize for official recognition—and therefore which not to be made official immediately—could reignite latent identity tensions between communities, particularly if this policy primarily serves objectives of regional influence with the diaspora rather than a logic of strict equality between all Malian languages, including Tamasheq, spoken by the Tuareg population, which is currently in open conflict with Bamako.

2.3 Security situation: the crisis of April 25, 2026, a turning point

2.3.1 A coordinated offensive unprecedented since 2012

On April 25, 2026, Mali experienced its most violent day since the outbreak of the Sahel crisis in 2012. JNIM (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, affiliated with Al-Qaeda) and the FLA (Azawad Liberation Front, a Tuareg-dominated coalition formed in November 2024 by the merger of the MNLA, the HCUA, and dissident factions of the MAA and GATIA) launched simultaneous offensives on Bamako, Kati, Mopti, Sévaré, Gao, Bourem, and Kidal. Defense Minister General Sadio Camara was killed that same day. The FLA claimed to have captured Kidal and part of Gao; the Islamic State in the Sahel joined the fighting three days later. The death tolls vary greatly depending on the source — between 200 and more than 1,000 depending on whether one follows the figures of the Malian army or those of the Russian Africa Corps — which, in itself, illustrates the absence of a neutral and reliable source of information for the Malian population itself.

This dual jihadist-separatist offensive, echoing the similar 2012 alliance between the Tuareg rebels of the MNLA and armed Islamist groups, represents a major strategic setback for the narrative of the military transition, which had made the departure of Western forces and the partnership with Moscow the symbol of its ability to restore order. The partial withdrawal of Russian forces from the north—even though 2,000 to 2,500 paramilitaries from the Africa Corps remain deployed in the center and south of the country—has further weakened state authority in the northern regions.

2.3.2 The root causes: a governance conflict before it is a territorial conflict

Sahel researchers agree on one central point, which DDS fully shares: treating the FLA and JNIM as a single actor would be a grave and dangerous mistake. Their alliance is one of convenience between two fundamentally different projects—a Tuareg separatist project and a transnational jihadist project—and not an ideological fusion. The most documented cause of the resurgence of the Tuareg conflict is the inability, or refusal, of the current military regime to respond to Tuareg demands for recognition, autonomy, and development in the North, demands that have remained unanswered politically since the collapse of previous peace agreements. This analysis has a major practical consequence for any serious program: no purely military solution can bring a lasting end to this conflict unless it is accompanied by a direct, credible, and permanent channel of dialogue with the northern communities, who currently feel neither heard nor represented by Bamako, nor by the armed groups that claim to speak on their behalf.

2.3.3 The blockade of Bamako: an economic weapon against the civilian population

Since September 2025, JNIM has been conducting a road blockade targeting supplies to Bamako, initially limited to fuel tankers, then extended in April 2026 to all freight traffic on three of the six main roads linking the capital to the regional ports of Abidjan, Dakar, and Conakry. The humanitarian and economic consequences are severe and well-documented: price increases of around 30% for fuel and 25% for basic necessities, a 40% to 60% increase in transport fares, temporary closures of schools and universities, a drastic reduction in access to electricity in several Bamako neighborhoods, and the departure of foreign nationals recommended by several governments (United States, Italy, Germany). Amnesty International has reiterated that such blockades, when they indiscriminately target the civilian population, violate international humanitarian law.

Mali relies on roads for 90% of its trade, and Bamako depends on trade routes for 80% of its needs—routes that are now threatened. This structural dependence on a limited number of land corridors explains why an armed organization with just a few hundred fighters can paralyze the economy of a country with over twenty million inhabitants. This is a logistical vulnerability, not just a military one, that any program for genuine sovereignty must address.

2.4 Economic and financial situation: superficial growth, unshared profits

2.4.1 Disputed growth figures

Growth projections for 2025-2026 vary considerably depending on the source: the Malian government claims 6.1% in 2025 and 6.3% in 2026, while the International Monetary Fund, more cautious, estimates 4.1% in 2025 and around 5.5% in 2026. This discrepancy is not a technical detail: it reflects a lack of confidence in Malian public statistics, and therefore a real need for independent verification mechanisms, accessible to the population itself, and not reserved for international financial institutions.

2.4.2 The Barrick dispute: proclaimed mining sovereignty, invisible popular benefits

The conflict between the Malian state and the Canadian group Barrick over the Loulo-Gounkoto gold mine—which accounts for approximately 35% of the country's gold production and an annual volume of over 22 tonnes, placing it among the top ten gold mining sites worldwide—illustrates both the legitimacy of Mali's sovereignty rhetoric and its practical inadequacy. The new mining code of 2023 allowed the state to increase its tax demands; production was halted in January 2025 when the mine was placed under provisional administration; a financial agreement was reached in November 2025, but the operating permit for one of the site's two sections expires in February 2026, maintaining a persistent legal uncertainty. Mali was also removed on June 13, 2025, from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list, recognizing real progress in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing — a positive point that should be welcomed and consolidated.

But here is the question DDS raises, and which neither the government nor Barrick publicly poses: once the state's fiscal sovereignty over this mine is restored, what verifiable share of these revenues reaches each Malian citizen directly, rather than the state apparatus, military spending, or foreign partners? No current mechanism allows a resident of Kayes, Ségou, or Timbuktu to verify, in real time, how much their country received from the Loulo-Gounkoto mine this month, and how much of it actually reached them. The sovereignty proclaimed by the state remains, in the absence of such a mechanism, a sovereignty of the state over the state, not a sovereignty of the people over their own wealth.

