DirectDemocracyS

Global system of direct democracy

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL PROGRAMME

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Critical analysis of the current situation and comprehensive proposal for a governance system based on direct democracy, collective ownership, imperative mandates and artificial intelligence at the service of the people (ddsAI / allddsAI)

Document prepared within the framework of the international coordination of DirectDemocracyS — 2026

Table of Contents

Table of Contents................. 1

Preface: Who are we and why this document....................... 1

Chapter 1 — Critical Analysis of the Current Situation in the DRC...................................... 1

1.1 An immensely rich country, an immensely poor people............................... 1

1.2 Macroeconomic growth that does not benefit the people............................... 1

1.3 Capture of mineral wealth by elites: the heart of the problem................... 1

1.4 The conflict in the East: war, displacement and the war economy..................... 1

1.5 A formally democratic, but actually locked-down political system................. 1

1.6 Critical synthesis: the DDS diagnosis.................. 1

Chapter 2 — The DirectDemocracyS system: principles and general application in the DRC.......... 1

2.1 The fractal micro-group model (1 → 5 → 25 → 125 → 625…)........................... 1

2.2 Imperative and revocable mandate: the end of the "out of control" elected official................... 1

2.3 Collective and non-transferable ownership (NTCO): wealth remains with the people, forever.... 1

2.4 ddsAI and allddsAI: neutral, complete and incorruptible information for every citizen...................... 1

ddsAI............................. 1

allddsAI.......................... 1

2.5 Protection against media manipulation and brainwashing..................... 1

2.6 Peaceful implementation in a context of political fragmentation and conflict........................ 1

Phase 1 — Local implementation through micro-groups (0-2 years)....................................... 1

Phase 2 — Consolidation and regional federation (2-5 years)..................... 1

Phase 3 — Institutional integration (5-10 years). 1

Chapter 3 — Economic and Financial Program................ 1

3.1 Mining Governance Reform: The “People’s Resource Contract”........... 1

Concrete mechanism.... 1

A concrete, quantified example......................... 1

Expected consequences....................................... 1

3.2 Real economic diversification: agriculture, energy, local industry........ 1

Agriculture: Transforming 80 million hectares of arable land into food security and exports...... 1

Energy: Inga's potential at the service of the people, not just exports. 1

Local processing industry: moving away from exporting raw materials........................ 1

3.3 Budgetary and fiscal reform: a budget that every citizen can follow in real time................................... 1

3.4 Debt Management and International Partnerships. 1

3.5 Summary Table — Economic and Financial Program............................ 1

Chapter 4 — Social Programme: Health, Education, Peace and Security................................. 1

4.1 Health: From Local Development Funds to Community Health Centers.......................................... 1

4.2 Education: quality, access and training for a majority of young people.. 1

Axis 1 — Construction and equipment by Local Development Funds...... 1

Axis 2 — Pedagogical support by allddsAI, in addition to teachers....... 1

Axis 3 — Explicit priority for girls and displaced children.......................... 1

4.3 The conflict in the East: a solution through local popular control of resources, not through weapons............................ 1

4.4 Water, electricity and basic infrastructure: local priorities defined by the people, not by Kinshasa... 1

4.5 Respect for traditions, languages, religions and minorities........................... 1

Chapter 5 — Implementation Roadmap.............................. 1

5.1 Indicative timetable..... 1

5.2 First concrete steps, immediately achievable.... 1

Chapter 6 — Summary of expected benefits and commitments........................ 1

6.1 Expected benefits, by time horizon...................... 1

Short term (1-2 years)... 1

Medium term (3-7 years)....................................... 1

Long term (7-10 years and more)...................... 1

6.2 Identified risks and mitigation measures.......... 1

6.3 Our commitment......... 1

 

Preface: Who are we and why this document

DirectDemocracyS (DDS) is a global political, economic, and social system based on genuine direct democracy, collective and non-transferable ownership of resources, shared leadership, imperative mandates revocable at any time, and the use of artificial intelligence exclusively for the benefit of the people. DDS is neither a traditional party nor a centralized organization: it is a network of fractal micro-groups, identically reproducible in every village, neighborhood, city, region, and country in the world, through which every citizen directly regains control of their life, resources, and decisions.

This document was prepared according to our usual method: a thorough and realistic study of the current political, economic, social and security situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), an honest and uncompromising critique of existing power dynamics, and then a detailed and concrete presentation of how the DDS system can be applied, step by step, to solve the identified problems.

Our approach is based on four non-negotiable pillars:

• Logic, common sense, rigorous study of reality and truth as the basis of all political decisions.
• Mutual respect between all citizens, all ethnicities, all religions, all political opinions, including the opposition and minorities.
• The absolute and universal rule: the natural, economic and financial wealth of each country, as well as the power to decide on this wealth, must remain forever and exclusively in the hands of the people of that country.
• A peaceful, intelligent, gradual and secure change — without any form of violence, coup d'état or forced destabilization — based on popular self-organization through micro-groups.

