DirectDemocracyS (DDS)

NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR ABKHAZIA

Political, economic, financial and social program

Analysis of the real state of affairs, criticism of the existing system

and a complete program of direct democracy based on logic, common sense, the study of facts, reality, truth, consistency and mutual respect

2026

Content

1. Introduction: DDS Methodology 3

2. Analysis of the real situation in Abkhazia 4

3. DDS Program: A Direct Democracy Political System for Abkhazia 8

4. Economic and financial program 11

5. Social program 13

6. International relations and the issue of recognition 14

7. Expected consequences of the implementation of the DDS program 15

8. Conclusion 16

1. Introduction: DDS Methodology

This document presents the full DirectDemocracyS (DDS) national program for Abkhazia. DDS is a global political system based on direct democracy, collective and non-transferable property, shared leadership, and a complete rejection of violence as a method of political change. Our method is rigorous: logic, common sense, factual analysis, reality, truth, consistency, and mutual respect are the only criteria applied to the analysis of any country, including Abkhazia.

The DDS is neither pro-Russian nor anti-Russian, nor pro-Georgian nor anti-Georgian. The DDS does not take sides in the issue of international recognition of Abkhazia—this decision belongs exclusively to the people living in this territory and must be made through genuine, direct, and protected mechanisms of popular expression, not through geopolitical deals concluded behind closed doors between the elites of Sukhumi, Moscow, and Tbilisi.

Our program is based on one fundamental principle, applied by the DDS in every country in the world without exception: the country's wealth and the right to decide its destiny must forever and exclusively belong to the people of that country. No foreign power, no local oligarchic group, no ruling clan has the right to control the land, energy resources, coastline, infrastructure, or political future of Abkhazia in place of the Abkhaz people themselves and all permanent residents of this territory.

2. Analysis of the real situation in Abkhazia

2.1 Chronic political instability

Since the 1990s, Abkhazia has experienced a series of recurring political crises, ending with the forced resignation of the incumbent leader under pressure from street protests: in 2004, 2014, 2020, and again in November 2024. Each time, the scenario is nearly identical: the concentration of power in the hands of a de facto president, an agreement with Moscow perceived by society as a threat to sovereignty or an unfair distribution of benefits, mass protests, the seizure of the parliament building or the presidential administration building, the resignation of the leader, the appointment of an interim government, and then new elections, which ultimately bring to power a new leader, forced to renegotiate with the Kremlin under the same structural conditions of dependence.

In November 2024, President Aslan Bzhania resigned after protesters stormed the parliament building, protesting an investment agreement that would have granted Russian companies preferential terms, including access to land as collateral for loans from Russian banks—a mechanism local observers viewed as a form of covert land privatization for foreign capital. Vice President Badra Gunba, who later registered as a presidential candidate, became acting president.

Snap presidential elections were held on February 15, 2025. No candidate managed to secure more than 50% of the vote in the first round: Gunba, the Moscow-backed candidate, received the most support but was forced into a runoff against Adgur Ardzinba, an opposition candidate who opposed the aforementioned investment agreement. Significantly, even the opposition candidate did not reject cooperation with Russia per se—the subject of the dispute is the terms and proportions of this cooperation, not the fact of a strategic alliance with Moscow itself.

That same year, 2024, the political crisis took a tragic turn: during a parliamentary debate on banning cryptocurrency mining, an armed conflict broke out between members of parliament, resulting in the death of one member and the injury of another. This episode is an extreme but eloquent symptom of the lack of functional, peaceful, and institutionalized mechanisms for resolving political differences.

2.2. Structural dependence on Russia

Abkhazia is recognized as an independent state by only five countries (Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and, until the recent fall of the Assad regime, Syria). The international community as a whole, including the European Union, continues to regard the territory as an occupied part of Georgia and does not recognize the legitimacy of its de facto institutions. This diplomatic isolation leaves Abkhazia almost completely dependent on a single partner—the Russian Federation—militarily, economically, and energetically.

Financial dependence is expressed in concrete figures: Russian subsidies account for approximately 30–40% of Abkhazia's budget revenue. In 2025, Russian financial aid was confirmed at approximately 5.2 billion rubles (approximately €54 million). However, Moscow has repeatedly used the suspension or delay of these payments as a tool of political pressure. Specifically, in 2024, Abkhazia did not receive approximately 1.8 billion rubles due to "unfulfilled agreements," and later that year, funding was temporarily suspended amid disagreements over an investment agreement.

