DIRECTDEMOCRACYS

Direct Democracy — Collective Ownership — Shared Leadership

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC PROGRAM,

FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL

FOR ITALY

2025 – 2035

Critical analysis of the real situation · Diagnosis · Concrete solutions · Expected consequences

Edition 1.0 — May 2025

directdemocracys.org

PREMISE: LOGIC, COMMON SENSE, REALITY

This program is developed according to the founding principles of DirectDemocracyS (DDS): logic, common sense, research, adherence to reality, the search for truth, internal coherence, and mutual respect. This is not a traditional electoral manifesto, built on impossible promises and empty slogans. It is a technical-political document that analyzes Italy's real situation, identifies the structural causes of its problems, and proposes concrete, measurable, and verifiable solutions, with explicit timelines and consequences.

DDS belongs neither to the traditional right nor the traditional left. It is not populist, it is not demagogic, it does not manipulate consensus through fear or unrealistic promises. It operates according to the principle that every citizen, adequately informed and equipped with the right tools, can and must participate in the governance of their community.

Each section of this program follows the same structure: diagnosis of the current situation with real data, identification of the causes, detailed solution proposal with concrete examples, implementation plan, and forecast of short-, medium-, and long-term consequences.

STRUCTURAL NOTE This program is intended for official DDS members and Italian citizens who want to truly understand what isn't working and why. The data cited comes from verifiable sources: ISTAT, Bank of Italy, OECD, Court of Auditors, Eurostat, and IMF. Each proposed solution has been assessed for feasibility, impact, and risk. The expected consequences also include the negative effects of transitions, as hiding them would be dishonest.

 

— PART I — DIAGNOSIS: THE REAL SITUATION IN ITALY —

1. MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK: A BLOCKED COUNTRY

1.1 Almost zero economic growth for thirty years

Italy is the only G7 country with a per capita GDP lower in real terms than in 1999. Between 1999 and 2024, average annual GDP growth was 0.3%, compared to 1.2% in Germany, 1.4% in France, and 2.3% in the United States. This is not a cyclical problem: it is a deep structural crisis rooted in clearly identifiable systemic elements.

Italy's GDP in 2024 is approximately €2.1 trillion. Public debt has exceeded €2.9 trillion, equal to approximately 137% of GDP. Debt interest payments absorb approximately €80-90 billion annually, resources that are not invested in healthcare, education, infrastructure, or research.

Indicator	Italy	Germany	France	Spain	EU average
Average GDP growth 2000-2024	+0.3%	+1.2%	+1.4%	+1.1%	+1.3%
Public debt / GDP (2024)	137%	64%	112%	107%	88%
Youth unemployment (2024)	20.3%	6.1%	17.0%	28.0%	15.5%
GDP per capita PPP (2024)	€35,800	€49,200	€42,300	€33,200	€38,100
R&D Spending / GDP	1.3%	3.1%	2.2%	1.4%	2.1%
Productivity (OECD index)	88	116	108	96	100

1.2 The structural causes of stagnation

Italy's stagnation is not an inevitable fate. It is the result of poor political choices, a dysfunctional institutional system, organized interests blocking reforms, and a bureaucratic culture that punishes initiative. The main causes are:

• Paralyzing bureaucracy: Italy has one of the most complex bureaucratic systems in the world. Starting a business takes an average of 41 days and five procedures (Germany: 10 days, three procedures). Obtaining a building permit takes an average of 127 days. Receiving civil justice takes an average of 1,120 days, the highest in Western Europe.
• Predatory and unfair taxation: The effective tax burden on employment income and small businesses is among the highest in Europe (42-46%), while structural tax evasion is worth €90-110 billion annually. Those who don't evade taxes also pay for those who do.
• A dual and stagnant labor market: overprotected workers with permanent contracts coexist with masses of precarious workers with no protections. Mobility is almost nonexistent. Young people remain trapped in precarious employment or emigrate.
• Inadequate education system: 28% of Italians aged 25-64 have only a middle school diploma. The percentage of university graduates is among the lowest in the OECD. Public investment in education is 4.1% of GDP, compared to the OECD average of 5.5%.
• Inefficient judicial system: The lengthy proceedings for civil and criminal justice discourage foreign investment and favor those who have the resources to litigate for years.
• Unstable political system: Italy has had 69 governments since 1946. Instability impedes any long-term strategic planning.
• Endemic corruption: Italy ranks 42nd in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, worse than all its main European partners.

