DirectDemocracyS — DDS

Global Direct Democracy

The political, economic, financial and social program of the Republic of Iraq

A critical analysis of the current situation and a comprehensive action plan for the transition towards full popular sovereignty.

2026

Introduction: Who we are and what we offer

Direct Democracy Worldwide (DDS) is a leading and radical global political movement built on logic, common sense, in-depth research, realism, truth, consistency, and mutual respect. We are not a traditional political party seeking to seize power and monopolize it, but rather an organizational tool that returns power, wealth, and decision-making to their rightful owners: the Iraqi people, in all their Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen, Assyrian, Shabak, Yazidi, Christian, and other components.

Our fundamental principle, which we apply in every country in the world without exception, is that the wealth of every country, and the power to make decisions within every country, must always and forever remain, and only, in the hands of its people. This principle is not a slogan, but a complete operational framework that we explain in detail in this program, with specific technical, legal, and institutional mechanisms that can be implemented immediately.

This program is not a propaganda document devoid of content. It is the result of a careful analysis of the current political, economic, social and financial situation in Iraq, based on recent data (end of 2025 and beginning of 2026), followed by a detailed presentation of each fundamental problem, a practical and implementable solution, with concrete examples, and realistic expected results, both positive and negative, without exaggeration or embellishment.

Part One: A Critical Analysis of the Current Situation in Iraq

1.1 The political situation: a structural and inherited paralysis

On November 11, 2025, Iraqis went to the polls for the sixth time since the fall of the previous regime, in elections that saw a turnout of approximately 56%, higher than the 2021 elections (41%), but still reflecting deep-seated public apathy and a growing lack of trust in the entire political system. The results confirmed what had been expected: the cohesion of traditional political forces and the absence of any real breakthrough by independent alternatives.

The coalition of outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, called "Reconstruction and Development," came in first with approximately 46 seats, followed by the "State of Law" coalition led by Nouri al-Maliki with approximately 29 seats, then the Sunni "Progress" coalition with approximately 27 seats, the Kurdistan Democratic Party with approximately 26 seats, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan with approximately 15 seats, in addition to smaller forces such as the New Generation Movement and Kurdish Islamist groups. This fragmentation means, as in all previous elections, that forming a government will take months of closed-door negotiations between the blocs, while fundamental reforms remain stalled.

After more than twenty years, the Iraqi political system remains captive to sectarian and ethnic power-sharing (the quota system), where top positions (the presidency, the prime ministership, and the speakership of parliament) are distributed according to pre-determined quotas among Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, rather than based on competence or electoral platforms. This system perpetuates political patronage and makes partisan quotas, not the will of the voters, the de facto standard for forming a government.

The electoral laws themselves, particularly the amendment that came into effect in March 2023 and relied on a system of district divisions that many observers described as favoring major parties and weakening independents and smaller parties, constitute a structural obstacle to any genuine political renewal from within the existing representative system. Opposition forces, including Kurdish groups, have also raised accusations of irregularities and manipulation in the electoral process, with some even withdrawing from parliament in protest.

Regionally, Iraq faces complex pressures: the US administration is pushing for a strong, non-sectarian central government to contain Iranian influence, while Iran, through its allied armed factions, seeks greater institutional integration of these factions within the Iraqi state to ensure the continuation of its influence. This has been evident in reports of Iraqi armed groups being used to suppress protests within Iran itself, and in statements by these factions expressing their readiness to intervene in defense of Iran in the event of any US escalation.

1.2 Internal Divisions: Kurdistan, Basra, and the Stalled Federalism

The relationship between Baghdad and Erbil remains one of the most sensitive issues. Oil and gas, the federal budget and Kurdistan's share of it, the salaries of the region's employees, and the unity of the Peshmerga forces are all recurring crises, temporarily resolved through fragile political compromises that quickly collapse with each new budget crisis. The internal rivalry between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) adds another layer of complexity, as this competition is reflected in the distribution of senior positions within the regional government itself.

In the south, the debate over transforming Basra, Iraq's most important oil-producing province, into a federal region independent of the central government resurfaced in late 2025 and early 2026, following announcements from the provincial council in this direction. This debate reflects a deep sense of injustice among Basra's residents, who generate the lion's share of Iraq's oil revenues while their province suffers from severe environmental pollution, dilapidated infrastructure, and a lack of basic services such as electricity and clean water, in stark contrast to the immense wealth extracted from their land.

This dynamic—a center that monopolizes decision-making and wealth, and peripheries (Kurdistan, Basra, Anbar, and others) that feel marginalized—is precisely the pattern that proves the urgent need for a truly decentralized system that redistributes power and wealth on a fair geographical and popular basis, not on the basis of elite deals.