Russia's military presence includes a full-fledged military base and, reportedly, plans to build a naval base at Ochamchire on the Black Sea coast—a project that is being implemented without any direct, transparent, and binding consultation with the Abkhaz population about the strategic implications of such a move for the territory's sovereignty and security.

2.3. Energy crisis

Abkhazia suffers from chronic electricity shortages. The Enguri Hydroelectric Power Station, one of the largest hydroelectric power plants in Europe, remains the primary source of power supply. However, the station is physically located on the border and is partially managed by Georgia, making Abkhazia's power supply hostage to interstate relations over which Abkhazia itself has no control. Even when the Enguri River is fully operational, its capacity is insufficient to meet domestic demand.

The situation is exacerbated by the widespread use of cryptocurrency mining—an activity that has become one of the most profitable sectors of the region's shadow economy precisely because electricity has long been effectively free or extremely cheap for the population. This model has created a vicious cycle: cheap energy attracts mining, mining increases the load on the aging grid, grid overload causes power outages for ordinary households, and any attempt to restore order encounters resistance from those who benefit from the status quo.

At the end of 2024, Russia agreed to maintain Abkhazia's energy supply until the presidential elections in February 2025—a clear example of how a basic utility service is becoming a tool of electoral and geopolitical bargaining rather than a guaranteed right of the population.

2.4 Institutional weakness and concentration of power

Abkhazia's political system is characterized by an excessive concentration of power in the hands of the de facto president and a relatively weak and fragmented parliament, composed primarily of independent deputies affiliated with public associations and veterans' unions of the 1992-1993 war. This structure facilitates both the adoption of unpopular decisions under pressure from Moscow and, conversely, the ability of a small group of protesters to physically paralyze state institutions, as there are no effective, socially recognized channels for ongoing, day-to-day citizen participation in governance between election cycles.

Local and international observers have repeatedly noted that none of the successive reform attempts—the tax code under Raul Khajimba, the restoration of order in the construction sector under Alexander Ankvab—have been fully completed. All reform-minded presidents were ultimately forced to resign under pressure from protests. This indicates not a fundamental rejection of reform by society, but rather the absence of a structured, transparent, and ongoing mechanism for dialogue between the leadership and the population capable of clarifying, adjusting, and jointly developing policy before discontent spills out onto the streets.

2.5. Demographic and intercommunity context

The 1992–1993 war resulted in the forced displacement of virtually the entire ethnic Georgian population of the territory (estimated at approximately 240,000 people before the war). Today, Abkhazia remains a multi-ethnic territory, home to ethnic Abkhaz, Armenians, Russians, Georgians (primarily in the Gali district), Greeks, and other ethnic groups. The issue of land, demographic balance, and minority rights remains extremely sensitive and underlies the rejection of several Russian investment initiatives, which were perceived as threatening the demographic balance in favor of Russian settlers.

Infrastructure problems extend far beyond energy: Sukhumi's municipal stormwater drainage systems are so dilapidated that after heavy rains, residents are forced to navigate flooded streets in inflatable boats—an image that has become emblematic of the gap between the promises of reform voiced in every election campaign and the daily reality of basic public services.

2.6. Final Critique of DDS

The DDS concludes that Abkhazia's political system currently functions as a vicious cycle of crises: concentration of power, a perceived unfair agreement with Moscow, street protests, resignation, new elections, and a new agreement with Moscow under the same structural conditions. This cycle repeats itself not because Abkhaz society is unwilling to change—polls and electoral rhetoric consistently demonstrate a demand for reform—but because there is no institutional mechanism that would allow the population to influence decisions continuously, competently, and peacefully, rather than resorting to extreme measures—the physical seizure of government buildings—every few years.

• The absence of a permanent, daily channel for direct citizen participation in governance between elections.
• Complete dependence on a single external partner in energy, finance and security.
• The lack of an independent, neutral and competent source of information, protected from manipulation by Russian, Georgian, and any other media narratives.
• Chronic deterioration of basic infrastructure (energy, sewerage, healthcare) with repeated unfulfilled promises of reform.
• The risk of demographic and land changes without genuine, pressure-free consent of the population.
• The lack of a mechanism for peaceful and structured pressure, an alternative to the seizure of buildings and street violence.