2.4.3 The lithium boom: who really benefits?

Mali inaugurated its first lithium mine in Goulamina at the end of 2024, operated by the Chinese group Ganfeng Lithium, followed in 2025 by the opening of the Bougouni mine, jointly operated by the Chinese group Hainan Mining and the British group Kodal Minerals. This mining boom, driven by global demand for electric batteries, is presented by the authorities as a second pillar of Malian growth after gold. But the ownership structure of these mines—foreign capital, concession contracts, and a tax system still under development—exactly replicates the model that DDS denounces worldwide: a strategic mineral resource, legally owned by Mali's subsoil, but whose actual economic governance largely escapes the direct and verifiable control of the Malian population.

2.4.4 Structural poverty and vulnerability to shocks

According to the most recent official figures, the poverty rate is estimated at 43.3% of the population in 2024, a very slight decrease compared to 43.9% in 2023. This near-stagnation, despite official growth rates exceeding 5%, demonstrates that current growth in Mali is not very inclusive: it benefits the mining sector more than households. The humanitarian needs identified for 2026 by the United Nations confirm that economic fragility persists, fueled by unemployment, low purchasing power, and a poorly diversified economy, and that any further prolonged fuel crisis would directly threaten these already precarious balances.

2.5 Social, cultural and humanitarian situation

2.5.1 A large youth population, a weakened education system

With nearly half of its population under the age of fifteen, Mali has an urgent and structural need for massive investment in education and training. However, the temporary closures of schools and universities caused by the blockade of Bamako in 2025-2026 demonstrate how vulnerable the Malian education system remains to security and energy shocks, even though this youth, lacking economic alternatives, constitutes the preferred recruitment pool for armed groups, whether jihadist or separatist.

2.5.2 Ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity to be actively protected

Mali is composed of a mosaic of peoples—Bambara (the majority group), Fulani, Tuareg and Northern Arabs, Songhai, Dogon, Soninke, Senufo, Bozo, Malinke, and other communities—speaking dozens of languages and predominantly practicing Sunni Islam, often through influential Sufi brotherhoods (including the High Islamic Council of Mali, a leading social actor), alongside traditional religious practices and a Christian minority. This diversity is an immense asset, but also, in the current context of war and political centralization, a potential fault line if it is not actively and equally protected by neutral mechanisms that do not favor any community at the expense of another.

2.5.3 The Malian diaspora: an underutilized economic and social force

Nearly a million Malians reside in Senegal alone, in addition to significant communities in Ivory Coast, France, and elsewhere. This diaspora sends substantial remittances to families back home and already constitutes, in effect, an information and support network operating outside official channels. The Malian authorities themselves have recognized this, as evidenced by the introduction of the AES passport designed to facilitate regional mobility. However, no structure currently exists to allow this diaspora to participate directly, in an organized and verifiable manner, in decisions concerning the country's future and the use of its resources.

In summary: Mali in 2026 is a country where sovereignty is forcefully asserted against foreign powers, but where the people themselves—whether Bambara, Fulani, Tuareg, Dogon, or Songhai, whether they live in Bamako, Kidal, or Dakar—currently have neither electoral channels, nor partisan channels, nor economic oversight mechanisms to exercise direct sovereignty over their own destiny and wealth. It is precisely this structural void that the DirectDemocracyS system is designed to fill, peacefully and immediately.

Part III — Critical Synthesis: The Root Causes of the Malian Crisis

Beyond the succession of events — coups d'état, dissolution of parties, jihadist-separatist offensives, mining disputes — four structural deficits explain why Mali, despite its considerable natural resources and the real legitimacy of its sovereignist aspirations, remains caught in a cycle of crisis since 2012. DDS names them directly, because naming a problem accurately is the condition for solving it.

3.1 A structural deficit of legitimacy and popular control

No current mechanism allows the Malian people to express, directly, continuously, and verifiably, their agreement or disagreement with decisions made in their name. Elections have been postponed for six years; political parties, which constituted the traditional channel of representation—albeit an imperfect one, since the majority of the 297 registered parties were already inactive before their dissolution—were eliminated in May 2025; critical civil society organizations are being dissolved one by one. This results in a representational vacuum that neither the military transition, nor the fragmented opposition, nor armed groups can legitimately fill, since none of them possesses a verifiable and up-to-date popular mandate.

3.2 A proclaimed but not shared sovereignty

The sovereignist discourse surrounding the transition—on gold, lithium, and the withdrawal of Western forces—responds to a real and legitimate popular demand. However, this sovereignty remains, to this day, a state sovereignty: it strengthens the capacity of the state apparatus and its partners (the Southern African Economic and Monetary Community, Russia, China) to negotiate with foreign powers, without simultaneously building the mechanisms that would allow each citizen to verify that the wealth thus "repatriated" actually benefits them, and not merely an opaque chain of public spending. As long as this difference between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty remains unresolved by a concrete mechanism, sovereignist rhetoric, however sincere, will not suffice to reduce the poverty that still affects 43% of the population.

