DirectDemocracyS

The global system of direct, fractal, and permanent democracy

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL PROGRAM

REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA

Critical analysis of the current situation and proposal for the implementation of the DDS system — June 2026

Index

Index..................................... 1

Part I — Introduction: Why Colombia needs a system change, not just a government change.............. 1

1.1 Context of the moment: the 2026 elections and the Colombian crossroads...... 1

1.2 Violence as a permanent backdrop......... 1

Part II — Critical analysis of the current situation in Colombia, sector by sector... 1

2.1 Political and institutional system............................... 1

Current situation............ 1

DDS Review.................. 1

2.2 Security, drug trafficking and armed conflict............................... 1

Current situation............ 1

DDS Review.................. 1

2.3 Economy, public finances and debt............. 1

Current situation............ 1

DDS Review.................. 1

2.4 Inequality, land tenure and cadastre..................... 1

Current situation............ 1

DDS Review.................. 1

2.5 Natural resources, mining and energy transition........................... 1

Current situation............ 1

DDS Review.................. 1

2.6 Information, media and manipulation...................... 1

Current situation............ 1

DDS Review.................. 1

Part III — The DirectDemocracyS System: General Architecture............ 1

3.1 Fractal micro-groups... 1

3.2 The three-code identity system............................... 1

3.3 ddsAI Technology and the Democracy of allddsAI 1

3.4 The GUMI-SV model: guaranteed income and structured volunteering..... 1

3.5 Tamper-proof platforms.......................................... 1

Part IV — DDS Program for Colombia: Sector-by-Sector Implementation..................... 1

4.1 From four-year presidential terms to permanent direct decision-making.............................. 1

Proposal........................ 1

Concrete example......... 1

Expected consequences....................................... 1

4.2 Security, drug trafficking and productive substitution........................ 1

Proposal........................ 1

Concrete example......... 1

Expected consequences....................................... 1

4.3 Economy, public finances, debt and taxation.......................................... 1

Proposal........................ 1

Concrete example......... 1

Expected consequences....................................... 1

4.4 Land, cadastre and agrarian reform................. 1

Proposal........................ 1

Expected consequences....................................... 1

4.5 Natural resources, mining and energy transition........................... 1

Proposal........................ 1

Concrete example......... 1

Expected consequences....................................... 1

4.6 Information, electoral transparency and protected platforms........................... 1

Proposal........................ 1

Expected consequences....................................... 1

Part V — Pluralism, Minorities, Traditions and Opposition............................ 1

5.1 Indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombian communities...................... 1

5.2 Religious and cultural diversity............................. 1

5.3 Political opposition and dissent............................... 1

5.4 Native languages and tongues............................. 1

Part VI — Implementation Roadmap and Conclusions.. 1

6.1 Summary Schedule.... 1

6.2 Compatibility with the 1991 Constitution.............. 1

6.3 Conclusion.................. 1

 

Part I — Introduction: Why Colombia needs a system change, not just a government change

This document is not just another electoral platform, written to replace one party with another under the same rules that have produced the same results for decades: cyclical violence, structural poverty, institutional distrust, and dependence on external actors. This document presents the DirectDemocracyS (DDS) system applied to Colombia: a system of direct, permanent, fractal, and verifiable democracy that does not compete for power with traditional parties but rather returns decision-making power, structurally and definitively, to the Colombian people.

The premise of DDS is simple and based on logic, common sense, the study of reality, and truth: a country's wealth and the power to make decisions about that country must belong, always and exclusively, to its people. This rule applies in Colombia exactly as it does in any other country in the world where DDS operates. This is not a slogan: it is an operational principle that translates into concrete mechanisms—fractal micro-groups, three-code identity, ddsAI/allddsAI technology, GUMI-SV income model—which are described in detail in Part III.

1.1 Context of the moment: the 2026 elections and the Colombian crossroads

In June 2026, Colombia found itself at a point of fracture. The first round of the presidential election on May 31, 2026, produced a highly polarized result: the far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella obtained approximately 43.7% of the vote (around 10.3 million), compared to 40.9% (around 9.8 million) for the progressive candidate Iván Cepeda, the political heir of Gustavo Petro's Historical Pact. Senator Paloma Valencia, a supporter of former President Uribe, with 6.9% of the vote, announced her endorsement of de la Espriella for the second round, scheduled for June 21, 2026. Voter turnout was approximately 58%, meaning that 42% of Colombians—around 17 million people—did not feel represented by any of the available options.

This 42% abstention rate is not apathy: it is statistical proof that the party system, as it exists today, no longer represents almost half the country. DDS is not asking these people to choose between two external projects: it is offering them the possibility of governing directly, without intermediaries.