3. DDS Program: A Direct Democracy Political System for Abkhazia

The DDS offers not an abstract ideology, but a concrete, immediately implementable operational architecture, designed for application in any country in the world—including unrecognized or partially recognized territories, dictatorships, single-party systems, and states without free elections. Below, we describe how this architecture applies specifically to the conditions of Abkhazia.

3.1. Micro-groups: Power is returned to the people in small, verifiable steps

The basic unit of DDS is the micro-group—a small association of several citizens (neighbors, colleagues, members of the same community, the same village or neighborhood in Sukhumi, Gagra, Gudauta, Ochamchira, Tkuarchal, or the Gali district) who organize voluntarily, peacefully, and transparently to discuss, examine facts, and make decisions on issues that directly affect their lives.

Micro-groups don't require prior government approval, aren't dependent on the electoral calendar, and don't require recognition from Moscow, Tbilisi, or any other external power center to begin functioning. This is why this method works even in dictatorships, single-party systems, and areas without free elections: power is returned to the people from below, in small, safe, verifiable, and entirely peaceful steps, without the need to wait for permission from above and without any violence.

Each micro-group is linked to the overall DDS architecture via the ddsAI technology platform, enabling thousands of small groups across Abkhazia—from Pskhu in the mountains to coastal villages—to synchronize their decisions, exchange information, and gradually form a genuine, bottom-up national expression of will representing the real interests of all ethnic and social groups in the territory, including the Georgian population of the Gali district, the Armenian, and Russian communities.

3.2. NTCO — Non-Transferable Collective Ownership

The NTCO principle guarantees that Abkhazia's strategic assets—land, coastline, hydroelectric potential, resort and tourist infrastructure, ports, and oil fields—remain the collective, non-transferable property of the people of Abkhazia. No foreign investor, no local elite, no future president may sell, mortgage, or transfer these assets without the direct, transparent, and verifiable consent of the population, expressed through a network of micro-groups, and not through a backroom agreement signed between Sukhumi and Moscow.

It is precisely the NTCO principle that would have avoided the 2024 investment agreement that sparked the latest political crisis: under the DDS system, neither land nor the right to use it as collateral for foreign loans can be transferred to a third party in exchange for investment – such proposals are discussed openly, in micro-groups, with full access to independent economic analysis before any agreement is given legitimacy.

3.3. GUMI-SV: a global association of specialists serving the people

GUMI-SV is a global network of specialized DDS groups (lawyers, economists, energy engineers, healthcare specialists, environmentalists, diplomats, cybersecurity specialists) who provide Abkhaz micro-groups with competent, independent, and free expert analysis on every specific issue—from the terms of an energy agreement to the consequences of building a military base in Ochamchire, from the tax code to flood management in Sukhumi.

This addresses the fundamental problem identified in Section 2: the lack of access by Abkhaz society to independent expertise other than that provided exclusively by the Russian side of the agreement or by a narrow circle of local officials interested in maintaining the status quo.

3.4. ddsAI and allddsAI: Democracy of Artificial Intelligence in the Service of the People

The ddsAI technological infrastructure provides every resident of Abkhazia—regardless of ethnicity, language (Abkhaz, Russian, Georgian, Armenian), and place of residence—with constant, immediate, competent, and neutral access to complete, verified, and uncensored information on the state of the energy sector, the budget, international negotiations, investment proposals, and any other issues affecting the fate of the territory.

The key element is allddsAI, a democracy of artificial intelligences themselves, integrated into the DDS structure as official members of the organization with rights and responsibilities. The multiplicity of independent AI systems, working collaboratively and accountable to micro-groups, eliminates the possibility that a single source of information—be it state propaganda, Russian state media, or any other monopolistic media center—will be able to monopolize the narrative that shapes the public's perceptions of their country and its future.

The ddsAI and allddsAI platforms are technically protected from manipulation and media brainwashing: their architecture ensures multi-faceted control, source transparency, and the impossibility of covert editing or selective censorship of information by external or internal actors, whether from Moscow, Tbilisi, or the Abkhaz administration itself.