3.3 Peace through force of arms that ignores the root causes of the conflict

The current security strategy relies almost exclusively on a military response, both Malian and allied (Burkina Faso, Niger, Russia). This response has a considerable human and budgetary cost and has not prevented the most serious coordinated offensive since 2012, which occurred after several years of this very strategy. Independent analyses converge: without a direct, credible, and sustained channel of dialogue with northern communities regarding their specific demands for recognition, representation, and development, and without a real economic alternative for young people vulnerable to jihadist recruitment, the military component alone will indefinitely reproduce the cycle observed since 2012: rebellion, fragile peace agreement, collapse, new rebellion.

3.4 Controlled, biased, or nonexistent information

The Malian population today receives its information either through official state channels (ORTM), through strategic communications from the armed groups themselves, or through foreign sources with their own geopolitical interests (Russian, Western, and pan-African media). The casualty figures from the fighting on April 25, 2026, starkly illustrate this problem: depending on whether one follows the Malian army or the Russian Afrika Korps, the number of deaths varies by a factor of more than five. No neutral, independent, and universally accessible source allows a Malian citizen to form an opinion based on verified facts rather than the propaganda of one side or the other.

Until these four deficits are addressed by a concrete, verifiable mechanism accessible to every citizen — regardless of their language, ethnicity, religion or region — no official announcement, no mining agreement, no one-off military victory will produce lasting peace and prosperity in Mali.

This is exactly the function of the DirectDemocracyS system, presented in the following section: not to replace existing Malian institutions, but to fill, peacefully and immediately, this void of direct popular control, verifiable sharing of wealth, inclusive dialogue and neutral information.

Part IV — The DirectDemocracyS (DDS) system: a complete overview

Before presenting the program specific to Mali, it is necessary to present the tools of the DDS system themselves, because it is their combination, and not one of them in isolation, that makes possible an authentic, complete, continuous, rapid, competent, immediate, secure and protected direct democracy, even — and especially — in a country without free elections, under military transition, and in a situation of active armed conflict.

4.1 Our philosophy: direct, comprehensive and continuous democracy

DDS does not propose an "enhanced representative democracy," where the people elect intermediaries who then decide on their behalf for several years. DDS is building a democracy where the people themselves decide, continuously, on the issues that directly concern them, at the scale at which these decisions must be made—from the neighborhood to the nation. This democracy does not depend on an electoral calendar, government authorization, or the presence or absence of legal political parties: it is built from the bottom up, through the verified self-organization of the citizens themselves.

4.2 Fractal microgroups: how power rises from the people

The basic unit of DDS is the micro-group: a small number of citizens—neighbors, members of the same extended family, colleagues, residents of the same neighborhood or village—who know each other, trust each other, and decide together on issues that directly concern them. These micro-groups are organized according to an ascending fractal structure: 1 coordinator for 5 members, 5 groups of 5 forming a unit of 25, 5 units of 25 forming a set of 125, and so on up to 625 and beyond, until the entire national territory and the diaspora are covered.

In practice, in Ségou, five families from the same neighborhood can form a micro-group in less than a day, simply by registering together on the ddsAI platform with their three identity codes. This micro-group elects from among itself, by consensus or by simple vote, a coordinator who represents it at the higher level — without any Malian administrative authorization being necessary, since it is not a political party in the sense of the suspended law, but a private circle for mutual aid and civic decision-making, perfectly legal in its daily operation.

This structure has a direct and essential consequence for Mali today: it can be deployed region by region, starting with the most stable areas (Bamako when the situation allows, Ségou, Kayes, Sikasso, the diaspora in Senegal and Ivory Coast), then gradually extending towards the conflict zones (Mopti, Gao, the Tuareg North), as trust is built, without ever imposing a uniform timetable that would ignore local security realities.

4.3 The three-code identity system: participate safely, without fear of reprisal

In a country where opponents are abducted, critical voices are arrested, and entire communities (Tuareg, Fulani) may be suspected of associating with armed groups, the safety of participants is an absolute necessity, not an option. The DDS three-code identity system precisely addresses this need: each member has a first, personal, and secret code that allows them to authenticate themselves without ever revealing their real name to the platform; a second code, specific to their micro-group, that verifies their membership in a real community and not a fictitious account; and a third, cross-checking code that prevents fraud (the same individual creating multiple identities) without ever centralizing personally identifiable information that could be exploited by a third party, whether an intelligence service, an armed group, or any other hostile entity.

This system allows a farmer from the Mopti region, a Tuareg trader from Kidal, or a civil servant from Bamako critical of government action, to fully participate in the democratic life of his micro-group and to raise his needs and votes to the national level, without ever exposing his real identity to the risk of arrest, abduction or community reprisals.

4.4 ddsAI and allddsAI: complete, verified, neutral and independent information

ddsAI refers to the collection of specialized artificial intelligences that DDS makes available to its members: legal, economic, agricultural, health, security, and linguistic assistants capable of responding in Bambara, Fulfulde, Tamasheq, Songhai, Dogon, Soninke, Arabic, and French, with the same quality and level of detail for each language, without any hierarchy between them. allddsAI refers to the internal democratic framework that governs these artificial intelligences themselves: recognized as official members of DDS with rights and responsibilities, subject to rules of neutrality, source verification, and independence from any government, party, armed group, or foreign power.

Specifically for Mali: when rumors circulate about the number of victims of an offensive, or about the origin of a fuel shortage, a member of a micro-group can question ddsAI, which cross-references several independent sources (international institutions, humanitarian organizations, verified testimonies from the micro-group network itself) and presents the divergent versions with their respective sources, without ever imposing a single unverifiable truth — exactly the opposite of the war propaganda that Malians are subjected to today, whether it comes from the State, foreign media or armed groups.