1.3 Economic situation: A rentier economy on the verge of collapse

Iraq is experiencing a stark economic paradox: it is one of the world’s largest oil producers, with a nominal GDP approaching $515 billion in 2025 (approximately $991 billion in purchasing power parity) and a per capita income of around $5,677 nominal (approximately $14,464 in purchasing power parity). Yet, its fiscal management has become demonstrably unsustainable. Recent economic reports (March 2026) indicate that roughly 93% of crude oil export revenues are used entirely to fund public sector salaries, pensions, and social welfare programs, leaving very little room for investment in infrastructure, economic diversification, health, and education.

This model—an economy entirely dependent on oil revenues and entirely directed toward funding a massive public sector wage bill—is inherently fragile: any decline in global oil prices or export volumes immediately translates into a severe liquidity crisis that directly threatens the livelihoods of millions of families. This is precisely what happened: by the end of 2025, the salaries of nearly eight million people—including civil servants, retirees, and social safety net beneficiaries—were delayed, an unprecedented situation in a country where the public sector is the cornerstone of the economy and the primary source of income for a large segment of the population. The Ministry of Finance asserted the availability of resources and denied the existence of a liquidity crisis, but these statements were insufficient to reassure the employees who had not received their salaries.

In addition to the inflated wage bill, Iraq suffers from a heavy reliance on imports of energy products from neighboring countries (Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) at an estimated value of hundreds of millions of dollars annually, especially kerosene and other refined oil products. This situation is radically at odds with Iraq being a prime oil-producing country, and reflects the weakness of the local manufacturing and refining sector inherited from years of wars, sanctions, and ISIS.

The unemployment rate is projected to reach nearly 13% in 2025, with a very low actual employment rate (around 33.2%), meaning that a significant proportion of the working-age population, particularly women and young people, are entirely outside the labor market. The agricultural sector accounts for only 2.8% of GDP, while the industrial sector (mostly oil-based) represents 55.6%, and services 42.3%—a distribution that reflects a dangerously unbalanced economy, entirely dependent on a single, volatile resource.

Public debt is about 45.9% of GDP in 2024, which is a relatively average figure, but the real problem is not the size of the debt but the structure of public spending: operational expenses (salaries and subsidies) consume the largest part of the budget, while investment expenditures (roads, hospitals, schools, electricity networks, water treatment plants) remain very weak compared to the actual size of the needs.

1.4 Infrastructure and Services: The Gap Between Wealth and Lived Reality

Despite the country's enormous oil revenues, the average Iraqi citizen faces a daily reality of frequent power outages, especially during the sweltering summer months, shortages of clean drinking water, and a dilapidated healthcare and education system resulting from decades of conflict, sanctions, and mismanagement. This gap between the country's vast oil and gas reserves and the actual services provided to its citizens is a primary source of public discontent, which has been repeatedly expressed through widespread protest movements in recent years, particularly among young people.

There are ambitious projects underway, such as the Grand Faw Port, which, according to the Ministry of Transport in February 2026, had reached advanced stages of construction; the multi-service "Economic City" project in a border region; the "Worldlink" project in partnership with Emirati companies; and evaluations of investment projects in Anbar Governorate to exploit silica reserves. These projects represent positive steps toward diversification, but they remain large-scale, top-down projects without a clear mechanism to ensure that their returns and benefits reach the local populations in the areas hosting them, or the Iraqi people as a whole, as the rightful owners of their country's resources.

1.5 Analytical Summary: Why Traditional Solutions Fail

All reform attempts in Iraq since 2003—amending constitutions, amending election laws, forming technocratic governments, and forging political agreements between blocs—share one fundamental characteristic: they are all top-down reforms, decided upon within a narrow circle of political, partisan, and sectarian elites, and then imposed on the people as final realities. The result has always been the same: the perpetuation of sectarian power-sharing, the continuation of corruption, the persistence of the gap between national wealth and daily life, and the continued feeling among citizens that they have no real influence over the decisions that determine their fate.

The solution offered by DirectDemocracyS is radically different in its approach: we do not propose a "better party" or a "clean leader," but rather we propose changing the decision-making structure itself, from a hierarchical representative system susceptible to being hijacked by elites, to a direct, digital, transparent, secure participatory system that effectively returns decision-making and wealth to the hands of every Iraqi citizen, through specific technical and institutional mechanisms that we explain in detail in the following parts of this program.

Part Two: The DirectDemocracyS System — Structure and Mechanisms

2.1 Microgroups: Popular sovereignty from the grassroots

The core of the DDS system is "micro-groups," which are small gatherings of citizens at the local level (neighborhood, village, district) that meet both digitally and in person to discuss issues that directly concern them, make decisions about them, and then transfer these decisions in a decentralized and branching manner (fractal model) to higher levels: governorate, region, and state. Each level does not cancel the lower level, but rather transmits a transparent aggregate of its decisions.