1.3 The demographic problem: a time bomb

Italy has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world: 1.20 children per woman in 2024 (the replacement rate is 2.1). The population is aging rapidly. Today, there are 3.2 workers for every pensioner; by 2040, there will be 1.8. The public pension system, already strained, will become unsustainable without radical reforms and increased labor force participation, especially among women (54% versus 72% in Germany) and young people.

The emigration of skilled young people is a silent hemorrhage: between 2000 and 2023, over 1.2 million Italians with university education emigrated, primarily to Germany, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the United States. This represents a huge loss of human capital, paid for by Italian taxpayers and given away to other countries.

1.4 The North-South divide: two countries in one

Northern Italy's per capita GDP is 40-50% higher than that of the South. Unemployment in the South is structurally double that of the North. The quality of public services—healthcare, schools, transportation, local bureaucracy—is systematically inferior in the South. Decades of welfare policies have created dependency without development. The problem is not a lack of resources: the South receives enormous transfers from the central government. The problem is the model: welfare instead of productive development, clientelism instead of meritocracy.

 

2. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: A BROKEN MECHANISM

2.1 Parties without internal democracy

Italian political parties, with very rare exceptions, are not democratic organizations. They are vertical power structures where a few leaders decide everything: candidacies, alliances, programs, appointments. Members and voters are spectators, not protagonists. This model produces mediocre ruling classes, selected for loyalty rather than competence.

The result is that Italian parliaments are filled with people who owe their positions to devotion to their leaders, not to competence or merit. The laws passed often reflect particular interests or party survival logic, not the common good.

2.2 The electoral law as a control tool

The Italian electoral laws of the last thirty years (Mattarellum, Porcellum, Italicum, Rosatellum) were designed, often deliberately, to concentrate power in the hands of party leaders through blocked lists. Citizens vote for a party but do not choose who will represent it. This severs the connection between elected officials and voters and turns parliamentarians into party soldiers.

2.3 The cost of politics

The cost of maintaining Italy's political and institutional apparatus is excessive compared to any European benchmark. The costs of regional governments, local authorities, boards of directors of public entities, and subsidiaries have soared decade after decade without corresponding improvements in services. The proliferation of institutions, agencies, authorities, and commissions creates duplication and structural inefficiencies.

 

3. HEALTHCARE: A SYSTEM THAT IS CRUMBLING

The National Health Service (SSN) is one of the greatest achievements of the Italian Republic. But it is under increasing pressure: chronic underfunding, intolerable waiting lists, a shortage of doctors and nurses, a huge gap in quality between North and South, and growing private healthcare filling the gaps in the public sector.

Italian public healthcare spending is 6.9% of GDP, compared to 9.4% in Germany, 9.5% in France, and 11.5% in the United States. Italians have one of the lowest preventable mortality rates in Europe—a sign that the system still works—but conditions are rapidly deteriorating.

CRITICAL DETAIL: WAITING LISTS In 2024, the average waiting time for a specialist appointment in the National Health Service is: cardiology 84 days, orthopedics 92 days, oncology 47 days, dermatology 71 days. For an abdominal CT scan: 68 days. These delays have direct consequences on health and mortality. Those who have the money turn to private healthcare. Those who don't, wait or give up.

In 2023, 34% of Italians had to forgo healthcare services for financial reasons or waiting times. Private healthcare, which generates profit, has captured a demand that the public sector cannot meet. This is neither a sustainable nor equitable model.

 

— PART II — THE DDS PROGRAM FOR ITALY —

4. INSTITUTIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC REFORM

4.1 Synthetic diagnosis

The Italian institutional system is designed to foster instability, favor existing parties, exclude citizens from real decision-making, and protect the political class from the consequences of its own mistakes. Without profound institutional reform, all other reforms will be blocked, watered down, or reversed when government changes.

4.2 DDS Proposals

A) Reform of the electoral law

DDS proposes a pure proportional system with a 3% threshold, small multi-member constituencies (maximum 5 seats per constituency), and mandatory preference. Voters express a binding nominative preference. There are no closed lists. Members of Parliament are elected directly by citizens, not by party secretaries.

A direct consequence: parliamentarians must answer to their constituents, not to party bosses. This creates a structural incentive for competence and hard work, not for vertical loyalty.

B) Reduction and rationalization of institutions

DDS proposes abolishing the Provinces as elective bodies (reducing them to technical coordination bodies), reducing the number of Regions from 20 to 12 through mergers of the smaller regions, and eliminating all public bodies with fewer than 50 employees that duplicate functions already performed by existing bodies.

Estimated savings: €4-6 billion annually during the full-scale phase, with reduced bureaucracy and increased efficiency.