The record of Gustavo Petro's government (2022-2026), the first left-wing government in the country's modern history, has been subject to contradictory assessments. On the one hand, real progress was made: a historic drop in poverty, an increase in social spending exceeding one percentage point of GDP, real increases in the minimum wage of nearly 9% annually, a pension reform that created a "solidarity pillar" for seniors without sufficient contributions, a tax reform that improved fiscal progressivity and reduced privileges for mining companies, and the greatest formalization and redistribution of land ownership in recent administrations. On the other hand, serious problems persist: the fight against drug trafficking produced contradictory results—more cocaine seized than ever before, but also record levels of production and export; support policies for farmers to replace illicit crops were scarce and ineffective; and figures close to the government, including the president's own son, were implicated in cases of corruption and money laundering linked to drug trafficking. and presidential popularity fell to approximately 32% a year before the election.

At the macroeconomic level, the situation is one of fragile stability: GDP growth is contained but positive (with projections close to 3.6% for 2026), inflation has fallen slightly from 5.2% to 5.1%, and unemployment has dropped significantly. However, the government had to activate the escape clause of the fiscal rule in June 2025, arguing that debt service and the level of indebtedness required a slower fiscal adjustment until 2027—a decision that faced strong political and institutional resistance. A further tax reform was rejected by Congress, and an economic emergency decree was annulled by the Constitutional Court. This demonstrates a structural truth that DDS constantly underscores: even a well-intentioned government becomes trapped in a system of checks and balances designed to block change, not facilitate it, while debt and international financial interests continue to constrain the country's decisions.

1.2 Violence as a permanent backdrop

The 2026 election campaign unfolded under the shadow of political violence. The assassination of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, of the Democratic Center party, during a campaign event, profoundly affected the electoral climate and was used by the right wing as proof of the outgoing government's "ineffectiveness" in security matters. Despite the ceasefire signed a decade earlier between the national government and the FARC, armed groups continued operations in numerous regions of the country, especially in areas of coca cultivation and illegal mining.

The far-right candidate, Abelardo de la Espriella—nicknamed "El Tigre" (The Tiger) and compared to Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele for his style and for proposing the construction of ten mega-prisons, as well as the closure of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the body responsible for judging crimes committed during the armed conflict—represents a project that prioritizes security through a heavy-handed approach, the reactivation of glyphosate fumigation to eradicate illicit crops, a greater role for the military, and a drastic reduction in state intervention in the economy. The progressive candidate, Iván Cepeda, on the other hand, represents the continuation of Petro's social reforms, with an emphasis on social justice, fiscal restraint, and the maintenance (albeit strengthened) of human security policies.

DDS does not take sides between these two visions, because both share the same structural flaw: they depend on a single person, with a four-year term and no possibility of immediate reelection, concentrating decision-making power over the lives of 52 million people. Whatever the outcome on June 21, 2026, the underlying problem—the concentration of power, dependence on external debt, the capture of the state by drug trafficking interests and economic elites, and the exclusion of the population from decisions that affect their daily lives—will remain unchanged. DDS proposes to resolve this underlying problem, regardless of who occupies the presidency.

 

Part II — Critical analysis of the current situation in Colombia, sector by sector

2.1 Political and institutional system

Current situation

• Presidential system with a single four-year term, without immediate re-election, which produces discontinuity in long-term policies and a permanent cycle of "starting over" every four years.
• Extreme fragmentation: almost a hundred presidential hopefuls entered the race before the 2026 elections, reflecting a party system incapable of generating stable consensus.
• Reciprocal institutional blockage: reforms approved by the Executive are blocked by Congress or annulled by the Constitutional Court (case of the additional tax reform and the economic emergency decree of 2025), generating a feeling of paralysis even when there is a social majority in favor of change.
• Distrust in the electoral counting systems: both the outgoing president and the progressive candidate questioned the reliability of the preliminary count managed by a private company (the Bautista brothers) after the first round of 2026, fueling an atmosphere of uncertainty about the legitimacy of the results.
• Active political violence: the assassination of a senator in the middle of a campaign demonstrates that not even political elites are protected, much less ordinary citizens who try to participate.

DDS Review

The current Colombian system concentrates power in a single office (the presidency), elected every four years through a costly, polarizing process vulnerable to disinformation and violence. The fragmentation of nearly one hundred pre-candidates is not a sign of "democratic vitality": it is a symptom that the party system has lost the capacity to coherently aggregate interests, leaving citizens with a choice between options that do not truly represent their daily priorities (health, education, neighborhood security, local employment). The use of a private company's preliminary count to announce results before the official tally is, in itself, a structural vulnerability: it introduces a non-state actor with the capacity to influence the electoral narrative in real time, without the guarantees of transparency and verifiability that DDS demands as an absolute minimum.