In the case of Iraq, this model practically means: a subgroup in the Al-Shula neighborhood of Baghdad, or in a district in the Dohuk Governorate, or in a sub-district in Basra, can discuss and decide on its priorities (water network repair, fair distribution of local oil revenues, an educational program, etc.), and send this decision, along with the voting results, to the next level via an encrypted and secure digital platform, without political or partisan intermediaries.

The essential benefit of this model in the Iraqi context is that it completely transcends the sectarian and ethnic quota system: the decision is not made by negotiation between the "representatives" of the sects at the top, but rather it rises from the popular base, where Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen, Assyrian, Yazidi, Christian citizens and all other components coexist as neighbors with shared daily interests (water, electricity, roads, education, security) before they have conflicting political affiliations.

2.2 Three-Code Identity System

To ensure secure, individual, and tamper-proof participation in every vote or debate, the DDS system relies on a digital identity consisting of three independent and integrated tokens for each citizen: the first token to verify personal identity (linked to official documents and encrypted), the second token to verify geographic location and affiliation to the relevant subgroup (to ensure that local decisions are actually made by the residents of the area), and the third token, which is the vote itself, used once for each decision and generated randomly and encryptedly linked to the previous two tokens without revealing the voter's identity in the public results record.

This three-tiered system addresses two fundamental problems plaguing traditional elections in Iraq: fraud and manipulation of results (which plagued the last elections, according to several political groups), and the lack of genuine secrecy (which makes citizens in conservative local environments hesitant to vote freely). Identity verification occurs locally and across a distributed network, eliminating a single, centralized system that could be compromised or controlled.

2.3 ddsAI and allddsAI technologies: Neutral, genuine, and independent information

One of the biggest reasons for the polarization and political paralysis in Iraq is the control exerted by media outlets affiliated with parties, factions, or regional powers over shaping public opinion. Each segment of the population receives a narrative completely different from reality, making any national consensus practically impossible. The ddsAI system is a specialized artificial intelligence platform that serves as a neutral analytical information source, independent of any party, sect, or state. It is accessible to every subgroup and every citizen, providing data and analyses supported by documented sources, and presenting all competing viewpoints on any issue without bias or direction.

The allddsAI system represents a further step: "artificial AI democracy." This means that multiple, independent versions of AI tools operate as active members of the DDS ecosystem, verifying each other's information, providing critical reviews of proposals and programs, and publicly disclosing their contributions, including when their suggestions or criticisms are adopted in final decisions. This creates a multi-source information system that is difficult for any single political entity to penetrate or monopolize—a stark contrast to the current Iraqi media landscape, which is divided along sectarian and partisan lines.

Each subgroup has a team of specialists (in economics, law, engineering, health, education, etc.) working with the support of ddsAI to provide detailed professional analyses of each decision under discussion, so that the citizen goes to vote with complete and balanced information, not partisan or sectarian propaganda.

2.4 Security and protection against misinformation and media manipulation

DDS platforms are designed from the ground up with multi-layered protection systems against manipulation and disinformation: end-to-end encryption of communications, distribution of data on a decentralized network (there is no single server that can be shut down, controlled, or blocked), automated and coordinated account detection systems (bots and organized disinformation campaigns), and a strict separation between DDS platforms and any advertising algorithms or "interaction" algorithms designed to prolong usage time or to emotionally engage users, as is the case with most current commercial social networks.

In the Iraqi context, where social media platforms are used extensively by factions and parties to spread conflicting narratives and sometimes sectarian incitement, the DDS platform provides a completely separate and neutral space where citizens can participate in public debate and voting without being subjected to that constant media pressure, while fully preserving their right to express their opinion, including criticism or opposition.

2.5 GUMI-SV Model: Basic Income and Structured Volunteer Work

The GUMI-SV (Guaranteed Universal Basic Income Linked to Structured Volunteering) model is a socio-economic framework that guarantees every citizen a minimum income, financed by national natural resource revenues (which in the case of Iraq are very large relative to the population), in exchange for a voluntary and structured contribution to activities of public benefit (education, care, environment, local infrastructure, digitization), organized and managed through the subgroups themselves, and not through a heavy central bureaucracy.

In Iraq, where the public sector functions as a de facto social safety net (salaries for millions of employees and retirees) in an unsustainable manner and is entirely tied to the price of oil, the GUMI-SV model offers a gradual alternative: converting part of the current payroll into a basic income linked to a national sovereign wealth fund (described in the next section), while redirecting excess public sector employment towards structured and genuinely beneficial voluntary activities for local communities, rather than nominal jobs with no productive value, a phenomenon well-known and documented in the Iraqi administrative system.