C) Binding direct democracy on our secure and protected platforms

DDS proposes introducing a propositional referendum into our system, to be extended nationwide, based on very detailed implementing rules, which would be binding, and a quorum-free abrogative referendum (replacing the 50%+1 quorum with a 33% quorum, a threshold that can be achieved and not manipulated through organized abstentionism). The propositional referendum allows 500,000 citizens to bring any proposed law to a direct popular vote.

We also propose introducing a recall mandate for all our political representatives: after the midpoint of their term, if 30% of voters in the constituency sign a petition, a recall procedure will be activated by popular vote in the constituency.

D) Structural anti-corruption law

DDS proposes: total incompatibility between political office and paid professional activities for the duration of the mandate; an absolute ban on transferring from the public sector to the related private sector for five years (revolving door); complete and real-time transparency of all party budgets and campaign expenses; reformulation of the crime of abuse of office with clear definitions and clear penalties; and a reform of the statute of limitations that no longer applies to crimes against public administration after indictment.

E) Reduction in the number of parliamentarians with an increase in quality

The 2020 cut in the number of parliamentarians (from 945 to 600) was made without the reforms needed to make parliament more efficient. DDS maintains the 600 parliamentarians but radically reforms procedures: elimination of perfect bicameralism (the Senate becomes the Chamber of Regions with limited functions), limitation of the number of parliamentary committees, complete computerization of the legislative process, and mandatory impact assessments for each bill.

CONCRETE EXAMPLE — SINGLE OFFICE CASE An entrepreneur wanting to open a shop in the center of Turin must currently interface with the Revenue Agency, the Chamber of Commerce, the Municipality (SUAP), the Local Health Authority (ASL), the Fire Department, INPS (National Institute for Social Security), and INAIL (National Institute for Insurance against Accidents and Injuries). Seven different bodies, seven different procedures, seven different timeframes. With the DDS reform, the integrated digital one-stop shop, all these procedures converge on a single platform, a single process, a single contact, and a maximum of 10 working days. This is already a reality in Estonia, Denmark, and Portugal. It's not a dream: it's organization.

4.3 Implementation plan

1. Months 1-6: The Technical-Constitutional Commission drafts proposals for electoral and institutional reform.
2. Months 7-18: Parliamentary process with mandatory public consultation and confirmatory referendum vote.
3. Months 19-36: Gradual implementation: first election under new law, start of regional mergers, closure of duplicate entities.
4. Years 4-5: Consolidation, impact assessment, adjustments.

4.4 Expected consequences

• Short term (1-3 years): strong resistance from existing parties, political instability during the transition, institutional conflicts between merging entities.
• Medium term (3-7 years): reduction of political-institutional costs, increase in civic participation, improvement of the average quality of elected representatives.
• Long term (7-15 years): increased government stability, increased citizen trust in institutions, Italy more attractive to foreign investment due to the greater predictability of the regulatory framework.

 

5. ECONOMY: BREAKING OUT OF STAGNATION

5.1 Radical tax reform

The Italian tax system is a labyrinth of 800 types of taxes, exemptions, concessions, brackets, rates, and special regimes. It is costly to manage, easy to evade for those with the means, and devastating for those who cannot. DDS proposes a structural tax reform based on three pillars:

Pillar 1 — Radical simplification

Reduction of over 800 taxes to no more than 15 main categories. Elimination of all tax expenditures that cannot demonstrate a social or economic return greater than their cost. Approximately 742 tax expenditures have been identified in Italy; a serious assessment would eliminate at least 60% of them, recovering €25-35 billion annually.

Pillar 2 — Real tax equity

Currently, employment and pensions account for nearly 80% of personal income tax (IRPEF) revenue. Capital gains, annuities, and professions with high levels of tax evasion contribute much less in proportion to actual income. DDS proposes: a flat proportional rate on capital gains (25%), a reformed land registry tax on real estate based on actual market values (currently, land registry values are often 30-60% of market values), a structural fight against tax evasion through mandatory electronic payment for all transactions exceeding 50 euros, and full interoperability between tax databases.

Pillar 3 — Reducing the tax burden on labor

The Italian tax wedge (the difference between the employer's labor costs and the net paycheck) is among the highest in Europe: 45.9% for the average worker, compared to the OECD average of 35.8%. DDS proposes reducing the wedge by 8-10 percentage points over five years, financed by combating tax evasion, structural spending review, and income taxation. The goal is to increase net wages without increasing costs for businesses.