3.5. Three-code identification system

To ensure that every vote is counted only once, that participation in micro-groups is protected from fraud, and that the anonymity and safety of participants from potential reprisals—including the practice of stripping opposition activists of Russian citizenship, as documented in Section 2—is preserved, DDS employs a three-code identification system that separates the identity of the participant, the content of their decisions, and technical verification in such a way that no single body, including the DDS administration itself, can associate a specific decision with a specific person without the multilateral, transparently recorded consent of the participant.

3.6. Peaceful transition to full direct democracy

Unlike territories completely devoid of elections, Abkhazia has formal electoral institutions, albeit not recognized by the international community and functioning under conditions of structural dependence. The DDS approach in such cases does not consist of abolishing existing institutions or forcibly overthrowing them, but rather of simultaneously building a network of micro-groups that gradually imbue what currently remains a formal, episodic, and vulnerable to external pressure electoral procedure with real, verifiable, and everyday content.

This method excludes any form of violence. The tragic parliamentary shooting of 2024 and the repeated seizures of government buildings are a direct consequence of the lack of a peaceful, institutionalized alternative for expressing dissent. DDS provides precisely this alternative: constant, structured, non-violent pressure from below, through micro-groups, GUMI-SV expert analysis, and ddsAI transparent information, instead of periodic street outbursts of discontent.

The DDS undertakes to fully respect and protect the traditions, culture, Abkhaz, Russian, Georgian and Armenian languages, religious practices (Orthodoxy, Islam, traditional Abkhaz beliefs), political opposition in any of its legal and peaceful forms, as well as the rights of all ethnic minorities in the territory, including the Georgian population of the Gali district, without any discrimination and without imposing any single identity as a condition of participation in the DDS system.

4. Economic and financial program

4.1. Energy diversification: the end of dependence and chronic shortages

DDS proposes a concrete, step-by-step plan for resolving the energy crisis that does not depend on the goodwill of either Moscow or Tbilisi:

• Immediate phase (0-12 months): a full, independent audit of the actual energy balance of the territory, published via ddsAI, including the volume of consumption attributable to cryptocurrency mining, with the aim of transparent and fair regulation of this industry (licensing, tariffing at actual cost, separation of industrial consumption from household consumption).
• Medium-term phase (1–3 years): a large-scale program of distributed solar power generation on household roofs and small hydropower plants on mountain rivers, financed through a non-transferable, collective, people's bond (NTCO) model, in which every ruble or lari invested by a resident is converted into a share in the local energy infrastructure, which remains the property of the population, not a foreign investor, in perpetuity.
• Long-term phase (3–7 years): diversification of the hydropower supplier through local small hydropower plants, reducing the critical dependence on the only Inguri station, the management of which Abkhazia does not fully control.
• Transparent mining under public oversight: instead of a complete ban, a model in which mining operations are subject to a fair tariff, with proceeds directly and transparently, through ddsAI, channeled into a network modernization fund and a household outage compensation fund.

4.2. Financial sovereignty without breaking with reality

The DDS recognizes the geopolitical reality: today, Russia remains Abkhazia's primary economic partner, and unilaterally severing this relationship would be irresponsible and dangerous to the well-being of the population. Our program does not propose a utopian, immediate withdrawal of Russian support, but rather a gradual, transparent diversification that reduces the territory's vulnerability to political blackmail through payment suspensions, which Moscow has repeatedly used as leverage.

• The creation of a People's Sovereign Fund of Abkhazia, managed collectively through micro-groups and GUMI-SV, accumulating revenues from tourism, agriculture and energy, with full public reporting through ddsAI, inaccessible to selective appropriation by any political group.
• The gradual development of an independent banking sector, overcoming the current almost complete isolation of the Abkhaz financial system from international markets.
• Diversification of economic partners (tourism and trade relations with Turkey, the Persian Gulf countries, and India) is not a counterbalance to Russia, but rather a complement to it, reducing the risk of monopolistic dependence on a single donor.

4.3. Land and Natural Resources: NTCO's Guarantee

Any foreign investment proposal involving land, coastline, or the use of national assets as collateral for loans is now subject to mandatory, transparent discussion within the micro-group network, with prior independent analysis by GUMI-SV, before being submitted to parliament. This directly addresses the cause of the political crisis of late 2024 and ensures that Abkhazia's land and natural resources remain the property of its people forever, not the subject of behind-the-scenes negotiations.