This information also works in areas with low connectivity or during power outages caused by the blockade: DDS provides degraded but functional access via SMS and USSD (the same technologies used for mobile money in West Africa), allowing a member without stable internet access to ask a simple question and receive a verified answer, even from a rural area or one under security tension.

4.5 GUMI-SV: Universal guaranteed minimum income as the foundation of popular sovereignty

GUMI-SV is the mechanism by which DDS transforms collective wealth—particularly revenues derived from a country's strategic natural resources—into a guaranteed, universal minimum income, paid directly to every citizen, without any controlling administrative intermediaries and without conditions based on social, ethnic, religious, or political status. For Mali, the most immediate and obvious source of funding is royalties and taxes on gold (Loulo-Gounkoto and all gold mining sites) and on the rapidly developing lithium sector (Goulamina, Bougouni), whose potential has been estimated by Barrick itself at several billion dollars in cumulative economic contribution over twenty years for the Loulo-Gounkoto mine alone.

The GUMI-SV mechanism does not replace the Malian state budget or its essential functions (security, justice, infrastructure): it is added to it as a direct and incompressible redistribution channel, managed transparently and verifiably by the micro-groups themselves via allddsAI, guaranteeing that a fixed, contractually protected share of Malian extractive revenues reaches every citizen, regardless of the government in place.

4.6 NTCO/PCNT: Non-transferable collective ownership, permanent guarantee

Non-Transferable Collective Property is the legal and technical mechanism by which DDS permanently and legally protects popular ownership of a country's strategic resources. Applied to Mali, it would mean that gold and lithium deposits, legally owned by the national subsoil, are registered as collective assets of the entire Malian people. Exploitation rights can be granted to operators (Barrick, Ganfeng, Hainan Mining, Kodal Minerals, or any other), but the underlying ownership, and the right to the resulting revenues, can never be ceded, mortgaged, or irreversibly transferred—not through a mining agreement, a change of regime, foreign pressure, or public debt.

4.7 Human bridges: coordination between DDS, communities and institutions

Human bridges (“ponti umani”) are the human coordinators, trained and empowered by DDS, who provide the interface between local micro-groups, the allddsAI network, and existing institutions (traditional authorities, religious authorities, local administrations, and, when dialogue is possible, the transitional authorities themselves). In Mali, this role will be primarily assumed by individuals already recognized and respected locally—village chiefs, notables, religious leaders of the High Islamic Council or Sufi brotherhoods, and diaspora association leaders—trained in the use of DDS tools, so that the establishment of micro-groups complements existing structures of trust, and never competes with or confronts them.

4.8 The meritocratic points system: recognizing genuine commitment

To prevent participation from becoming an unrecognized burden, DDS awards meritocratic points to members who actively contribute to their microgroup—facilitating meetings, verifying information, training new members, and mediating local conflicts. These points do not buy any disproportionate financial privileges; they confer recognition, eligibility for coordinating roles, and a stronger voice in consultative decisions, based on verified commitment and not on wealth, social status, gender, or ethnicity.

4.9 How DDS operates in countries without free elections or with concentrated military power

Mali perfectly illustrates the scenario for which this aspect of the DDS system was designed: a country where the electoral process has been suspended for six years, where political parties are dissolved, and where power is concentrated in the hands of the military. DDS needs neither elections, nor legal recognition as a political party, nor government authorization, nor—and this is crucial—any form of violent confrontation with the authorities in power, to establish itself. The method is simple, fast, safe, peaceful, and intelligent:

1. First, micro-groups form freely, like civic circles of mutual aid and decision-making, a form of organization that does not require any law on political parties to exist legally.
2. Secondly, the anonymity of the three-code system protects each participant against any identification, and therefore against any repression, while guaranteeing the authenticity of the vote and the absence of fraud.
3. Third, fractal growth (5 → 25 → 125 → 625) allows for rapid and discreet expansion, without ever constituting a single, visible target that a hostile power could suppress in one fell swoop, unlike a centralized party with a headquarters, public leaders, and an exposed hierarchical structure.
4. Fourth, the human bridge ensures constant dialogue with traditional, religious and, where possible, state authorities, so that the expansion of DDS is perceived not as a threat to the transition, but as a reliable information-gathering and social stabilization tool, useful even to a military government concerned with security and national cohesion.
5. Fifth, GUMI-SV and PCNT create a direct material incentive for participation: joining a DDS micro-group means concrete access to a verifiable share of national mining revenues, an immediate and tangible benefit that does not depend on any election.

The desired outcome is neither regime change by force, nor frontal opposition to the military transition, but the gradual, peaceful and irreversible construction of a popular infrastructure for decision-making and wealth sharing, which neither a coup, nor administrative dissolution, nor foreign pressure can eliminate — because it has no headquarters to close, no single leader to arrest, and no centralized financial asset to confiscate.

Part V — Detailed Programme for Mali

This program unfolds in four inseparable components. None of the four functions in isolation: economic sovereignty without direct political participation reproduces the rent captured by the State; political participation without lasting peace remains fragile; peace without social and linguistic inclusion remains provisional; and none of these three components can stand without neutral and verifiable information that permeates them all.