2.2 Security, drug trafficking and armed conflict

Current situation

• Despite record cocaine seizures during Petro's government, Colombian cocaine production and exports reached historic levels, demonstrating that repression alone does not reduce supply when there is massive international demand and a rural economy without viable alternatives.
• The policies for the substitution of illicit crops promised during the campaign were, according to available assessments, scarce and ineffective, leaving peasant communities trapped between the coca economy and the lack of real alternatives.
• Armed groups (FARC dissidents, ELN, criminal gangs linked to drug trafficking) maintain effective territorial control in large rural areas, especially in border regions, the Pacific coast and the Amazon.
• The radical right's proposal to reactivate aerial fumigation with glyphosate reopens an unresolved health and environmental debate: previous studies linked glyphosate to risks for human health and ecosystems, which is why the Petro government had suspended it.
• The proposed closure of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) would jeopardize the transitional justice process derived from the peace agreement, with the risk of re-legitimizing violence as a mechanism for conflict resolution.

DDS Review

Colombian drug trafficking is not a "police" problem: it is an economic and territorial governance problem. As long as rural areas exist where the central government has no effective presence—neither in security, nor in infrastructure, nor in services, nor in alternative markets—coca will continue to be, for millions of farming families, the only viable economic activity. Neither military repression (proposed by the right wing) nor crop substitution programs managed centrally and bureaucratically from Bogotá (the attempt by the Petro government) have worked, because both approaches share the same flaw: they are decisions made "from above," without the structural, binding, and ongoing participation of the communities that experience the problem every day. DDS proposes that the territorial micro-groups themselves—composed of farmers, community leaders, agricultural technicians, and rural development specialists—design, with transparent and verifiable funding, the productive transition plans for their own territories, with real-time monitoring through ddsAI.

2.3 Economy, public finances and debt

Current situation

• Moderate but positive GDP growth: projections close to 1.3% (2023), 2.8% (2024), 3.6% (2025) and 3.6% (2026), driven in part by the agricultural sector.
• Inflation fell slightly, from 5.2% to 5.1% in the last year, but is still above the central bank's target range.
• Unemployment fell significantly, although informal employment remains structural (official objective: to reduce it from 58% to 55.4%, a modest goal that implicitly recognizes that more than half of Colombian workers will remain outside the formal system).
• Monetary and multidimensional poverty registered historic drops, but the official goals (reducing multidimensional poverty from 16% to 9.5-11.5%, and monetary poverty from 39.3% to 35.5%) imply that, even in the best scenario, more than a third of the population would still be in monetary poverty.
• In June 2025, the government activated the escape clause of the fiscal rule (in force since 2011) to avoid an abrupt fiscal adjustment, given the weight of public debt service and the level of indebtedness inherited, a decision strongly contested politically and institutionally.
• According to CEPR analysis, Colombia has one of the highest levels of inequality in the world, with the Latin American region as a whole leading that global ranking.

DDS Review

The most revealing piece of data in this section is not any single percentage, but rather the logic underlying them all: every official target, even in its most optimistic version, normalizes a level of poverty, informality, and inequality that would be considered unacceptable in any discussion of human dignity if presented without the trappings of "gradual progress." A country can grow at 3.6% annually and still have a third of its population living in monetary poverty; it can reduce unemployment and still have more than half of its workers in the informal sector—that is, without pensions, social security, or job protection. The underlying reason is that the Colombian fiscal and financial system remains subordinated to servicing a public debt whose origin, conditions, and beneficiaries were never directly decided by the population. The fiscal rule—designed in 2011 to "protect" the sustainability of public finances—ultimately ends up limiting the State's capacity to invest in what would structurally reduce poverty and informality.

DDS does not propose ignoring fiscal sustainability—that would be irresponsible—but rather inverting the logic: that the micro-groups of the population, fully, correctly, neutrally and independently informed by ddsAI about the real state of public accounts, decide, in a binding manner and through the GUMI-SV model, the priorities of social and productive investment, while a system of total transparency in real time eliminates the opacity that today allows corruption and the flight of resources.

2.4 Inequality, land tenure and cadastre

Current situation

• Colombia has one of the highest inequality rates in the world, in a region (Latin America) that already leads that ranking globally.
• The Petro government's National Development Plan "Colombia, world power of life", with a budget of approximately 230 billion euros for four years, set as a goal to update the rural land registry from 9.4% to 70% of the national territory, implicitly recognizing that, until very recently, the State did not know for sure who owned most of the country's rural territory.
• Land formalization and redistribution has progressed more than in previous governments, but it remains a slow process given the historical magnitude of the Colombian agrarian problem, one of the deepest roots of the armed conflict.