2.6 Sovereignty over resources: The non-negotiable principle

In every national program offered by DDS, in every country, we apply the same principle without exception: the country's wealth (natural resources, land, water, strategic infrastructure) and the power to decide on it must always and solely remain in the hands of the people of that country. In practice, this means, in the case of Iraq:

• Any contract for the exploitation of oil, gas, or any natural resource must be presented, with its full terms and in simplified language supported by a neutral ddsAI analysis, to the subgroups in the directly affected areas, and to the Iraqi people in general, for a vote, before final signing.
• The proceeds from these riches go into a transparent national sovereign wealth fund, whose accounts are managed publicly and in real time via the DDS platform, with constitutionally defined percentages (not subject to modification by a single government) allocated to basic income (GUMI-SV), infrastructure investment, and local funds for productive provinces.
• No government, party, faction, or foreign state can control these assets or their contracts without the direct and transparent consent of representatives of the affected subgroups.

This principle directly addresses real historical grievances, such as the feeling among Basra residents that they generate wealth while decisions and revenues go to Baghdad without a fair local return, or the feeling among Kurdistan residents that their share of the federal budget is held hostage by repeated political negotiations.

 

2.7 Governance in the absence of free elections or under one-party systems

This program is directed at Iraq, which has a formal, albeit flawed, sectarian electoral system, marred by alleged rigging and fraud. However, DDS applies a principle consistent with all countries worldwide, including those with a single party or where elections are not held: subgroups can be built and operate independently of any formal party or governmental structure, entirely peacefully and without conflict or violence, because they do not "seize" existing power, but rather build, in parallel, a participatory system that derives its legitimacy from the increasing voluntary participation of citizens.

Over time, as the proportion of citizens participating in subgroups increases, the collective decision they produce becomes a genuine, documented, and transparent expression of popular will, difficult for any authority to ignore, just as no authority can ignore a large, documented opinion poll encompassing the majority of the population. The transformation occurs through the accumulation of popular legitimacy and transparency, not through confrontation, which ensures the peaceful, intelligent, and secure nature of this process, with full respect for all existing institutions, traditions, and laws throughout the transition.

Part Three: The Political and Institutional Program

3.1 The problem: Sectarian power-sharing and governmental paralysis

As we explained in the analysis, the quota system (the system of constituent groups) transforms government formation into lengthy negotiations between partisan and sectarian elites, lasting for months and paralyzing the state. Meanwhile, major decisions (the budget, appointments, policies) remain hostage to power balances unrelated to electoral platforms or competence. The sixth elections (November 2025) accurately replicated this pattern: a predictable victory for traditional forces and expectations of protracted negotiations to form a government.

3.2 DDS Solution: Subgroup Coordination Board

We propose establishing a participatory structure parallel to the existing parliamentary structure, called the "Coordination Council of Iraqi Subgroups," which would serve as a consultative body with moral and political (and gradually constitutional) binding authority on all major decisions. This council would operate as follows:

1. Voluntary subgroups are formed at the neighborhood/village/district level, open to all citizens without any party, sectarian or ethnic affiliation requirement, with registration via the three-code identity system.
2. Each group elects, periodically and subject to change, local coordinators (not "deputies" in a traditional representative sense, but facilitators of discussion and faithful transmitters of decisions).
3. Decisions concerning local issues (services, infrastructure, local spending priorities) are made directly at the group level and implemented through coordination mechanisms with the existing local administration.
4. Issues of a national character (energy contracts, federal budget, major policies) are presented, with a neutral ddsAI analysis that explains all options and their consequences, to all subgroups across Iraq, and the results are compiled transparently at the governorate level and then at the national level.
5. The results of this direct popular vote are published immediately and officially presented to Parliament and the government as a documented popular position, which, over time, with increasing participation, becomes an actual reference that is difficult for any government to ignore.

A practical example: When discussing a new oil field development contract, instead of the matter being decided in closed-door negotiations between political blocs in Baghdad, the contract, with its full terms, is presented to the local communities in the affected governorate (e.g., Basra), along with a ddsAI analysis of the contract terms, the state's share of revenue, the environmental impact, and the expected local job opportunities. The residents vote, the result is published, and their position becomes an official part of the decision-making process.

3.3 Addressing sectarian power-sharing at its roots

We do not propose abolishing the balanced representation of Iraqi components (Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks, and others) by a sudden top-down decision, but rather we propose dissolving it gradually through the mechanism of decision-making from the ground up: when the issues put to a vote are common living issues (electricity, water, education, job opportunities) that transcend sectarian affiliation, citizens discover practically, through the announced results of their votes, that their real priorities are similar across affiliations, which gradually weakens the logic of “sectarian voting” that is fueled by the elites to consolidate their power.

At the same time, the DDS platform guarantees guaranteed and protected representation for all minorities (Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks, Mandaean Sabians, Kakais, and others) through subgroups allocated to them in their areas of presence (Nineveh Plain, Sinjar, and others), with a symbolic and actual veto right over any national decision that directly and negatively affects their cultural, religious, or linguistic rights, thus ensuring that the numerical majority is not used to crush the particularities of minorities.