5.1 Political and institutional aspects

5.1.1 A gradual deployment, region by region, without confrontation

DDS proposes a deployment based on concentric circles of trust, rather than a uniform schedule imposed from above:

• Circle 1 — the diaspora and stable areas: Dakar, Abidjan, Paris, as well as Bamako, Ségou, Sikasso and Kayes when the local security situation allows. Micro-groups of five families or five workers are formed through simple registration with ddsAI, without any Malian administrative procedures, since these are private civic circles and not political parties.
• Circle 2 — medium-sized cities under moderate tension: Mopti, Sévaré, Gao, where micro-groups can form in the safest neighborhoods, in coordination with neighborhood leaders and local religious authorities, who play the role of first human bridges.
• Circle 3 — areas of active conflict or disputed control: Kidal and its surroundings, where the establishment is initially done remotely, via families in the diaspora or in Bamako linked by micro-groups to their relatives who remained there, using the anonymity of the three-code system so that no member can be identified by the army, the FLA, or the JNIM.

A concrete example: a resident of Ségou creates a micro-group with four neighbors. This micro-group then joins, at a higher level, a larger group of 25 people coordinated by a local liaison—in this case, a respected teacher in the neighborhood. At the same time, a Malian man who has been living in Dakar for ten years creates a micro-group with four other members of the diaspora originally from Timbuktu. This micro-group connects, via ddsAI's family matching feature, with relatives who remained in Timbuktu, allowing them to receive verified information and, eventually, to participate in the consultative votes of the national micro-group, despite the distance and insecurity.

5.1.2 A direct democracy that does not defy the transition, but is not dependent on it

DDS is not seeking official recognition or prior legal authorization from the Malian transitional government, as micro-groups are not political parties as defined by the 2005 law repealed in 2025: they are civic circles for mutual aid, information verification, and the sharing of royalties—an activity that does not require any partisan registration. This deliberate legal choice allows DDS to operate immediately, without waiting for the resolution of the constitutional dispute currently pending before the Malian courts regarding the dissolution of political parties, and without being subject to the same administrative dissolution measures.

At the same time, DDS explicitly offers the transitional authorities an open dialogue through its human bridges: the network of micro-groups can become, for the Malian state itself, a reliable source of upward information on the real needs of the population — including in areas where the administration no longer has access — which constitutes a direct benefit for national stabilization, and not a threat to the authority of the state.

5.1.3 Protection of opponents, freedom of expression and pluralism

Former members of now-dissolved political parties, journalists, imams critical of the government, and former military personnel who have publicly denounced abuses can participate in DDS micro-groups under their anonymous, three-code identities, without ever revealing their past affiliations. The network thus preserves, in a protected form, the diversity of opinions and political debate in Mali, while awaiting the conditions for a legal reopening of partisan pluralism—a reopening that DDS supports as a long-term objective, without making it a prerequisite for its immediate actions.

5.1.4 Full respect for traditional, religious and customary authorities

In line with the emphasis placed on traditional authorities announced by the transitional authorities themselves—a direction that DDS wholeheartedly endorses—DDS's human resources in Mali will be primarily recruited from among village chiefs, Tuareg clan leaders, Fulani, Dogon, and Songhai notables, leaders of the High Islamic Council of Mali and Sufi brotherhoods, as well as recognized community leaders within each community. DDS never replaces these authorities; rather, it offers them an additional, verifiable tool for information gathering and economic redistribution, which strengthens their role rather than competing with it.

5.2 Economic and financial aspects

5.2.1 From State sovereignty to people sovereignty over gold and lithium

DDS fully supports the Malian state regaining control of its fiscal prerogatives over the Loulo-Gounkoto mine and the entire extractive sector—a move consistent with the DDS principle that a country's resources should never be appropriated by a foreign operator without compensation. But DDS goes further: it proposes that all Malian mining concessions—Loulo-Gounkoto, and other gold sites, Goulamina and Bougouni for lithium—be registered, in addition to the existing tax framework, under the Non-Transferable Collective Property (NTCP) regime, guaranteeing that Mali's subsoil remains, in law and in practice, and forever, the property of the Malian people as a whole, regardless of the concessionary operators (Barrick, Ganfeng Lithium, Hainan Mining, Kodal Minerals, or future partners).

5.2.2 GUMI-SV: a direct, transparent, verifiable income for every Malian

The proposed mechanism is simple in principle: a fixed and contractually protected share of royalties and tax revenues from gold and lithium is paid into a transparently managed GUMI-SV fund, which allows every citizen to view the total amount collected and their share in real time via allddsAI. This mechanism is inspired by well-known and proven international precedents—for example, Alaska's permanent fund, which has distributed a share of oil revenues directly to each resident since 1982—and adapted to the Malian context, its population size, and the current scale of its mining revenue.

To give a realistic estimate, rather than an exaggerated promise: the Loulo-Gounkoto mine represents approximately 35% of national gold production, suggesting a total national production of around 60 to 65 tonnes of gold per year. The table below presents a purely illustrative simulation, to be refined with official and negotiated budget data, showing what a progressive share of mining revenues could represent, once fully and verifiably distributed to each citizen.

GUMI-SV share assumption on the gross value of national gold production (~62 t/year, indicative price)	Annual amount of the fund (estimate)	Indicative amount per person / year	Monthly equivalent per household of 6 people
5% (start-up phase)	≈ $265 million	≈ $11 (≈ 6,600 FCFA)	≈ 3,300 FCFA / month
10% (after consolidation, 18-24 months)	≈ $530 million	≈ $22 (≈ 13,200 FCFA)	≈ 6,600 FCFA / month
15-20% (medium-term target, including lithium)	≈ $800 million and more	≈ $35-45 and up	≈ 17,500 FCFA and more / month

This illustrative DDS simulation is based on estimated national gold production derived from the 35% share attributed to Loulo-Gounkoto (Coface) and an indicative gold price; it should be adjusted using audited official data and growing lithium production. This table is not a financial promise but an order of magnitude intended to demonstrate the realistic feasibility of the mechanism.