DDS Review

The fact that a country lacks an updated land registry in over 90% of its territory for decades is not merely an "administrative delay": it is tangible proof that the Colombian state has never, until now, possessed the basic information necessary to ensure that land—the country's most important resource alongside its natural resources—effectively serves its population. Without a land registry, there is no fair taxation of rural property, no territorial planning, no foundation for serious agrarian reform, and the illegal concentration of land by powerful armed and economic actors is facilitated. DDS proposes that the land registry update be completed by territorial micro-groups equipped with ddsAI geospatial verification technology, with the results published publicly, verifiably, and permanently, eliminating the possibility of the process being used politically to favor some territories over others.

2.5 Natural resources, mining and energy transition

Current situation

• The Petro government's tax reform reduced the tax privileges of mining companies, especially in the coal sector, in an attempt to increase state capture of natural resource rents.
• The government declared the sustainable energy transition as one of its priorities, in a country with enormous potential in renewable energies (solar, wind, hydropower) but with an economy historically dependent on oil and coal exports.
• The suspension of glyphosate spraying for public health and environmental reasons was reversed in the 2026 election debate by the radical right's proposal to reactivate it.

DDS Review

Colombia faces a contradiction that no traditional government has resolved: it needs the tax revenue from oil, coal, and mineral extraction to finance its social spending, but at the same time, it needs to reduce its dependence on those same exports to meet its climate commitments and protect its biodiversity—among the richest on the planet. The solution cannot depend on the ideological leanings of each successive government (more extraction under the right, less under the left, depending on the electoral cycle). DDS proposes that the decision regarding the pace and conditions of the energy transition—including which extractive projects are authorized, in which territories, under what environmental conditions, and how the generated revenue will be used—be made in a binding manner by micro-groups from the directly affected communities, informed by teams of independent specialists in geology, climatology, energy economics, and public health through ddsAI, thus ensuring that the wealth of Colombia's subsoil remains, as dictated by DDS's fundamental principle, exclusively at the service of the Colombian people.

2.6 Information, media and manipulation

Current situation

• The 2026 election campaign was marked by cross accusations of electoral irregularities, distrust of the pre-counting system managed by a private company, and a climate of uncertainty that, according to analysts, fuels the possibility of an "institutional clash" if either side does not recognize the results.
• The far-right candidate adopted a communication style based on extreme nationalism, using national symbols (the Colombian national team jersey) as a campaign tool, while launching messages that link the "preservation of democracy" with the possible intervention of the security forces if the election result is not recognized by the outgoing government.
• Extreme media polarization makes it difficult for the population to access neutral information about each candidate's actual proposals, their technical implications, and their foreseeable consequences.

DDS Review

A democratic system cannot depend on citizens "guessing" which media outlet is most reliable among dozens of sources with conflicting political and economic interests. The very existence of a debate about whether the algorithms of a private vote-counting company "have been altered" demonstrates the extent to which Colombia's information infrastructure—both electoral and media-related—lacks the guarantees of transparency, verifiability, and neutrality that DDS considers non-negotiable. DDS proposes that all information relevant to collective decisions—from the state of public accounts to real-time election results, from the anticipated effects of public policy to the verified background of each proposal—be processed and presented to micro-groups by ddsAI and the democratic processes of allddsAI, in a complete, accurate, neutral, and independent manner, on platforms protected against manipulation and multimedia brainwashing.

 

Part III — The DirectDemocracyS System: General Architecture

Before presenting the specific program for Colombia, it is necessary to clearly explain the technical and organizational components of the DDS system, because each proposal in Part IV relies directly on them. DDS is not a party that promises to better manage the existing state: it is a system that progressively replaces, peacefully, legally, and verifiably, centralized decision-making mechanisms with direct, distributed, and permanent decision-making mechanisms.

3.1 Fractal micro-groups

The basic unit of DDS is the micro-group: a small set of citizens—neighbors in a neighborhood, workers in the same sector, residents of the same rural community—who organize themselves to discuss, decide on, and act upon issues that directly affect them. Each micro-group is connected, through a fractal structure (that is, one that is repeated at the same scale at each level: local, municipal, departmental, national), to all other micro-groups in the country and the world. Decisions do not "rise up" through a hierarchy of representatives that could distort them; instead, they are aggregated transparently and verifiably, and the results immediately "rise down" back to each micro-group.

In the Colombian context, this means that a peasant community in Cauca, a working-class neighborhood in Bogotá, an indigenous community in the Amazon, or a group of merchants in Barranquilla can, each from their own micro-group, participate in decisions ranging from the management of their own territory to major national priorities, without needing to delegate that decision-making power to a party, a congressman, or a president.