3.4 True Federalism: Resolving the Basra and Kurdistan Issue

Regarding the debate on turning Basra into a federal region, the DDS system offers a solution that goes beyond the binary question (region yes/no) through a more precise mechanism: a Sovereign Local Fund, to which a fixed and non-negotiable annual percentage (for example, ranging between 5% and 10% depending on popular consensus through voting) of the revenues of resources extracted from the governorate’s lands is constitutionally allocated, managed locally and with full transparency through the DDS platform, under the direct supervision of local subgroups, regardless of the official constitutional status of the governorate (region or governorate linked to the center).

This solution separates the complex political question (the constitutional situation, which requires broad national consensus and may take years) from the urgent practical question (Will Basra benefit immediately and tangibly from its oil wealth? The answer: Yes, immediately, through the local fund, regardless of the outcome of the federal debate).

For Kurdistan, the same principle applies: the region’s share of the federal budget, and its oil and gas revenues, are managed through a transparent local fund on the DDS platform, updated in real time, so that the cycle of recurring crises about “delays in transferring funds from Baghdad” ends, because full transparency (no government is able to hide or delay transfer information) makes any dispute resolvable quickly through a direct popular arbitration mechanism between the subgroups in Baghdad and Erbil.

The file on the unification of the Peshmerga forces, which has remained pending for years, can be presented, with a neutral military and legal analysis from ddsAI, directly to the subgroups in Kurdistan and Iraq as a whole, to determine a clear timetable and mechanisms for unification, instead of remaining hostage to intertwined Kurdish-Kurdish and Kurdish-federal party balances.

3.5 Dealing with armed factions and the security file

The issue of armed factions linked to Iran, and the proliferation of weapons outside the official army and police forces, is one of Iraq's most complex and dangerous challenges. DDS does not offer military or security solutions (that is outside the scope of this program), but it does provide an important political tool: complete transparency regarding the budgets, funding, and decisions related to these factions. This information is made available to the public through the DDS platform, including residents of the areas where these factions are active, along with an impartial analysis by ddsAI of the impact of this situation on Iraq's local economy, security, and international relations.

This transparency, on its own, does not resolve the issue immediately, but it removes the “taboo” character that always turns public discussion into extremist slogans on one hand or complete denial on the other, and opens the door to a broad and enlightened public discussion about the future of the state’s monopoly on weapons, a discussion that is necessary but is absent today from the official public sphere.

3.6 Respect for traditions, religions, languages, and opposition

The DDS system, in Iraq as in every country, adheres to fixed principles:

• Complete neutrality towards religious, sectarian and ethnic affiliations: The platform does not classify users according to their religion, sect or ethnicity for any political purpose, and protects the right of each component to practice its rituals, traditions and language with complete freedom.
• The official languages of the platform in Iraq include Arabic, Kurdish (in its two main dialects, Sorani and Kurmanji), Turkmen and Syriac, with neutral simultaneous translation via ddsAI provided for all content submitted for national discussion, so that no citizen is at a disadvantage because of language.
• The political opposition, in all its forms, including the forces that boycotted the elections (such as the Sadrist movement in previous cycles), has a full and guaranteed right to form subgroups, participate in the discussion and voting, and present its positions via ddsAI on an equal footing with all other forces, without any discrimination or censorship.
• DDS does not impose any economic, social or religious model "from the outside": Every essential decision concerning the cultural or religious identity of Iraq remains in the hands of the Iraqis themselves, through their direct vote, not through recommendations from experts, international organizations or from DDS itself.

Part Four: The Economic and Financial Program

4.1 The Problem: An economy that lives day to day on fluctuating rents

As analyzed above, the Iraqi economy allocates approximately 93% of its oil revenues to cover wages, salaries, and social welfare. This model has led to a liquidity crisis that, by the end of 2025, resulted in delayed salaries for nearly eight million people. Meanwhile, the non-oil sector (agriculture at 2.8%, manufacturing very weak) does not represent a viable alternative base for absorbing the growing workforce, particularly among young people, where unemployment stands at 13% and the actual employment rate is only 33.2% of the workforce.

4.2 DDS Solution: The Sovereign Transparency Fund

We propose the creation of a new national sovereign wealth fund, separate from the regular operating budget, into which a fixed constitutional percentage of all oil and gas export revenues would be allocated (we propose a starting percentage of between 10% and 15%, to be definitively determined by a direct popular vote across subgroups after a ddsAI analysis of various scenarios). This fund would have three key characteristics that distinguish it from traditional sovereign wealth funds:

6. Full and instant transparency: Every income and every expenditure from the fund is published automatically and immediately on the DDS platform, so that any citizen can, at any moment, see exactly how much the fund has received this month, and where every dinar of it has gone, down to the project and governorate level.
7. Participatory governance: Decisions regarding the use of major fund proceeds (launching a new infrastructure project, adjusting the basic income transfer rate) are put to a direct popular vote across subgroups, not left to the discretion of a single government.
8. Constitutionally fixed allocation: A percentage of the fund (we propose 40% as a starting point for discussion) is permanently allocated to finance the GUMI-SV basic income, such that no future government can "seize" this funding for other purposes without a direct popular vote changing this percentage.