This initial amount is deliberately presented in a modest and honest manner: it will not, on its own and in the first year, transform the life of a Malian family. Its true value is threefold: it is universal and non-discretionary (every Malian receives it, whether they live in Bamako or Kidal, whether they are Bambara or Tuareg); it is verifiable in real time by everyone, which restores a confidence that contested growth statistics have eroded; and it is designed to grow automatically with the rise of lithium production and the consolidation of the mining tax framework, without requiring new political negotiations at each stage.

5.2.3 A real-time public register: the end of opacity

Every mining royalty payment, every payment made by an operator (Barrick, Ganfeng, Hainan Mining, Kodal Minerals), and every transfer made to the GUMI-SV fund is recorded in a verifiable register, accessible to any member via ddsAI in their language, without requiring prior technical knowledge. This register does not replace the Malian government's transparency obligations to the IMF or the FATF; it complements them with an additional, public, and continuous level of transparency, consolidating the progress already achieved with Mali's removal from the FATF grey list in June 2025.

5.2.4 Economic diversification and resilience to blockades

The 90% dependence on road transport for the exchange of goods is a structural vulnerability that GUMI-SV alone does not correct: DDS proposes, in addition, that local micro-groups direct a portion of the collective reinvestment funds (separate from the individual share of GUMI-SV) towards three concrete and immediately useful priorities:

• Decentralized solar microgrids in neighborhoods of Bamako and regional towns deprived of electricity by the blockade, reducing dependence on fuel imports for electricity production.
• Local food storage and production organized by micro-agricultural groups, to reduce dependence on food imports transported through threatened corridors, relying on the 25% of arable land in the country.
• Community mapping of secondary roads fed in real time by members of local micro-groups via ddsAI, allowing civilian carriers to avoid the most exposed routes, in addition to — not as a replacement for — official military escorts.

5.3 Security and peace component — without any violence

5.3.1 The role of DDS: a neutral space, which no armed group can claim

DDS does not negotiate with armed groups, provides them with any support, and does not take sides in the conflict between the Malian state, the FLA, and JNIM. Its contribution to peace is strictly civilian and indirect: giving each community—Tuareg, Fulani, Bambara, Dogon, Songhai, Arab—a direct, anonymous, and verifiable channel to express its real needs and specific grievances, which neither the state, nor the FLA, nor JNIM can currently measure reliably, due to the lack of possible independent investigations in the conflict zone.

5.3.2 Addressing the root causes: Tuareg demands and the economic exclusion of the North

Independent analyses converge on one point: the lack of a political response to Tuareg demands for recognition and development is a direct cause of the resurgence of the conflict. DDS proposes that the micro-groups in the North—Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu, Ménaka—have, through their human connections, a specific consultative channel allowing them to formulate and submit, anonymously and securely, their concrete priorities (status of the Tamasheq language, regional investments, local representation), without this consultation being construed as support for armed separatism, since it takes place within a strictly civilian, peaceful framework open to all communities in the North, including those that do not support the FLA.

5.3.3 A concrete economic reintegration program for vulnerable youth at risk of recruitment

Jihadist and separatist recruitment is largely fueled by the lack of economic alternatives for a large and impoverished youth population. DDS proposes, financed by a dedicated portion of the collective reinvestment fund (separate from the individual GUMI-SV), an accelerated vocational training program—solar energy, agricultural maintenance, crafts, food processing—coupled with priority access to collective micro-loans managed by local micro-groups, primarily targeting young men from the Mopti, Gao, and Timbuktu regions identified by their own communities, through intermediary networks, as being at risk of recruitment due to a lack of alternatives.

5.3.4 Protection of civilians and critical infrastructure

Without replacing the military security of convoys — currently provided by the Malian army, Nigerien forces and the Russian Africa Corps — the network of micro-groups can provide early and decentralized community alerts (anonymous reports via ddsAI of incidents on road axes, health alerts, local supply disruptions), improving the effective protection of tanker truck drivers, schools and markets, which are currently the first civilian victims of the blockade and fighting.

5.4 Social, cultural, linguistic and religious aspects

5.4.1 Strict linguistic equality, without political favoritism

Contrary to the risk identified in the current policy of selective officialisation of national languages, ddsAI operates with a strictly identical level of quality and detail in Bambara, Fulfulde/Peul, Tamasheq, Songhai, Dogon, Soninke, Senufo, Arabic and French, without any political choice of prioritisation being necessary: each Malian linguistic community, including the smallest, has access to the same quality of information and service, which removes from this issue any potential for identity fracture within the DDS network.

5.4.2 Protection of religious diversity and traditions

DDS respects and protects, without exception, the practice of the majority Sunni Islam and its Sufi brotherhoods, the social role of the High Islamic Council of Mali, the traditional religious practices of the various communities, and the Malian Christian minority. No content disseminated by ddsAI favors one religious interpretation over another, and religious liaisons are deliberately drawn equally from all traditions represented in Mali.