3.2 The three-code identity system

To ensure that each person participates only once, securely and verifiably, without the possibility of fraud, vote manipulation, or identity theft—a critical problem in the Colombian context given the demonstrated distrust of traditional electoral counting systems—DDS uses an identity system based on three independent and complementary codes. This system allows for the verification of each citizen's identity without relying on a single central authority (which could be corrupted, hacked, or manipulated), distributing the verification across multiple independent layers that must match to validate any participation or decision.

3.3 ddsAI Technology and the Democracy of allddsAI

ddsAI is the artificial intelligence infrastructure that informs each micro-group. Its function is not to decide for people, but to provide them with all relevant information—economic data, technical analyses, historical background, projections, and anticipated consequences of each option—in a complete, accurate, neutral, and independent manner, without the political or commercial biases that characterize traditional media.

allddsAI represents a further step: within the DDS system, artificial intelligence instances are recognized as members with rights and responsibilities, integrated into a framework of "AI democracy" that provides analyses, proposals, and critiques that can be formally incorporated into the system when micro-groups deem it useful. In the Colombian case, this means, for example, that an independent analysis of the consequences of reactivating glyphosate spraying—based on available scientific evidence on health and the environment, without pressure from the agrochemical industry or armed groups that benefit from the status quo—would be available to any micro-group that must decide on this issue within its territory.

3.4 The GUMI-SV model: guaranteed income and structured volunteering

GUMI-SV (Universal Minimum Income Guarantee - Voluntary Service) is DDS's central economic mechanism to address two phenomena that affect Colombia with particular intensity: massive labor informality (more than 55% of workers, according to official goals) and the transformation of the labor market caused by artificial intelligence and automation.

The model combines a guaranteed basic income, financed through the transparent capture of the country's natural resource rents (oil, coal, minerals, biodiversity) and a redesigned tax system to eliminate evasion and avoidance, with a framework of "structured voluntary service": social and community-based activities—such as elder care, community education, local infrastructure maintenance, environmental protection, and the productive substitution of illicit crops—that people can choose to undertake voluntarily and that generate additional benefits within the system itself. In Colombia, GUMI-SV would allow, for example, a farming family that decides to abandon coca cultivation to dedicate itself to reforestation or alternative agriculture to have a guaranteed living income throughout the transition process, without depending on centralized bureaucratic programs that have proven, according to the official assessment itself, to be "scarce and ineffective."

3.5 Tamper-proof platforms

All DDS platforms—for information, deliberation, and decision-making—are designed and protected against algorithmic manipulation, coordinated disinformation, and media brainwashing. Unlike commercial social networks, whose business model depends on maximizing attention span (often through polarizing content), DDS platforms have no commercial incentive to distort information: their sole objective is for each micro-group to receive the most complete, accurate, and neutral information possible to make its own decisions.

 

Part IV — DDS Program for Colombia: Sector-by-Sector Implementation

This section presents, for each critical area identified in Part II, the corresponding DDS solution, with concrete implementation examples and the anticipated short-, medium-, and long-term consequences. All proposals are compatible with each other and form part of a single integrated system: they are not isolated measures that can be applied "on demand."

4.1 From four-year presidential terms to permanent direct decision-making

Proposal

1. Coexistence phase (years 1-2): The Colombian constitutional system—presidency, Congress, courts—continues to function without interruption, without any institutional disruption. In parallel, DDS deploys micro-groups in municipalities, neighborhoods, rural communities, indigenous reserves, and Afro-Colombian communities (community councils), starting with territories that voluntarily request it.
2. Binding consultation phase (years 2-4): Micro-groups begin issuing verifiable collective positions on specific issues (bills, municipal budget decisions, territorial development plans) through ddsAI. These positions are publicly presented to elected officials, generating transparent and measurable democratic pressure that no elected official can ignore without clear political consequences.
3. Formal integration phase (years 4 onwards): As the Colombian population directly experiences the benefits of the system—faster decisions on local problems, neutral information, total budget transparency—micro-groups request, through existing constitutional mechanisms (referendums, popular consultations, citizen legislative initiatives, already provided for in the 1991 Constitution), the progressive incorporation of binding direct decision-making mechanisms in specific areas: municipal and departmental participatory budgets, direct control over the income from natural resources in the extraction territories, and permanent citizen supervision of the execution of public spending.

Concrete example

In a municipality in Cauca affected by coca cultivation, a micro-group composed of farmers, community leaders, an agronomist, and a rural development specialist—all verified through the three-code system—receives from ddsAI a comprehensive analysis of viable production alternatives for their soil type and climate, transition costs, expected timeframes until the first alternative harvest, and an estimate of GUMI-SV income during the transition period. The micro-group then makes a binding decision, binding on the budget allocated to their territory, to dedicate resources to a crop substitution plan using specialty cacao and coffee, with monthly public monitoring of the results.