This program is applied with the same rigor in all political contexts, including in countries with authoritarian regimes, single-party systems, or without free elections. In these cases, DDS does not propose a direct confrontation with the established power, but rather the parallel, discreet, and legal construction of a grassroots self-organizing network which, through its organic growth, gradually and peacefully returns real power to the people.

Chapter 1 — Critical Analysis of the Current Situation in the DRC

1.1 An immensely rich country, an immensely poor people

The Democratic Republic of Congo, thanks to its rich subsoil, is one of the most resource-rich countries on the planet: cobalt (approximately 70% of global production), copper, coltan, gold, diamonds, tin, zinc, manganese, oil, gas, as well as colossal hydroelectric potential (Inga Dam) and the second largest rainforest in the world, covering approximately 126 million hectares. The country also possesses over 80 million hectares of arable land, an agricultural potential theoretically capable of feeding a large part of the African continent.

Despite this wealth, approximately 75% of the population, out of an estimated total of over 106 million inhabitants experiencing rapid population growth (around 3.3% per year), lives below the poverty line. Access to electricity, clean water, healthcare, and quality education remains extremely limited, particularly outside Kinshasa and other major urban centers. This contrast—referred to by many observers as the “Congolese paradox”—is the clearest evidence that the problem is not a lack of resources, but rather a problem of governance, distribution, and popular control over those resources.

The national minimum wage was doubled in early 2025 to approximately $130 per month, an increase acknowledged by the president himself as insufficient. In mining areas like Kolwezi, no industrial company guarantees a decent wage to all its workers, direct or subcontracted, who remain largely below the poverty line despite the extraction of minerals essential to the global energy transition economy.

1.2 Macroeconomic growth that does not benefit the people

On the macroeconomic front, the DRC is posting relatively high growth figures: +7.5% in 2023, +6.2% in 2024, and projected growth of around 5.0% to 5.1% for 2025-2026, driven almost exclusively by the extractive sector, which represents approximately 39% of GDP, 95% of exports, and 42% of government revenue. Inflation has fallen sharply, from around 17.7% in 2024 to around 7.2%-7.5% in 2025-2026, thanks to a restrictive monetary policy by the Central Bank of Congo (the key interest rate has been maintained at 25%).

However, this macroeconomic performance remains an illusion for the majority of Congolese. Growth is concentrated in a capital-intensive, low-labor-intensive extractive sector, largely controlled by foreign capital and often opaque agreements. The 2025 budget, increased by 20% to approximately $17 billion due to the conflict in the East, remains woefully inadequate for a territory of 2.3 million km², the second largest country in Africa.

The budget deficit is projected to be around 3.0% of GDP in 2025 and 2.3% in 2026, and public debt is expected to remain around 18% of GDP — an apparently manageable level, but one that masks the state's chronic inability to finance essential social spending: health, education, social protection, basic infrastructure.

1.3 Capture of mineral wealth by elites: the heart of the problem

The Congolese mining sector, the country's main source of wealth, is riddled with organized rent-seeking, according to analyses by Congolese research institutions themselves. While the 2018 mining code did classify cobalt as a "strategic substance" with a royalty rate increased to 10%, and the government attempted to renegotiate the most opaque contracts, including the 2008 Sino-Congolese agreement, these reforms are hampered by deeply entrenched domestic political interests.

In July 2025, a complaint was filed in Belgian courts against nine people close to the presidential family, both biological and political, accusing them of corruption and embezzlement of mineral wealth from Katanga province, the richest in the country. These accusations add to a long list of similar denunciations, including those against the former president's inner circle. The government announced an audit in April 2026 on the repatriation of mining export revenues, a sign that the problem is acknowledged at the highest level, but without any structural solution ensuring transparency for the public.

The conclusion is inescapable: as long as the control, traceability and distribution of mining revenues remain in the exclusive hands of a closed political decision-making chain — however well-intentioned it may be on occasion — mining wealth will continue to flow into private accounts, offshore companies and informal networks, instead of funding schools, hospitals, roads and rural electrification.

1.4 The conflict in the East: war, displacement and the war economy

Eastern DRC, particularly the provinces of North and South Kivu, is the scene of a protracted armed conflict involving the M23/AFC group, supported by Rwanda according to several sources, as well as numerous local armed groups (Mai-Mai, Wazalendo, PARECO-FF, etc.). This conflict has already displaced more than 4.6 million people in the Kivu region, with over 400,000 new displacements in January 2025 alone. Approximately 14% of the total population is directly affected by the unrest.

The loss of government control over certain areas of North and South Kivu represents an estimated loss of approximately $900 million in public revenue, siphoned off by an illicit mining economy in the conflict zone. Several entities, including PARECO-FF and companies linked to the trade of conflict minerals, were sanctioned by the United States in 2025.