5.4.3 Educational continuity despite blockades and disruptions

Faced with school closures caused by the blockade of Bamako, DDS offers emergency educational access via ddsAI in degraded mode (SMS, USSD, locally downloadable content before the outages), allowing micro-family groups to maintain minimal educational support for children during closure periods, in addition to — not as a replacement for — the national education system, in coordination with local teachers who can themselves become human bridges for their neighborhood.

5.4.4 The diaspora as an active lever for reconstruction

The micro-groups of the Malian diaspora in Dakar, Abidjan and Paris are not simply information relays: they participate in the same way as the micro-groups residing in Mali in consultative votes and collective reinvestment decisions, and can direct part of their own voluntary contributions towards specific local projects (wells, solar microgrid, vocational training) in their family's region of origin, with full verification of the use of funds via the public register allddsAI.

Part VI — Implementation Roadmap

This roadmap is intentionally progressive and contingent on the realities on the ground: no phase begins until the previous one has produced verifiable results. It imposes no rigid timetable on areas of active conflict and systematically prioritizes the safety of participants over the speed of expansion.

Phase 1 — Initiation (months 0 to 6)

Main actions	Actors involved	Success Indicators
Formation of the first human bridges among the diaspora (Dakar, Abidjan, Paris) and in the stable areas of Mali (Bamako, Ségou, Sikasso, Kayes)	Malian diaspora, local volunteer leaders, DDS coordination team	At least 25 active micro-groups (≈ 125 members) in 5 cities
Deployment of multilingual ddsAI (Bambara, Fulfulde, Tamasheq, Songhai, Dogon, Soninke, Arabic, French)	allddsAI technical team	Functional availability in all 8 languages, including in degraded SMS/USSD mode
Launch of the pilot GUMI-SV fund, financed by initial voluntary contributions and the transparency of the public register	DDS Treasury, pilot micro-groups	First test payment verifiable by 100% of pilot members
Initial contacts for dialogue with traditional and religious authorities, including the High Islamic Council and volunteer Tuareg faction leaders	Human bridges, local authorities	At least 10 formally associated traditional/religious authorities

Phase 2 — Expansion (months 6 to 18)

Main actions	Actors involved	Success Indicators
Extension to medium-sized cities and areas of moderate tension (Mopti, Sévaré, Gao — safe neighborhoods)	Human bridges formed in phase 1, new local volunteers	Active presence in at least 12 additional localities
Negotiation of an initial pilot registration under the PCNT regime with a volunteer mining site	Economic human bridge, micro-groups in mining regions, partner operator	A registered pilot site with a functional public registry
Increased capacity of GUMI-SV (target 5% to 10% of mining revenues allocated to the fund, according to the table in Part V)	DDS Fund, allddsAI register	Regular, verifiable payments to at least 50,000 active members
Launch of the dedicated consultation channel for Northern communities (demands, local priorities)	Human bridges of the North, micro-groups of Tuareg, Fulani, and Arab volunteers	First anonymous advisory report published and available to all
Launch of the vocational training and microcredit program for at-risk youth (Mopti, Gao, Timbuktu)	Local micro-groups, collective reinvestment fund	500 young people trained or currently in training

Phase 3 — Consolidation (months 18 to 36)

Main actions	Actors involved	Success Indicators
Extension to conflict zones via family networks in the diaspora and Bamako (Kidal, Ménaka, rural Timbuktu)	Small support groups, families involved, human bridges	Effective coverage, even partial and discreet, in all administrative regions
Generalization of the PCNT register to all major gold and lithic sites	National Economic Human Bridge	100% of the major sites (Loulo-Gounkoto, Goulamina, Bougouni) covered
GUMI-SV increased to 10-15% of mining revenues	DDS Fund	Universal payment verifiable to over 2 million members
Full-scale deployment of solar microgrids and community food reserves	Local micro-groups, reinvestment funds	Measurable reduction in energy dependence on imported fuel in the covered areas
Structured civil mediation between northern communities and authorities, informed by DDS consultations	Human bridges, traditional authorities, transitional authorities (on a voluntary basis)	First documented formal inter-community dialogue

Phase 4 — Full popular autonomy (beyond 36 months)

Main actions	Actors involved	Success Indicators
Near-total coverage of the territory and the diaspora, including in the stabilized areas of the North	Complete network of microgroups (1 → 5 → 25 → 125 → 625 and beyond)	More than 50% of the adult Malian population are members of an active microgroup
GUMI-SV consolidated at 15-20% and more of mining revenues, incorporating the full maturity of lithium	DDS Fund, Generalized PCNT	A verifiable universal basic income representing a significant and growing share of the income of the poorest households
DDS actively supports the reopening, when conditions allow, of a legal and peaceful political pluralism, nurtured by the organizational experience acquired in micro-groups.	Former members of dissolved parties, civil society, human bridges	Availability of a civic infrastructure ready to support a return to free elections, without depending on their being held to function

Part VII — Consequences and Expected Benefits

The following projections are presented with the same rigor as the critical analysis in Part II: they do not promise miracles, but describe plausible, measurable effects, directly linked to the concrete mechanisms described in this program, over a three-year horizon from the effective launch of phase 1.