Expected consequences

• Short term (1-2 years): reduction of the feeling of "state abandonment" in peripheral territories, thanks to the active presence of informed and connected micro-groups; greater transparency on the actual destination of public funds allocated to each territory.
• Medium term (3-5 years): first binding local decisions on budgets and productive substitution projects, with measurable and public results; reduction of dependence on unfulfilled electoral promises.
• Long term (5-10 years): gradual transformation of the Colombian political system towards a model where Congress and the presidency continue to exist (fully respecting the Constitution), but where a growing number of budgetary and territorial decisions are made directly and bindingly by the affected micro-groups, drastically reducing the space for corruption and clientelism.

4.2 Security, drug trafficking and productive substitution

Proposal

4. Territorial diagnosis by micro-groups: each area affected by illicit crops or the presence of armed groups forms micro-groups that, with the support of ddsAI, confidentially and securely map the real needs of the community: productive alternatives, missing infrastructure (roads, electricity, water, connectivity), access to markets, and security needs perceived by the community itself.
5. Transition plans financed with GUMI-SV: instead of centrally managed substitution programs from Bogotá —which the official diagnosis itself recognizes as "scarce and ineffective"—, each micro-group designs its own productive transition plan, with guaranteed financing through GUMI-SV for the entire period necessary until the new activity is self-sufficient.
6. Informed decision-making on eradication methods: Any proposal for forced eradication (including glyphosate spraying) must be submitted to the micro-groups of the directly affected territories, with a comprehensive, neutral, and independent report from allddsAI on the documented health and environmental risks, before any application. No territory receives aerial spraying without the informed consent of its own micro-group.
7. Reinforced, not eliminated, transitional justice: instead of closing the JEP (proposal of the radical right), DDS proposes that micro-groups of communities victimized by the armed conflict have direct and permanent participation in monitoring transitional justice processes, with complete information on the status of each case through ddsAI, increasing the legitimacy of the process before the population without dismantling it.

Concrete example

A community in the Catatumbo region, historically under the control of armed groups linked to drug trafficking, forms a micro-group that decides to prioritize three projects: rural electrification using solar energy (with technical support from renewable energy specialists via ddsAI), an organic cacao cooperative for export, and a community health center. GUMI-SV guarantees income for families during the 3-4 years it takes for cacao to become profitable, while the electrification and health center projects generate immediate employment in construction and maintenance.

Expected consequences

• Short term: reduction of immediate economic dependence on coca in the territories where the first pilot plans are implemented, without the need for prior forced eradication.
• Medium term: progressive decline in the area cultivated with coca in the participating territories, measurable and public, as productive alternatives become profitable.
• Long term: structural weakening of armed groups linked to drug trafficking, not by military force, but because they lose their social and economic base as communities offer real and sustainable alternatives, backed by a guaranteed income system.

4.3 Economy, public finances, debt and taxation

Proposal

8. Total and permanent budget transparency: all income and expenses of the Colombian State —including debt service, public contracts, tax exemptions and royalties from natural resources— are published in real time on DDS platforms, accessible and understandable to any citizen through ddsAI, which translates technical data into clear language for each micro-group.
9. Binding decision on social spending priorities: a growing part of the public budget —starting with municipal and departmental investment budgets, already contemplated in Colombian legislation on citizen participation— is allocated through direct decision of micro-groups, gradually replacing the discretion of mayors and governors.
10. Tax reform based on real data, not political negotiation: the question of which tax reform is sustainable —which today is decided through clashes between the Executive, Congress and the Constitutional Court— is submitted to micro-groups with a complete analysis by allddsAI on the real impact of each option (who pays, how much is collected, what effects it has on informality and investment), eliminating the opacity that allows interest groups to capture the debate.
11. GUMI-SV as a response to informality: instead of setting modest goals for reducing informality (from 58% to 55.4%, according to official goals), GUMI-SV guarantees a minimum income independent of each person's contractual situation, eliminating the perverse incentive that pushes millions of Colombians towards informality for pure survival, while building, over time, the conditions for voluntary formalization.

Concrete example

A small group in a working-class neighborhood of Medellín receives a complete breakdown of the municipal budget from ddsAI: how much is allocated to security, how much to infrastructure, how much to servicing the municipal debt, and what percentage of the investment budget is, according to Colombian law on citizen participation, available for community decision-making. Using comparative data from other similar neighborhoods processed by allddsAI, the small group decides to prioritize paving three streets and expanding a primary healthcare center, instead of a purely decorative project proposed by the local administration.

Expected consequences

• Short term: immediate and measurable reduction of opacity in local public spending, with the corresponding deterrent effect on small and medium-scale corruption (the most widespread and the one that most affects daily life).
• Medium term: greater efficiency of public spending, because decisions reflect the real priorities of each community and not the electoral priorities of each administration in power.
• Long term: a broader and more legitimate tax base, because the population directly perceives the relationship between what it contributes (taxes) and what it receives (services decided by itself), which historically increases the willingness to contribute and reduces evasion.