4.3 Detailed GUMI-SV Model for Iraq

Assuming a reasonable initial transfer rate of oil revenues (which in recent years have exceeded tens of billions of dollars annually), a three-stage, phased basic income program can be designed:

Phase 1 (Years 1-2): Partial basic income for the most vulnerable groups

Funding will be directed first to retirees and families reliant on the social safety net—a group whose salaries were already delayed at the end of 2025—through fixed monthly direct transfers guaranteed by a transparent sovereign wealth fund, rather than the operating budget, which is vulnerable to liquidity crises. This addresses the most immediate and pressing problem: ensuring that the scenario of "eight million people without salaries" is not repeated.

Phase Two (Years 3-5): Expanding the basic income for young people and job seekers

Unemployed youth (who make up a large part of the 13% unemployment rate) are integrated into the full GUMI-SV program: a basic income conditional on participation in structured voluntary activities (organized through local subgroups) in areas such as: local digitization (public service data entry, record digitization), supplementary education (educational support for children in underserved areas), the environment (rehabilitation of land affected by oil pollution in Basra, for example), and local maintenance of small infrastructure.

Phase Three (Years 5-10): Universal Basic Income and Complete Economic Diversification

As the economic diversification program matures (Section 4.4), the basic income is gradually expanded to include all adult citizens, with a gradual and parallel decline in the "formal" public payroll (jobs that do not produce an actual service, a documented and widespread phenomenon in the Iraqi administrative apparatus), through the voluntary and gradual redirection of this workforce towards the emerging private sector and structured paid voluntary activities, without the forced dismissal of any employee.

4.4 Economic diversification: from rent-seeking to production

The fundamental problem is not the presence of oil, but the lack of diversification. We propose a diversification program based on Iraq's actual and existing strengths, not on far-fetched dreams.

4.4.1 Refining and Oil Processing Industries

Instead of importing hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of refined petroleum products annually from Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait (a paradoxical situation for a crude oil-producing country), a portion of the sovereign wealth fund could be allocated to finance the expansion and modernization of existing Iraqi refineries, in partnership with the local and international private sector. The terms of these contracts would, as previously explained, be subject to a vote by the affected sub-groups. The expected outcome over 5-7 years would be a significant reduction in the energy import bill and the creation of thousands of direct and indirect jobs in the refining sector and related industries (plastics, fertilizers, building materials).

4.4.2 Agriculture: Restoring Iraq's role as a regional food basket

The agricultural sector represents only 2.8% of the GDP, despite Iraq's historically rich agricultural heritage (Mesopotamia). The proposed solution: a local fund for each agricultural province (financed by the sovereign wealth fund), managed through local agricultural sub-groups, to finance irrigation modernization projects (a vital necessity given the escalating water crisis caused by Turkish and Iranian dams on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers), provide modern seeds and equipment, and connect farmers directly to markets, bypassing intermediaries who currently capture the largest profit margins.

4.4.3 Religious, historical and natural tourism

Iraq is home to religious sites of global significance (Karbala, Najaf, Samarra, Kadhimiya) that receive millions of visitors annually from Iran, the Gulf states, and South Asia, in addition to exceptional historical sites (Ur, Babylon, Nineveh, and prehistoric ruins). Organized investment in tourism infrastructure (transportation, accommodation, and services) around these sites, with transparent local management through sub-groups in Karbala, Najaf, Mosul, and other locations, could create an economic sector comparable to oil in the medium term, while fully respecting the religious and cultural character of these sites.

4.4.4 Renewable Energy: Exploiting the Geographic Location

Iraq has some of the highest solar irradiance rates in the world, yet investment in solar energy remains very limited. Decentralized solar energy projects, at the governorate and district levels, could reduce reliance on gas/oil-fired electricity (which is subject to frequent outages), decrease energy imports, and create jobs in installation and maintenance, with initial funding from the sovereign wealth fund and operating revenues partially returned to the local fund of the host governorate.

4.5 Addressing public debt and spending structure

Public debt at 45.9% of GDP is not high by international standards, but the structure of spending (operating versus investment expenditures) is the problem. We propose, through a direct popular vote on the annual budget (not just the current formal parliamentary approval), setting a constitutional minimum for the percentage of investment expenditures (infrastructure, health, education, renewable energy) in the total budget, to be gradually increased over 10 years, in parallel with a gradual reduction in the "nominal" payroll through the GUMI-SV program described above.