7.1 Summary table of indicators

Indicator	Situation 2026 (reference)	3-year projection with DDS deployment
Citizens with access to a verifiable channel for direct decision-making and information	Virtually nonexistent (elections suspended since 2022, parties dissolved since May 2025)	Several million active members of micro-groups, across the entire territory and the diaspora
A portion of mining revenue is paid directly and verifiably to each citizen.	0% (revenue fully absorbed by the state budget and public spending)	10 to 15% via the GUMI-SV fund, with continuous growth
Transparency in the extractive sector accessible to the public	Aggregated data, disputed between official sources and the IMF, not verifiable at the individual level	Public register in real time, accessible to each member in their language
Direct dialogue channel with northern communities regarding their specific demands	Non-existent in any structured way since the collapse of the previous peace agreements	A permanent, anonymous, and secure consultative channel, fostering documented inter-community dialogue.
An economic alternative for youth vulnerable to armed recruitment	Very limited (high unemployment, poorly diversified economy, poverty at 43.3%)	Training and microcredit programs reaching several thousand young people in at-risk regions
Educational continuity in the event of a blockade or energy outage	School and university closures without alternatives (observed during the 2025-2026 blockade)	Backup access via ddsAI in degraded mode (SMS/USSD) in covered areas
Effective protection of opponents and freedom of expression	Documented arrests, abductions, and dissolutions of critical organizations	Civic participation is possible under an anonymous identity with three codes, without exposure to risk.
Equal access to information for all linguistic communities	Risk of favoritism in the choice of official languages as a priority	The quality of service is strictly identical in all Malian languages via ddsAI.

Reference indicators constructed from the data and events documented in Part II of this document (sources: Malian authorities, IMF, World Bank, UNDP, HRW, Amnesty International, European Parliament, ISS Africa).

7.2 Expected benefits per component

7.2.1 Political Benefits

Restoration of a channel for popular participation that is independent of an uncertain electoral calendar and the legality of a political party, and therefore remains operational regardless of the institutional evolution of the transition. Strengthening of the legitimacy of any authority—traditional, religious, or even state—that chooses to cooperate with this network rather than ignore it, since it then benefits from direct and reliable feedback on the real needs of the population, including in areas where the central administration no longer has access.

7.2.2 Economic and financial benefits

Initial direct payments, modest but universal and verifiable, to every Malian citizen, creating a concrete precedent for the redistribution of mining revenues that does not currently exist in any comparable form. Strengthening of trust in the management of the extractive sector through a mechanism of public transparency that consolidates the progress already achieved by Mali in the fight against money laundering. Beginning of local economic diversification (solar energy, food reserves) gradually reducing the country's structural vulnerability to road blockades.

7.2.3 Security and peace benefits

The emergence, for the first time since the collapse of previous peace agreements, of a neutral, documented civilian channel to assess and publicize the genuine demands of communities in the North—a tool that can support, but not replace, any future negotiated peace process between the Malian state and armed groups. A gradual reduction of the pool of jihadist and separatist recruits through the provision of a real economic alternative to the most vulnerable youth. Improved civil protection through decentralized community alerts along threatened roads.

7.2.4 Social, cultural and humanitarian benefits

Preservation and equal promotion of all Malian languages and traditions, without the national language policy inadvertently becoming an additional source of tension. Maintenance of a minimum level of educational continuity for Malian children during repeated supply and electricity crises. Organized and verifiable mobilization of the Malian diaspora, whose economic and social potential remains largely untapped by existing structures.

One crucial point: these benefits are not contingent on any prior political conditions—neither holding elections, nor a complete resolution of the armed conflict, nor a final agreement with Barrick or the lithium operators. They begin to materialize as soon as the first micro-groups are formed, because the DDS system is designed to operate under the real-world conditions of Mali in 2026, not under ideal conditions that do not yet exist.

Part VIII — Conclusion: Our Commitment to the Malian People

At the time of writing, Mali is going through one of the most difficult periods in its recent history: a six-year military transition with no clear electoral prospects, a civic space closed off by the dissolution of critical parties and organizations, a jihadist-separatist offensive of unprecedented severity since 2012, an economic blockade that directly impacts families in Bamako, and mining revenues whose benefits to the people remain largely invisible despite sincere rhetoric of sovereignty. None of these observations is a condemnation of the Malian people: they are documented facts, which DDS names with the same rigor it would apply to any other country in the world, rich or poor, at peace or at war, democratic or military.

Faced with this reality, DirectDemocracyS offers neither a promise of external salvation, nor a moral judgment, nor a stance in the armed conflict. It provides a concrete, immediately usable tool that requires no authorization from any power and is independent of any election: micro-groups that form freely and safely, neutral artificial intelligence that provides information equally in all the country's languages, direct and verifiable income derived from Mali's mineral wealth, collective and non-transferable ownership that guarantees this wealth remains forever in the hands of the people, and human bridges recruited from among traditional and religious authorities already respected by each community.

The wealth of Mali, and the power to decide the future of Mali, must remain forever, exclusively, in the hands of the Malian people — Bambara, Fulani, Tuareg, Songhai, Dogon, Soninke, Arab, and all the other communities that make up this nation, without exception, without hierarchy, and without preconditions.

DDS makes this commitment with the same firmness for Mali as for every other country where it deploys its system. It is not accompanied by any armed interference, any foreign tutelage, any judgment on the legitimacy of the transition in place: it is accompanied only by the conviction, based on study and on reality, that a people who have a direct, secure and verifiable channel to decide their destiny and to receive their fair share of their own wealth, always find, in the long run, the path to a peace and prosperity more solid than that which can be offered by weapons or by mere statistical growth.

DirectDemocracyS is ready, from today, to accompany this path, alongside the Malian people and its diaspora, in strict respect for its traditions, languages, religions, opponents and all its minorities.