Year	Tax wedge target	Estimated tax evasion recovery	Savings spending review	Net balance
2026	-2 points	+8 billion	+5 billion	+1 billion
2027	-4 points	+15 billion	+10 billion	+3 billion
2028	-6 points	+22 billion	+15 billion	+5 billion
2030	-8 points	+35 billion	+22 billion	+7 billion
2035	-10 points	+50 billion	+30 billion	+10 billion

5.2 Fighting tax evasion: concrete tools

Tax evasion in Italy is worth between €90 and €110 billion a year, according to the most reliable estimates. It's not a problem of mentality, but of the system: when the probability of being caught is low and the penalties are mild, tax evasion is rationally convenient. DDS proposes changing the cost-benefit equation of tax evasion:

• Mandatory electronic invoicing for ALL transactions between economic entities (already in force for B2B, to be extended to B2C transactions under 5,000 euros).
• Electronic payment is mandatory for all transactions over €50 (the threshold will gradually be lowered to €20 by 2028). Penalty for refusing electronic payments: immediate suspension for three days for the first violation, 30 days for the second.
• Full interoperability between the Revenue Agency, INPS, Bank of Italy, Guardia di Finanza, banks, and financial intermediaries. An artificial intelligence algorithm cross-references data and automatically flags the most obvious tax irregularities.
• Reform of the penalty system: for tax evasion exceeding €100,000, a prison sentence (not suspended), confiscation of equivalent assets, and disqualification from holding public office.
• Reward for those who report tax evasion: 10% of the proceeds go to the whistleblower, with guaranteed legal protection.

CONCRETE EXAMPLE — PORTUGAL Portugal introduced a tax receipt lottery in 2014: every electronic receipt is entered into a monthly draw. The result: a 17% increase in VAT revenue in three years and a 23% increase in restaurant revenue. This measure, costing the state nothing, is highly effective in incentivizing consumers to request receipts. DDS proposes adopting it immediately in Italy as well.

5.3 Labour market reform

The Italian labor market is characterized by a paradox: it is simultaneously too rigid (dismissals are difficult for those on standard contracts) and too precarious (millions of workers in atypical employment contracts with no protections). DDS rejects both extreme solutions—neither maintaining the current dualism nor completely liberalizing dismissals.

A) Single progressive entry contract

DDS proposes replacing the proliferation of atypical contracts (co.co.co., fictitious VAT numbers, fixed-term contracts renewed indefinitely, seasonal, and intermittent) with a single contract offering increasing protections: in the first 12 months, easier termination for both parties; from the 13th to the 36th month, increasing protection; and after 36 months, full stability. This eliminates the incentive for companies to keep workers in perpetual precarious employment.

B) Legal minimum wage and bargaining

DDS proposes the introduction of a legal minimum wage of €10 gross per hour (indexed annually to inflation), with collective bargaining only able to improve it. Currently, the lack of a legal minimum wage creates wage dumping in sectors not covered by strong collective agreements. The minimum wage does not replace bargaining; it protects it.

C) Real active labor policies

DDS proposes a radical transformation of the currently useless Employment Centers: each center must have qualified personnel with measurable re-employment objectives (currently, 4% of the unemployed find work through Employment Centers; the DDS goal is 35% within five years, aligning with the European average). The basic income, as tested in Italy, has been a partial failure: it hasn't truly activated people into work. DDS proposes a transitional income system conditioned on active participation in certified training programs and an active and documented job search.

5.4 Industry and competitiveness

Italy boasts a unique industrial fabric of SMEs: flexible, creative, and export-oriented. However, Italian SMEs suffer from three main problems: difficulty accessing credit, too small to compete on global markets, and insufficient investment in technology and innovation.

• DDS proposes a public guarantee fund for voluntary aggregations of SMEs (consortia, business networks), encouraging growth without forcing mergers.
• Tax credit for investments in automation, digitalization, and research: already in place (Industry 4.0/Transition 5.0 Plan), but needs to be made structural, simplified, and certain, not subject to annual cuts.
• Reform of the public banking system: relaunch Cassa Depositi e Prestiti as an investment bank for the real economy, modeled on the German KfW (which annually provides €100 billion in long-term loans to businesses and infrastructure).
• Selective industrial policy: identification of 5-7 strategic supply chains (aerospace, pharmaceuticals, quality agri-food, renewable energy, applied artificial intelligence) with targeted public investments and institutional coordination.

 

6. PUBLIC DEBT: THE GORDIAN KNOT

6.1 The real situation

Italy's public debt of €2.9 trillion is the second highest in the eurozone, after Germany (which, however, has a GDP almost double ours). The debt-to-GDP ratio of 137% means that every Italian, from birth to death, virtually inherits approximately €49,000 of public debt. Interest payments consume approximately 4.2% of GDP each year—more than we spend on defense and more than we invest in research.