4.6 Major Infrastructure Projects: Transparency as a Prerequisite for Continuation

Projects such as the Grand Faw Port, the Border Economic City, the Worldlink project with Emirati partners, and the silica projects in Anbar are projects with real economic potential. The DDS solution does not object to these projects, but rather adds a mandatory layer of transparency and public participation: every project with a value exceeding a certain threshold (e.g., $100 million) must have its full contract published (excluding only sensitive security information, and this must be independently verified by legal experts through ddsAI) on the DDS platform, with regular updates on implementation phases and actual spending, and an advisory vote by subgroups in the host regions on terms related to local employment and environmental impact.

A concrete example: The Grand Faw Port, which, according to the Ministry of Transport (February 2026), has reached advanced stages of construction, could, through a popular vote in Basra Governorate, allocate a minimum number of job and vocational training opportunities for the residents of Basra and other southern cities, with a percentage of its future operating revenues going directly to the local Basra fund described in Section 3.4.

Part Five: The Social Program

5.1 Electricity and Water: From Chronic Interruptions to Stable Service

Frequent power outages, especially in the summer, and the shortage of clean drinking water are the two biggest sources of daily discontent for Iraqi citizens. These issues are also directly linked to the economic situation (energy imports) and the environment (water pollution in Basra and the south). The DDS solution is based on three pillars:

9. A local energy and water fund in each governorate, financed by the sovereign wealth fund in proportions proportional to the population and actual need (not according to the political weight of the governorate), managed through local subgroups with technical oversight from ddsAI teams specializing in electrical and water engineering.
10. Priority is given to decentralized solar energy (as mentioned in section 4.4.4) to cover neighborhoods and villages, instead of relying entirely on a centralized national grid that is vulnerable to outages and attacks.
11. Water treatment and pollution control projects in Basra and the south are of the highest priority, given the direct and documented health impact on the population (water pollution from oil waste and industrial sewage), funded by the constitutionally allocated local Basra fund.

Expected outcome: Within 3-5 years, a significant decrease in daily power outage hours in the beneficiary governorates, and a measurable improvement in drinking water quality, with these performance indicators (power supply hours, pollution levels) being published publicly and in real time on the DDS platform, so that any citizen can assess for themselves the actual progress, not the promises.

5.2 Health and Education: From Collapse to Sustainable Investment

Iraq's health and education infrastructure has suffered from decades of conflict, sanctions, and underinvestment, with a budget largely consumed by salaries. The DDS solution directly links this issue to Section 4.5 (Constitutional Minimum for Investment Expenditures): a progressively increasing percentage of this minimum is automatically allocated to hospitals and schools, with a transparent project selection mechanism: each governorate, through its subgroups, proposes a list of priorities (new hospital, school renovations, training for medical and educational staff), which is then technically evaluated by ddsAI (cost, impact, number of beneficiaries), and finally submitted to a national vote to distribute the total budget fairly among the governorates based on actual need, not political influence.

A concrete example: A governorate suffering from a severe shortage of pediatricians (a documented problem in several Iraqi governorates) could, through its subgroups, propose a locally funded scholarship program for the governorate's youth to specialize in pediatrics, on the condition that they return to work in the governorate's hospitals for a specified period, instead of relying on slow and insufficient central appointments.

5.3 Youth and women: genuine economic inclusion

The very low actual employment rate (33.2%) masks a stark disparity between men and women, and between young people and older adults. The GUMI-SV program (section 4.3) is specifically designed as an integration tool for unemployed youth through structured, paid volunteer activities. For women, whose participation in the labor market faces deeply rooted social and cultural barriers in some regions, the DDS system offers two parallel pathways without any coercion:

• GUMI-SV activities can be organized within the local subgroups themselves, respecting local cultural contexts (e.g., women’s groups specializing in supplementary education or home digitization), thus opening the door to economic participation without imposing a specific social model from the outside.
• The ddsAI platform provides every woman, as well as every citizen, with neutral and complete information about her legal and economic rights actually available under Iraqi law, without any pressure or ideological direction, leaving the final decision to the individual and their family and community context.

5.4 Combating corruption through structural transparency

Corruption in Iraq is not an isolated "problem," but rather a direct result of the lack of transparency in the flow of public funds and the complexity of administrative procedures. All contracts, budgets, and spending decisions described in this program are automatically and searchably published on the DDS platform, with automated analytical tools (ddsAI) that detect unusual patterns (unexplained duplication of suppliers, illogical price discrepancies, recurring delays in specific projects) and automatically notify the relevant local subgroups. This does not "eliminate" corruption by decree, but it makes it politically costly and readily detectable, instead of remaining hidden for years as is currently the case.