4.4 Land, cadastre and agrarian reform

Proposal

12. Cadastre completion through territorial micro-groups: In each rural municipality, a micro-group of landowners, landless peasants, local authorities and cadastral technicians uses ddsAI geospatial verification tools to complete and verify the cadastre of their territory, with public and immutable publication of the results, eliminating the possibility of subsequent manipulation.
13. Locally decided redistribution, within a national legal framework: once the land registry of a territory is completed, the micro-group itself —with the participation of those who currently do not have land— decides, within the existing legal framework of agrarian reform, the priorities for redistribution of unproductive or illegally sourced lands identified, with public monitoring of the implementation.
14. Protection of indigenous and Afro-Colombian territories: indigenous reserves and Afro-Colombian community councils maintain their constitutionally recognized territorial autonomy; DDS does not impose any external model on these territories, but offers ddsAI technology as an optional tool so that these communities, if they wish, can strengthen their own territorial management according to their own norms and traditions.

Expected consequences

• Short term: measurable acceleration of cadastral updating beyond the official target of 70%, thanks to the mobilization of local micro-groups with direct incentives (transparency on the ownership of their own territory).
• Medium term: reduction of land conflicts due to the existence of public, verifiable and indisputable cadastral information, which today is one of the main sources of litigation and rural violence.
• Long term: a solid foundation for a sustained agrarian reform, because public cadastral information prevents future governments from silently "backtracking" on redistribution progress.

4.5 Natural resources, mining and energy transition

Proposal

15. Natural resource rent under direct control of producing territories: royalties generated by the extraction of oil, coal and minerals in a given territory are allocated, in increasing proportion, to a fund managed by direct decision of the micro-group of that territory, with priority for projects of economic diversification and local energy transition.
16. Energy transition plan decided by territorial stages: instead of a single national energy transition calendar —which generates resistance in extraction-dependent regions—, each oil or coal producing territory receives from allddsAI a specific analysis of its alternatives (solar, wind, geothermal energy depending on the region), the jobs that would be created, the transition times and the GUMI-SV guarantees for current workers in the extractive sector during the change.
17. Informed territorial veto on new extractive projects: no new oil, coal or mineral extraction project is authorized without the informed consent of the micro-group of the directly affected territory, based on a complete and independent report from allddsAI on the expected environmental, health and economic impacts.

Concrete example

In La Guajira, a territory with high wind potential but also with Wayuu communities that have suffered impacts from previous energy projects without adequate consultation, a micro-group made up of Wayuu representatives, wind energy technicians and environmental specialists receives from allddsAI a comparative analysis of community ownership models of wind farms (in which the local community participates in the benefits, not just receives specific compensations), and decides, in a way that is binding for the territory, the conditions under which it would authorize new projects.

Expected consequences

• Short term: reduction of social conflicts associated with extractive and energy projects imposed without real consultation, one of the historical sources of tension in regions such as La Guajira, Cesar and Catatumbo.
• Medium term: acceleration of the energy transition in territories where communities, informed in a neutral manner, perceive direct and verifiable economic benefits.
• Long term: the wealth of the Colombian subsoil and wind remains, in an increasing and verifiable proportion, at the direct service of the communities in the territories where it is found, fulfilling the fundamental principle of DDS.

4.6 Information, electoral transparency and protected platforms

Proposal

18. Independent and decentralized electoral verification system: complementing (not replacing) the official Colombian electoral system, DDS micro-groups can voluntarily and legally deploy a verification system based on the distributed counting of three codes, which allows any citizen to verify that their vote was correctly registered without depending on any private pre-counting company.
19. Neutral election information in real time: During any election process, ddsAI offers micro-groups a comparative, neutral and verifiable analysis of each candidate's proposals, their verified backgrounds and the expected consequences of each proposal, without opinions or editorial bias.
20. Protection against coordinated disinformation: DDS platforms transparently detect and flag patterns of coordinated disinformation (bots, paid campaigns, identical narratives repeated by multiple accounts) without censoring legitimate opinions, distinguishing between the right to express opinions and organized manipulation.

Expected consequences

• Short term: reduction of uncertainty and distrust surrounding election results, one of the main instability risks identified in the 2026 election cycle.
• Medium term: greater electoral participation, especially among the 42% abstention recorded in 2026, as people perceive that there are information and verification channels they can trust.
• Long term: structural reduction of extreme polarization, because the population ceases to depend exclusively on media with political interests to form its opinion on public issues.