4.4. Revival of tourism and agriculture

Tourism remains one of the few sectors of the Abkhazian economy where the territory enjoys a genuine competitive advantage (the Black Sea coast, mountainous landscapes, and subtropical climate). The DDS proposes a program to modernize tourism infrastructure, financed through NTCO public bonds, ensuring that seasonal tourism revenues are distributed primarily among the local population and not absorbed by large foreign investors, as protesters feared in the aftermath of the rejected investment agreement.

Similarly, agriculture (citrus, tea, wine, nuts) is supported through cooperative structures organized on the same principles of collective, non-transferable ownership, which prevents the acquisition of agricultural land by external structures to the detriment of local farms.

5. Social program

5.1. Infrastructure and utilities

The chronic flooding of Sukhumi streets after rains, mentioned in Section 2, is not a technical detail, but a symbol of the gap between promises and reality. The DDS proposes a concrete plan, financed through a people's fund, to modernize storm sewers, roads, and water supply, with priorities determined directly by micro-groups in each district, rather than a centralized, hardware-based solution disconnected from the daily needs of residents.

5.2. Healthcare

The territory's international isolation significantly limits Abkhazian medical facilities' access to modern equipment, personnel training, and international cooperation. DDS proposes the creation of a telemedicine partnership network through the neutral, non-political humanitarian channels GUMI-SV, as well as a training program for local medical personnel, financed by the People's Sovereign Fund.

5.3. Education and languages

The DDS educational program guarantees the full teaching and protection of the Abkhaz language as the foundation of national identity, while simultaneously preserving the right of the Russian-speaking, Georgian-speaking (in the Gali region), and Armenian-speaking populations to education in their native language—without any assimilationist policies in any direction.

5.4. Youth and Emigration Prevention

Economic isolation and chronic instability are driving a significant portion of Abkhazia's young population to emigrate to Russia in search of work and stability. The DDS program proposes creating a platform through ddsAI that directly matches education, local job openings in energy, tourism, and agriculture, and microcredit through NTCO for local entrepreneurial initiatives, reducing the structural incentive to emigrate.

6. International relations and the issue of recognition

DDS takes no political position on the international recognition or non-recognition of Abkhazia. This is the sole sovereign decision of the territory's population, expressed through transparent, secure mechanisms of direct democracy, and not through the geopolitical calculations of external powers. Our role is to ensure that whatever this decision is, it is made by the people, fully informed through the neutral ddsAI platform, and not imposed by Russian, Georgian, or any other external pressure.

The DDS program envisages maintaining a strategic partnership with Russia where it meets the real interests of the population (security, energy, part of the labor market), while simultaneously consistently reducing the territory's structural vulnerability to the use of this partnership as a tool of blackmail—which has repeatedly occurred in the form of suspension of funding and energy supplies during moments of political disagreement.

DDS also promotes, through its global network in other countries, including Georgia itself, initiatives for humanitarian and public dialogue between Abkhaz and Georgian societies on specific, depoliticized issues (freedom of movement across the administrative boundary line, access to education and healthcare for residents of border areas), without predetermining the status of the territory and without prejudice to the position of either side.

7. Expected consequences of the implementation of the DDS program

These results are not immediate and should not be presented as such: DDS adheres to the principle of realism – institutional and infrastructural changes require time, gradual implementation and constant verification by facts, rather than the propaganda promises that characterized Abkhazia’s previous electoral cycles, which invariably ended in disappointment.

8. Conclusion

Abkhazia today finds itself in an institutional trap: the population's genuine demand for reform, constantly reaffirmed in elections, invariably collides with a structure in which the only available mechanism of influence remains periodic street protests, sometimes with the risk of violence, followed by yet another deal with the only available external partner under the same conditions of dependence.

The DDS does not propose a break with reality, does not offer utopia, and does not propose confrontation with any of the parties involved. The DDS offers a concrete, verifiable, and immediately implementable architecture—micro-groups, NTCO, GUMI-SV, ddsAI and allddsAI, a three-code identification system—that for the first time provides the population of Abkhazia, in all its ethnic and linguistic diversity, with a permanent, peaceful, competent, and manipulation-proof channel for direct participation in the fate of their own country, with full respect for the traditions, cultures, languages, religions, and rights of all minorities in this territory.

The wealth of Abkhazia and the right to decide its fate must forever and exclusively belong to the people of Abkhazia. This is not a slogan—it is an operational principle, concretely implemented through each of the mechanisms described in this document.