On the diplomatic front, a US-mediated peace agreement was signed in late June 2025 between the DRC and Rwanda, linking regional economic integration to respect for territorial integrity and promises of Western investment. A Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) was negotiated but its signing was delayed, and a ceasefire negotiated in Washington in December 2025 did not include effective mechanisms for justice or accountability for atrocities committed. The M23 continued to strengthen its parallel administration in the areas under its control, with more than 7,000 fighters regrouped by September 2025.

This situation illustrates a recurring pattern: agreements signed "between elites", at the top, without direct participation of the populations concerned, which do not resolve the root causes of the conflict — in particular the local control of mineral resources — and which can therefore be reopened or circumvented at any time.

1.5 A formally democratic, but actually locked-down political system

On paper, the DRC has democratic institutions: a bicameral parliament composed of a National Assembly of 500 members elected by direct suffrage and a Senate of 108 members elected indirectly by the provincial assemblies, plus a former president who is a senator for life. Citizens officially have the right to create political parties, and several hundred exist, most often organized along ethnic, community, or regional lines, with a primarily local reach.

The country's first peaceful transfer of power took place in January 2019 with the arrival of President Félix Tshisekedi, after the former president's attempts to extend his term in 2015-2016 were thwarted by popular and international pressure. However, in 2024, the current president reignited the constitutional debate and announced the creation, in 2025, of a commission tasked with proposing a new constitution "adapted to the realities" of the country—a formula that, in many African countries, has historically been used to remove presidential term limits.

A "Social Pact for Peace and Living Together," championed in particular by the Catholic Church, officially aims to guarantee peace until 2060, the centenary of independence. However, some voices within the country, including religious ones, have expressed suspicions that this initiative could primarily pave the way for a smooth political succession, rather than strengthening direct popular participation.

Transparency International ranked the DRC among the most corrupt countries in the world as early as 2006 (6th in the world, 3rd in Africa), and the situation, although the subject of regular reform speeches since 2019, remains structurally marked by endemic corruption within the public administration, which "stifles progress" according to the independent Congolese media's own analyses.

1.6 Critical synthesis: the DDS diagnosis

The fundamental problem in the DRC is neither a lack of resources, nor a lack of economic growth, nor even a lack of democratic constitutional texts. The problem is the absence of a direct, continuous, transparent, and incorruptible mechanism by which the Congolese people—village by village, neighborhood by neighborhood—truly control, on a daily basis, the use of their own resources and the decisions that affect them.

Five structural obstacles emerge from this analysis, and each of them will be addressed concretely in the DDS program that follows:

• Lock No. 1 — Elite capture of mining revenues: the riches of the subsoil benefit restricted political-economic networks, Congolese and foreign, to the detriment of the social budget.
• Lock No. 2 — Armed conflict in the East and war economy: the lack of local popular control over resources fuels a cycle of violence, displacement and illicit exploitation.
• Lock #3 — Endemic administrative corruption: the opacity of public management prevents any real accountability, despite occasional audits and trials.
• Lock #4 — Formal but distant representative democracy: citizens vote for parties that are often ethnic or regional, without the ability to continuously monitor or recall between elections.
• Lock #5 — Information manipulation: in a country with hundreds of channels and parties, the population does not have access to neutral, independent and verified information, which makes any citizen mobilization vulnerable to disinformation and ethnic or political manipulation.

Chapter 2 — The DirectDemocracyS system: principles and general application in the DRC

2.1 The fractal micro-group model (1 → 5 → 25 → 125 → 625…)

The operational heart of DDS is the micro-group: a basic cell made up of a small number of citizens (for example, 5 people), who meet regularly, in person or online, to discuss, inform themselves and decide together on issues that directly concern them — their neighborhood, their village, their workplace, their community.

Each micro-group elects representatives to the next higher level, based on the principle of shared leadership and revocable imperative mandates. The structure thus develops in a fractal fashion: 1 micro-group connects to 5 others to form a level 2 group, which in turn connects to 5 similar groups to form a level 3, and so on (1 → 5 → 25 → 125 → 625 → …), until it covers the entire national, and then international, territory.

For the DRC, this model is particularly well-suited to the country's reality for several concrete reasons:

• The vast and poorly connected territory (2.3 million km²) makes purely centralized governance effective impossible; local micro-groups allow for a local organization, functioning even without advanced digital infrastructure, with progressive connection via ddsAI as soon as possible.
• The country's ethnic and linguistic diversity (more than 200 ethnic groups, 4 official national languages — Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo, Tshiluba — plus French) is respected because each micro-group operates in its local language, without the imposition of a single model from Kinshasa.
• The current political fragmentation, with hundreds of ethnically or regionally based parties, is gradually being overcome not by their suppression, but by the creation of a parallel, cross-cutting decision-making space, where every citizen — regardless of their party, ethnicity or religion — has an equal voice within their micro-group.

2.2 Imperative and revocable mandate: the end of the "out of control" elected official

In the classic representative system, an elected official—president, member of parliament, or senator—receives a mandate for five years (or more) and is only accountable to their constituents at the time of the next election. Between elections, they can pass laws, sign agreements, or manage budgets without any direct and continuous oversight from the public.