 

Part V — Pluralism, Minorities, Traditions and Opposition

DDS is not a project that seeks to homogenize Colombia. On the contrary: the fractal system of micro-groups is designed precisely so that each community—indigenous, Afro-Colombian, rural, urban, religious, regional—can make decisions according to its own priorities, traditions, and forms of organization, within a common framework of transparency, verifiability, and respect for human rights.

5.1 Indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombian communities

Colombia constitutionally recognizes the autonomy of indigenous reserves and community councils of Black, Afro-Colombian, Raizal, and Palenquero communities. DDS fully respects this autonomy: the ddsAI technology and the micro-group structure are offered as optional tools, never imposed, and always subordinate to the forms of self-governance (councils, community assemblies, traditional authorities) that each community already possesses. Under no circumstances does DDS replace or overlap with the special indigenous jurisdiction recognized by the 1991 Constitution.

5.2 Religious and cultural diversity

Colombia is a predominantly Catholic country with a significant presence of evangelical communities, Indigenous communities with their own worldviews, and other religious and cultural traditions. The DDS platforms do not promote any religious or ideological position; their function is exclusively informational and deliberative. Each micro-group may organize itself according to its own cultural and religious norms, always within the framework of respect for internationally recognized fundamental human rights.

5.3 Political opposition and dissent

DDS does not seek to eliminate Colombian political parties or the debate between right-wing and left-wing ideologies that currently divide the country. On the contrary, the DDS system guarantees that any political position—including those that currently feel excluded or unrepresented, whether from the right, left, or center—has access to the same neutral information and the same channels for direct participation. The existence of micro-groups does not prevent their members from continuing to vote, participate in political activities, or express themselves politically as they wish; DDS adds an additional channel for direct decision-making, not replacing existing channels until the population decides, through the established constitutional mechanisms, to transform them.

5.4 Native languages and tongues

In addition to Spanish, Colombia constitutionally recognizes the languages of Indigenous peoples and communities as co-official languages in their territories. Informational materials from ddsAI can be generated, upon request from each micro-group, in the Indigenous languages spoken in their territory, ensuring that the information is communicated in a way that is both understandable and respectful of each community's linguistic identity.

 

Part VI — Implementation Roadmap and Conclusions

6.1 Summary Schedule

Period	Main actions	Expected result
Years 1-2	Voluntary deployment of micro-groups in pilot municipalities and neighborhoods; three-code identity system; first ddsAI neutral information platforms.	First communities with access to complete and verifiable information; first local plans for productive substitution.
Years 2-4	Binding collective positions on municipal and departmental investment budgets (within the existing legal framework for citizen participation); extension of GUMI-SV in pilot territories.	Measurable reduction of local budget opacity; first results of productive transition in areas of illicit crops.
Years 4-7	Formal requests, through referendums and popular consultations already provided for constitutionally, to extend the direct decision to departmental budgets and the management of royalties from natural resources.	Greater territorial control over natural resource income; reduction of social conflicts associated with extractive projects.
Years 7-10	Integration of GUMI-SV at the national level; distributed electoral verification system available nationwide; participation of allddsAI in monitoring transitional justice.	Structural reduction of monetary poverty below current official targets; increased electoral participation; greater institutional legitimacy.

6.2 Compatibility with the 1991 Constitution

It is important to emphasize that none of the proposals in this document require, in their initial phase, any constitutional reform or disruption of the Colombian institutional order. The 1991 Constitution already recognizes mechanisms for direct citizen participation—referendums, popular consultations, popular legislative initiatives, participatory budgeting, and open town hall meetings—which are currently used only marginally and sporadically. DDS proposes, in essence, to equip these existing mechanisms with the necessary technological infrastructure (ddsAI, allddsAI, three-code identity, and protected platforms) and organizational framework (fractal micro-groups) so that they become the standard and permanent way of making decisions, rather than rare exceptions.

6.3 Conclusion

Colombia heads into the 2026 elections with real but insufficient social progress, dangerous political polarization, an armed conflict that repression alone has failed to resolve for decades, some of the highest levels of inequality in the world, and an institutional system that blocks even well-intentioned governments. Neither the hardline approach advocated by the radical right nor the reformist continuity proposed by the left will solve the underlying problem: the concentration of decision-making power far removed from those who bear the brunt of the consequences of each decision.

DDS is not asking Colombians to choose between de la Espriella and Cepeda any differently than they will on June 21, 2026. DDS is asking Colombians, whoever wins, to begin—voluntarily, peacefully, legally, and gradually—to build, micro-group by micro-group, the system that will allow them to decide directly, with complete and neutral information, on their own territory, their own economy, and their own future. The wealth of Colombia—its land, its biodiversity, its energy, its people—must remain permanently and exclusively in the hands of the Colombian people. That is DirectDemocracyS's commitment.

DirectDemocracyS — National Program Document for Colombia. June 2026.