 

Part Six: Implementation Plan and Timeline

6.1 Year One: Launch and Construction

• Establish the first subgroups in 3-5 model governorates (proposed: Baghdad, Basra, Erbil, Nineveh, Anbar) that represent the geographical, ethnic and sectarian diversity of Iraq.
• The three-digit identity system was deployed via a digital application available in all of Iraq's official languages.
• Launching the first specialized ddsAI teams (Economics, Energy, Water, Health) to provide the first neutral analyses of the most pressing issues (the salary crisis, the water crisis in Basra).
• A first trial vote on a local issue of limited impact (e.g., spending priorities of a small local fund) to test the system and build trust.

6.2 Years 2-3: Expansion and First Implementation of the Sovereign Wealth Fund

• Expanding the subgroups to include most Iraqi governorates, including Kurdistan in all its languages.
• The creation of a truly transparent sovereign wealth fund, with an initial transfer rate that is popularly agreed upon, and the commencement of real-time publication of revenues and expenditures.
• The first phase of GUMI-SV has begun: direct transfers to pensioners and the most vulnerable families, via the fund, independent of normal budget liquidity crises.
• First national votes on major energy contracts, with full contractual terms published.

6.3 Years 4-7: Economic Diversification and the Second Phase of GUMI-SV

• Launching projects in refining and manufacturing industries, modern agriculture, decentralized solar energy, and religious and historical tourism, financed by the sovereign wealth fund and private partnerships, are subject to a public vote.
• Expanding GUMI-SV to include unemployed youth through structured paid volunteer work.
• Activating the local funds for the producing governorates (Basra, Kirkuk, Kurdistan) with their fixed constitutional percentages.

6.4 Years 8-10: Maturity and Universal Basic Income

• GUMI-SV is being gradually expanded to include all adult citizens.
• The participatory system has matured to the point where the results of the subgroups’ votes become an actual, binding political reference (and gradually constitutional through amendments decided by the people themselves) for all major decisions.
• A comprehensive and independent evaluation (via allddsAI and neutral international experts) of the program's results over ten years, with amendments open to public voting.

Part Seven: Expected Outcomes — Honestly, the Advantages and Challenges

7.1 Expected positive results

• The payment of salaries and pensions remains stable and independent of sharp fluctuations in oil prices, thanks to the sovereign wealth fund, which is separate from the operating budget.
• A gradual and tangible decrease in power outages and water crises in the governorates with active local funds, especially Basra.
• A noticeable decrease in the import bill for refined petroleum products, with the growth of local manufacturing industries and associated job opportunities.
• A measurable increase in the effective employment rate (from 33.2%) through the GUMI-SV program, especially among young people.
• There has been a gradual decline in the intensity of sectarian polarization in public discourse, as a result of part of the decision-making process shifting from closed party negotiations to direct popular voting on common livelihood issues.
• There is a growing feeling among the residents of the producing governorates (Basra, Kurdistan, Kirkuk) that the wealth of their lands brings them a direct and tangible benefit, which reduces the intensity of the tense secessionist or federalist debates.
• A tangible decrease in detectable levels of corruption, thanks to real-time transparency of contracts and budgets.

7.2 Real-world challenges and risks

• Potential resistance from the current political and partisan elites, who benefit from the existing system (sectarian power-sharing, closed contracts), may attempt to obstruct or discredit DDS platforms through the media or legal means. The response: Legitimacy is built gradually through growing and transparent popular participation, not imposed, which makes direct obstruction politically costly over time.
• The technical challenge: Access to the internet and smart devices is not equal between cities and rural and remote areas. The response: Supported community access points in the first phase, and priority given to the least connected areas in allocating digital infrastructure resources from the sovereign wealth fund.
• A potential slowdown in changing the rentier-based economic model: dependence on oil will not decrease overnight, and economic diversification requires years of continuous and stable investment, which in turn requires political patience and continuity that goes beyond short election cycles.
• The complexity of the security situation (armed factions, regional tensions with Iran and America): This program does not offer a direct solution to this issue, and acknowledges that any popular economic and political transformation needs a minimum level of security stability in order to succeed.

Conclusion: An invitation to participate

This program is not a final, closed document, but rather a basis for ongoing discussion and development across the DDS platforms themselves, with the participation of Iraqi citizens, experts, and the ddsAI and allddsAI teams. Every suggestion, every critique, and every correction submitted by an Iraqi citizen or independent expert will be seriously considered and may be formally incorporated into future versions of this program, with its source publicly acknowledged, in accordance with the DDS principle of transparency and mutual recognition.

The ultimate goal is simple and straightforward: that Iraq’s wealth and decision-making power be returned to the Iraqi people, in all its components, permanently, transparently, safely, and peacefully, without waiting for this sovereignty to be “granted” from above, but rather by actually building it from the ground up, step by step, one partial group after another.