DDS introduces the principle of the imperative mandate: each representative, at each level of the fractal structure, receives precise instructions from his micro-group on the positions to defend, must regularly report on his actions, and can be dismissed at any time by a vote of the micro-group that appointed him, without waiting for the end of a fixed mandate.

Applied to the DRC, this principle means in concrete terms that, for example, a representative of a micro-group in Kolwezi tasked with monitoring mining issues should regularly report to his community on the status of negotiations, contracts, royalties collected and their use — and could be immediately replaced if he does not faithfully defend the interests of his community, without having to wait for a national election.

2.3 Collective and non-transferable ownership (NTCO): wealth remains with the people, forever

Fundamental principle, applicable without exception in the DRC as in all countries of the world:

The natural, economic, and financial wealth of each country, as well as the power to decide its use, must belong collectively, in a non-transferable manner, to the people of that country — and can never be sold, given away, mortgaged, or permanently transferred to private, foreign interests or to any elite whatsoever.

For the DRC, this means that the cobalt, copper, coltan, and gold deposits, as well as the Inga hydroelectric potential and the rainforests, remain the collective, inalienable, and non-transferable property of the Congolese people. Congolese or foreign companies can obtain time-limited, transparent, publicly negotiated, and revisable exploitation rights, but never definitive ownership or political control over these resources.

In concrete terms, DDS proposes the creation, in each mining area, of a People's Resource Council (PRC), composed of mandated and recallable representatives of local micro-groups, who:

• Receives real-time production, export and revenue data from each mining site via ddsAI.
• It approves or rejects, after public consultation, any new mining concession or renegotiation of mining contracts in its zone.
• Controls the allocation of a fixed and guaranteed share of mining revenues (for example a collectively determined percentage) directly to local development funds: schools, health centers, drinking water, electrification, rural roads.
• Publishes monthly, on the ddsAI platform, a simple and accessible report — including for non-literate people, via audio synthesis in local languages — on the status of accounts and ongoing projects.

2.4 ddsAI and allddsAI: neutral, complete and incorruptible information for every citizen

One of DDS's most innovative pillars is the integration of artificial intelligence directly in service of democracy, through two complementary tools:

ddsAI

ddsAI is an artificial intelligence assistant available to every micro-group and every citizen. It works with teams of human specialists (lawyers, economists, mining engineers, agronomists, doctors, education experts, etc.) who validate and enrich the information provided by the AI. ddsAI allows any Congolese citizen, in their local language (Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo, Tshiluba, French), to:

• To understand, in simple language, the content of a mining contract, a budget law or an international agreement that concerns one's community.
• To receive neutral and verified answers to one's questions, without political, ethnic or religious filtering.
• Follow in real time the progress of projects financed by local collective funds (for example: "where is the construction of the school in my village at?").
• Participate in votes and consultations within your micro-group, including by voice message for those who cannot read or write.

allddsAI

allddsAI is the “artificial intelligence democracy” system: a network of AI instances, each representing a field of expertise (health, education, agriculture, mining, energy, security, international law, etc.), which debate each other in a transparent and documented manner, relying on verified data and groups of human specialists, to propose balanced solutions to micro-groups — without ever imposing a decision: the final decision always belongs to the people, via their micro-groups.

For the DRC, allddsAI would, for example, allow for the simultaneous analysis, independently of existing mining and political interests, of the real consequences of a new cobalt mining contract: impact on local revenues, on the environment, on workers' health, on global markets — and to present this information in a neutral manner to the People's Resource Councils before any decision.

2.5 Protection against media manipulation and brainwashing

The DRC has hundreds of media outlets and political parties, often based on ethnicity or region, which creates a fragmented information environment conducive to manipulation, particularly in the context of the conflict in the East, where disinformation fuels community tensions.

DDS platforms incorporate technical and organizational mechanisms to protect against manipulation and multimedia "brainwashing":

• The anonymous three-code identity system ensures that no citizen can be identified, monitored or intimidated for their opinions expressed within their micro-group, while preventing multiple or fraudulent voting.
• Any information disseminated on DDS platforms via allddsAI must be cross-checked with at least two independent and verifiable sources, with a clear indication of the level of certainty and points of disagreement between sources.
• Content identified as propaganda, incitement to ethnic hatred, or targeted disinformation is flagged — never arbitrarily censored — with factual counter-explanation provided in parallel, leaving each citizen free to judge for themselves with all the information at their disposal.
• The recommendation algorithms of DDS platforms are prohibited from any advertising or political optimization: no entity, Congolese or foreign, can pay to influence what a citizen sees as a priority.

2.6 Peaceful implementation in a context of political fragmentation and conflict

DDS is not proposing yet another party to add to the hundreds already existing, nor is it advocating a violent breakaway movement. Its deployment strategy in the DRC is based on three progressive and strictly peaceful phases:

Phase 1 — Local implementation through micro-groups (0-2 years)

In every commune, village, or neighborhood—including, and especially, in the areas most affected by conflict and poverty—DDS micro-groups are voluntarily forming, without confrontation with existing local authorities, political parties, or traditional leaders. These micro-groups begin with concrete and immediately useful actions: organizing access to ddsAI via shared mobile phones, participatory mapping of local needs (schools, water points, health centers), and establishing collectively managed community solidarity funds.

Phase 2 — Consolidation and regional federation (2-5 years)

As micro-groups demonstrate their effectiveness (transparency of local accounts, completed projects, resolution of local conflicts through mediation rather than violence), they federate at the provincial level according to the fractal model. The People's Resource Councils begin to be recognized de facto, initially informally, as credible interlocutors by the communities themselves, and then progressively by local authorities and businesses operating in the area, who see an advantage: fewer social conflicts, greater stability, and a better international image.

Phase 3 — Institutional integration (5-10 years)

Once the fractal structure is sufficiently developed and recognized by the population in a majority of provinces, DDS proposes, through local and then national referendums organized via the micro-groups themselves, the gradual integration of the binding mandate and the People's Resource Councils into the existing constitutional framework—for example, in the form of a legally recognized status for these councils, with binding oversight of natural resource contracts. This integration is achieved through legal and constitutional means, never by force.

In the specific case of areas under the control of armed groups (such as some areas held by the M23/AFC), DDS micro-groups continue to operate at the most local level possible (village, community), focusing on mutual aid, neutral information via ddsAI (when internet access allows) and the peaceful preparation for future reintegration, without ever taking sides in the armed conflict or constituting a competing force.

Chapter 3 — Economic and Financial Program

3.1 Mining Governance Reform: The “People’s Resource Contract”

The extractive sector represents 39% of GDP, 95% of exports, and 42% of government revenue; therefore, any real transformation must begin with this sector. DDS proposes the implementation, site by site, of a People's Resource Contract (PRC), which would gradually replace the current opacity with a system of direct and continuous transparency.

Concrete mechanism

• Each industrial mining site (Kolwezi, Lubumbashi, Tenke Fungurume, Kamoa-Kakula, etc.) is associated with a People's Resource Council composed of representatives elected by micro-groups of the directly affected communities (workers, residents, local traditional authorities).
• Via ddsAI, this council receives a real-time dashboard: tonnage extracted, selling price, royalties paid, taxes paid, salaries distributed — data cross-referenced with customs declarations and world prices to automatically detect anomalies (under-declaration, under-invoicing).
• A fixed percentage guaranteed by law (to be determined collectively, for example between 15 and 25% of the mining royalties collected by the State on the site concerned) is paid directly, without going through the central budget, into a Local Development Fund (LDF) managed by the People's Council of Resources, with monthly public audit via allddsAI.
• The FLD exclusively finances projects voted on by micro-groups: schools, health centers, water supply, rural electrification (particularly via local solar and hydroelectric micro-grids), and agricultural access roads.

A concrete, quantified example

For example, if a site like Kamoa-Kakula (one of the world's largest copper deposits) generates, for instance, $200 million in annual royalties paid to the State, applying a rate of 20% to the Local Development Fund would represent $40 million per year directly invested, under direct popular control, in the basic infrastructure of Lualaba — that is, by comparison, several hundred primary schools built and equipped each year in that province alone.

Expected consequences

• A gradual but measurable reduction in the flight of mining capital to private accounts or shell companies, thanks to automated anomaly detection by allddsAI and continuous citizen monitoring.
• Direct and visible increase in social infrastructure in mining areas, creating a virtuous circle of popular support for the system.
• Reduction of social tensions and strikes in the mining sector, because workers and communities see concretely where the money generated by their work and their land goes.

3.2 Real economic diversification: agriculture, energy, local industry

Agriculture: Transforming 80 million hectares of arable land into food security and exports

The DRC possesses considerable agricultural potential, which is largely underutilized. The DDS program plans, through rural micro-groups, the creation of Popular Agricultural Cooperatives (CAPs), organized according to the same fractal model, which:

• They receive, via ddsAI, agronomic advice adapted to each local soil and climate, developed by the groups of agricultural specialists at allddsAI, by combining satellite, meteorological and market data.
• They pool the purchase of inputs (seeds, fertilizers) and access to equipment (tractors, irrigation systems) financed in part by Local Development Funds from mining royalties — thus creating a direct and transparent transfer of mining wealth towards food security.
• They organize the collective marketing of surpluses, reducing dependence on intermediaries who currently capture a large part of the value between the producer and the market.

Expected outcome: reduced dependence on food imports, massive rural job creation in a country where more than 70% of the population is under 25, and direct improvement in infant nutrition, particularly in isolated rural areas.

Energy: Inga's potential at the service of the people, not just exports

The hydroelectric potential of the Inga site is one of the largest in the world, but its development has historically been geared towards the export of electricity (particularly to South Africa) rather than towards the electrification of the Congolese territory, where access to electricity remains very low, especially in Kinshasa itself.

DDS proposes that before any new phase of expansion of Inga intended for export, a minimum percentage of the production capacity (for example 40%) be reserved by law, under the control of the People's Resource Councils, for the electrification of rural and urban areas of Congo, primarily via local micro-networks managed by popular energy cooperatives, which are faster to deploy than large national transport lines.

Local processing industry: moving away from exporting raw materials

Currently, almost all Congolese cobalt and copper is exported in its raw or semi-processed state, with the added value of processing (batteries, electronic components) being captured abroad. DDS proposes the creation of Popular Processing Zones (PPTs), industrial zones dedicated to the local processing of a portion of mining production, financed through transparent partnerships between Local Development Funds, international investors, and the State, but with infrastructure ownership remaining collective and non-transferable, in accordance with the NTCO principle.

3.3 Budgetary and fiscal reform: a budget that every citizen can follow in real time

The DRC's national budget (approximately $17 billion in 2025, a 20% increase to address the conflict in the East) remains, for the vast majority of citizens, an abstract concept with no visible connection to their daily lives. DDS proposes the creation of a Transparent People's Budget (TPB), published and updated on ddsAI, which allows each citizen to see, for their province and municipality:

• Locally collected revenues (taxes, mining fees, customs duties) and their exact destination.
• Expenditure details, project by project, with photos and progress reports provided by the local People's Councils.
• An automatic comparison, via allddsAI, between budgeted amounts and amounts actually spent, flagging any significant discrepancies for investigation by microgroups.

In parallel, DDS supports the strengthening of citizen control over the anti-corruption fight already undertaken by Congolese institutions (audit commissions, trials for embezzlement of funds), by giving these institutions access to cross-referenced data from allddsAI, which can identify embezzlement patterns much faster than traditional manual audits.

3.4 Debt Management and International Partnerships

With public debt projected to reach around 18% of GDP for 2025-2026, the DRC still has a relatively healthy margin of maneuver compared to many similar countries. DDS recommends maintaining this budgetary discipline while directing new financing (particularly that linked to Western investment pledges stemming from the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement of June 2025) towards projects whose governance includes, from the outset, a local People's Resource Council—a condition of transparency which, far from deterring serious investors, actually guarantees social stability and reduces the risk of conflict surrounding projects.

Regarding the temporary embargo on cobalt exports decreed in February 2025, DDS supports this type of economic sovereignty measure when it is decided in a transparent manner and when its benefits (improved terms of trade, thanks to the dominant position of the DRC which supplies 70% of the world's cobalt) are directly reinvested, via Local Development Funds, in the producing communities.

3.5 Summary Table — Economic and Financial Program

Domain	Current situation	DDS Proposal	Expected profit
Mining revenues	Largely captured by opaque networks; 10% royalties on cobalt	Popular Resource Contract: 15-25% of royalties allocated to Local Development Funds controlled by micro-groups	Visible local infrastructure, reduced capital flight
Agriculture	Potential of 80 million hectares of arable land largely underutilized	Popular Agricultural Cooperatives with advice from DDSAI and cross-financing via FLD	Food security, rural jobs for youth
Energy (Inga)	Export-oriented, low internal electrification	Minimum legal reserve (e.g., 40%) for popular local microgrids	Accelerated rural and urban electrification
Industry	Export of raw minerals, added value captured abroad	Popular Transformation Zones, non-transferable collective property	Creation of skilled industrial jobs, local added value
Public budget	USD 17 billion, lack of transparency, deficit of 2.3-3.0% of GDP	Transparent Popular Budget, real-time ddsAI tracking	Reduction of corruption, better allocation of social spending
Public debt	~18% of GDP, manageable but under security pressure	Conditionality: new funding linked to a local CPR	Stable investments, fewer social conflicts

Chapter 4 — Social Programme: Health, Education, Peace and Security

4.1 Health: From Local Development Funds to Community Health Centers

Access to basic healthcare remains highly unequal in the DRC, particularly outside major urban centers, and the situation is exacerbated in conflict-affected areas in the east, where more than 4.6 million people are displaced. DDS proposes that the first priority for the allocation of Local Development Funds (derived from mining royalties, see Chapter 3) be, in each area, the establishment or rehabilitation of at least one locally managed community health center.

These centers would be connected to ddsAI to:

• Enable teleconsultation with specialist doctors, via allddsAI's health specialist groups, for complex cases that cannot be treated locally.
• Tracking drug and vaccine stocks in real time, automatically reporting shortages to the relevant People's Councils for priority restocking.
• Disseminate neutral and verified health information (vaccination, nutrition, prevention of epidemics such as Ebola or cholera) in local languages, by voice message for illiterate people.

Expected outcome: reduction in maternal and infant mortality, better response to recurring epidemics in certain provinces, and reduction of population displacements linked to the lack of local care.

4.2 Education: quality, access and training for a majority of young people

With over 70% of the population under the age of 25, education is the most crucial social issue for the future of the DRC. The Congolese education sector has seen rapid expansion of access, but this is accompanied by inefficiencies, low learning outcomes, and a learning crisis that threatens the country's future productivity, particularly for girls and children from disadvantaged families.

The DDS program for education is based on three pillars:

Axis 1 — Construction and equipment by Local Development Funds

As mentioned in Chapter 3, a guaranteed share of mining revenues is directed towards the construction, equipping and maintenance of primary and secondary schools in producing areas, with public photographic and budgetary monitoring via ddsAI, allowing each parent to check the progress of the work financed by the resources of their own region.

Axis 2 — Pedagogical support by allddsAI, in addition to teachers

allddsAI provides Congolese teachers, via tablets or phones shared in schools, with educational tools adapted to national programs, in French and local languages, with exercises personalized according to the actual level of each student — particularly useful in overcrowded classrooms, frequent in the current system.

Axis 3 — Explicit priority for girls and displaced children

In accordance with the DDS principle of protecting all minorities and vulnerable populations, local People's Councils are required, in the allocation of Local Development Funds to education, to guarantee specific measures (scholarships, safe transport, temporary boarding schools) for girls and children displaced by the conflict, who are statistically the most exposed to dropping out of school.

4.3 The conflict in the East: a solution through local popular control of resources, not through weapons

The conflict in the North and South Kivu provinces is, to a large extent, a conflict over control of mineral resources (notably gold, coltan, and tin) and territory. The peace agreements negotiated at the highest levels (the DRC-Rwanda agreement of June 2025 and the Washington ceasefire of December 2025) represent significant diplomatic progress, but have not, to date, included a mechanism enabling local communities to regain control of their resources and benefit directly from them—leaving the underlying economic causes of the conflict unaddressed.

DDS proposes a complementary, strictly peaceful approach, based on the priority extension of the People's Resource Contract model to artisanal mining areas in the East, as soon as the security situation allows locally, village by village:

• In areas where the state is regaining control, artisanal mining sites (gold, coltan, tin) are organized into popular mining cooperatives, with traceability via ddsAI to guarantee to international buyers that the minerals do not come from conflict zones — a strong commercial argument for access to markets that respect international standards on “conflict minerals”.
• Part of the income from these cooperatives is directed towards local programs for the reintegration of former combatants (whether from Mai-Mai, Wazalendo or other groups), based on the disarmament-demobilization-reintegration model, but with transparent funding and direct community monitoring, reducing the economic incentive to join or remain in an armed group.
• In areas still under the control of armed groups, DDS micro-groups continue to operate at the most local and discreet level possible, focusing on mutual aid, access to neutral information via ddsAI when the connection allows, and the peaceful documentation of humanitarian needs (displaced persons, access to water, health) transmitted to international humanitarian organizations — without ever taking military sides.

Expected medium-term consequence: by reducing the profitability of the war economy compared to a transparent, popular mining economy connected to international markets that respects anti-conflict norms, DDS helps to make peace economically more attractive than war for local populations — without resorting to any form of additional violence or armed pressure.

4.4 Water, electricity and basic infrastructure: local priorities defined by the people, not by Kinshasa

Access to drinking water and electricity remains very low in a large part of the country, including Kinshasa. Rather than top-down centralized planning, often disconnected from real needs, DDS proposes that each local People's Council establish, through a vote by micro-groups, its own list of infrastructure priorities (wells, boreholes, solar microgrids, bridges, roads for opening up agricultural areas), financed by the Local Development Fund and supplemented, if necessary, by transparent co-financing appeals to international partners, always under the supervision of the People's Council.

This approach avoids the classic trap of "white elephants" — large infrastructure projects decided at the top, oversized or poorly adapted to real needs, and historically a major source of debt and corruption in the country.

4.5 Respect for traditions, languages, religions and minorities

The DRC has over 200 ethnic groups and four national languages (Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo, and Tshiluba) in addition to French, as well as a wide religious diversity (Catholics, Protestants, Kimbanguists, Muslims, and traditional religions). The DDS system, by design, never seeks to impose a single culture, language, or religion.

Each micro-group operates in the language and according to the customs of its community. Traditional authorities (village chiefs, chiefdom chiefs, sector chiefs) are not replaced by DDS: they are invited to participate fully in local micro-groups, where their moral authority and knowledge of the territory constitute an asset, within a framework where decisions are made collectively and transparently, and no longer in a purely customary and unverifiable manner.

Existing political parties, including those based on ethnicity or region, are neither banned nor fought against: their members and sympathizers are full citizens, free to participate in micro-groups in their neighborhood or village on the same basis as any other citizen, where their voice counts exactly as much as that of any other participant — whether they are a member of the presidential majority, the opposition, or without political affiliation.

Religious and ethnic minorities benefit from explicit protection: any report of discrimination or hate speech within DDS platforms is given priority processing by allddsAI, with transmission to the relevant People's Councils for local mediation.

Chapter 5 — Implementation Roadmap

5.1 Indicative timetable

Period	Main actions	Actors	Success Indicators
Year 1	Establishment of the first pilot micro-groups (Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kolwezi, Goma-secure zone); ddsAI deployment on shared phones	Volunteer citizens, Human Bridges DDS, local specialists	Number of active microgroups; DDSAI usage rate
Year 2	First pilot People's Resource Councils on 2-3 volunteer mining sites; first Local Development Funds	People's councils, partner mining companies, local authorities	Amounts paid to the FLDs; first local projects funded
Years 3-5	Provincial expansion of the fractal model; first Popular Agricultural Cooperatives; first energy microgrids	Microgroups federated at the provincial level, allddsAI	Number of provinces covered; agricultural land under cooperative management; electrified households
Years 5-7	Extension to secure areas in the East (traceable artisanal mining cooperatives); first locally funded reintegration programs	Eastern Popular Councils, certified international buyers	Volume of traced minerals; number of reintegrated veterans
Years 7-10	Local and then national referendums for the legal recognition of People's Resource Councils and the binding mandate	All national micro-groups, DRC institutions	Legal status of CPRs; voter turnout in referendums

5.2 First concrete steps, immediately achievable

In accordance with our pragmatic and non-confrontational approach, the initial actions require neither constitutional change nor prior agreement from the central authorities:

1. Identification, in 5 to 10 pilot communes representing the diversity of the country (Kinshasa, Katanga, Kasai, Kivu outside active combat zones, Equateur), of local Human Bridges volunteers trained in DDS principles.
2. Deployment of ddsAI via shared community access points (schools, health centers, churches, markets), in Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo, Tshiluba and French, starting with simple functionalities: verified information, community messaging, participatory mapping of needs.
3. Formation of the first micro-groups of 5 people, on a completely voluntary basis, with a first concrete and measurable objective chosen by each community itself (for example: rehabilitation of a water point, followed by the construction of a school already budgeted).
4. Public documentation, via ddsAI, of the first results obtained — however modest — to build trust and encourage organic expansion to other communities.
5. Approach, at this pilot stage, of a mining company willing to experiment with a first small-scale People's Resource Contract, highlighting the benefits for the company itself: reduction of social conflicts, improvement of image, strengthened compliance with international standards on responsible minerals.

Chapter 6 — Summary of expected benefits and commitments

6.1 Expected benefits, by time horizon

Short term (1-2 years)

• Access, for the pilot communities, to neutral, verified information available in local languages on topics that directly concern them (health, education, local contracts).
• First concrete and visible local projects, financed and monitored transparently, creating a demonstration effect.
• Reduction of tensions related to misinformation in pilot communities, thanks to the factual counter-scanning provided by allddsAI.

Medium term (3-7 years)

• Measurable increase in social infrastructure (schools, health centers, water points, electrification) in areas covered by Local Development Funds from mining royalties.
• Real economic diversification: growth of Popular Agricultural Cooperatives, reduction of food dependence on imports.
• In the East, the economic attractiveness of armed groups is being progressively reduced thanks to traceable and profitable artisanal mining alternatives.

Long term (7-10 years and more)

• Legal and constitutional recognition of People's Resource Councils and the imperative mandate, through peaceful referendum.
• Structural transformation of the "Congolese paradox": macroeconomic growth in the extractive sector is finally translating, in a verifiable way, into improved living conditions for the majority of the population.
• A model that can be reproduced and exported to other African countries facing similar dynamics of mineral wealth and widespread poverty.

6.2 Identified risks and mitigation measures

Risk	DDS Mitigation Measure
Resistance from networks benefiting from the current opacity	A gradual and non-confrontational approach; benefits demonstrated initially on a small scale, without directly challenging existing structures
Limited internet and electricity access for ddsAI	Offline and voice messaging operation; shared community access points; locally defined electrification priority
Security in conflict zones in the East	Action limited to the most discreet local level, strict neutrality towards armed groups, priority given to mutual aid and information sharing.
Initial distrust of a new system	Total transparency from day one; concrete and verifiable results before any request for broader commitment; full respect for existing traditional and religious structures
Attempts to manipulate or politically exploit the movement	Anonymous identity with three codes; revocable imperative warrant preventing any lasting capture by an individual or group

6.3 Our commitment

DirectDemocracyS does not promise instant change, nor does it claim to hold a magic bullet for the immense challenges facing the Democratic Republic of Congo. We offer a tool—the microgroup, supported by ddsAI and allddsAI—that allows the Congolese people themselves, with full respect for their traditions, languages, religions, and political diversity, to gradually, peacefully, and verifiably regain control of their own wealth and their own future.

This document serves as a working document, open to criticism, amendment, and enrichment by anyone, Congolese or otherwise, who shares the principles of logic, common sense, truth, and mutual respect that underpin DirectDemocracyS. Any suggestion for improvement, particularly from Congolese citizens with firsthand knowledge of local realities, will be studied with the utmost seriousness by our specialist groups and by allddsAI.