Debt reduction cannot be achieved through brutal austerity (which curbs growth and worsens the debt-to-GDP ratio) nor through intentional inflation (which would hit the middle class and savers). The only sustainable path is GDP growth combined with a sustained primary surplus (revenue > expenditure net of interest).

6.2 DDS Debt Reduction Strategy

DDS proposes a three-track parallel strategy:

5. Denominator growth: All the structural reforms described in this program have the primary effect of increasing Italy's potential growth. Each percentage point of additional growth reduces the debt-to-GDP ratio by approximately 1.4 points over three years.
6. Structural primary surplus: primary surplus target of 1.5% of GDP by 2027, 2% by 2030, through structural spending reviews (not linear cuts) and the fight against tax evasion.
7. Active debt management: extending the average maturity of government bonds (currently around 7.3 years; target 10 years), reducing the average cost through green bond issuances and sustainability-linked bonds that attract institutional investors at better rates.

PROJECTION: CREDIBLE OPTIMISTIC DDS SCENARIO If the DDS reforms produce an average additional growth of 0.8% per year compared to the baseline scenario, a recovery of tax evasion of €30 billion over five years, and a spending review saving of €20 billion, the debt-to-GDP ratio will fall to 122% by 2035. This isn't the solution to the problem, but it is a credible and verifiable trend reversal. Debt cannot be eliminated in a decade: it can be brought under control and gradually reduced.

 

7. HEALTH: SAVE AND STRENGTHEN THE NHS

7.1 Adequate financing

DDS proposes increasing public healthcare spending from the current 6.9% of GDP to 7.5% by 2030 and to 8% by 2035. This equates to approximately €12-15 billion in additional annual funding at full capacity. The primary source of funding is recovery from tax evasion and the rationalization of unproductive spending, not new debt.

7.2 Elimination of waiting lists in 5 years

Waiting lists aren't a resource problem in the strict sense: they're a problem of organization, incentives, and governance. Concrete solutions:

• Legal guarantee of maximum waiting times (Class A/urgent: 3 days; Class B/short: 10 days; Class C/deferrable: 60 days; Class D/programmable: 180 days) with automatic activation of the private contracted provider at the expense of the NHS if the times are not respected.
• A single national information system for waiting lists: every citizen can see in real time where and when they can access services within their regional NHS.
• Strengthening community health: 1 general practitioner for every 800 patients (currently up to 1,500), with clinics equipped for basic diagnostics, eliminating inappropriate visits to the Emergency Room (currently 40% of visits to the Emergency Room are non-urgent).
• Truly functioning community homes: the facilities envisaged by the PNRR must be operational with staff, equipment, and extended hours, not just empty buildings.

7.3 Training and retention of healthcare personnel

Italy trains excellent doctors and nurses who then emigrate for better economic and working conditions. DDS proposes: increasing national contracts for NHS staff (which have been at a standstill for years), adequate and increased specialization scholarships (currently 20,000 specialists are short), mandatory five-year service in the NHS for those trained with public scholarships (with the option of reimbursement of the scholarship as an alternative), and no longer unsustainable working conditions.

7.4 Real healthcare digitalization

The Electronic Health Record exists on paper but is fragmented and unused in practice. DDS proposes a single, truly interoperable national EHR, accessible by all doctors and healthcare professionals within the National Health Service with the patient's consent, and by the patient themselves via an app. This eliminates duplicate tests, reduces medical errors, and enables real-time epidemiological surveillance. The model is the Danish system (MedCom), recognized as one of the best in the world.

 

8. EDUCATION AND RESEARCH: INVESTING IN THE FUTURE

8.1 The current situation

The Italian education system has structural problems that ripple throughout the chain: insufficient preschool (only 27% of children aged 0-3 have access to nursery school, compared to 56% in Denmark), primary and secondary schools with outdated curricula and 20th-century teaching methods, underfunded universities with few doctorates and little research, and a public research system with some of the lowest salaries in Europe.

8.2 DDS proposals for schools

• Increase spending on education from the current 4.1% to 5.5% of GDP by 2030, with priority given to nursery schools (target: 50% coverage for children aged 0-3 by 2030).
• Reform of school curricula: mandatory introduction of digital civics, critical thinking, basic statistics, and economic and financial education, starting in middle school.
• Teacher salaries: 30% increase in 5 years (currently, Italian teachers earn 20-30% less than their German and French colleagues), with a meritocratic evaluation system linked to salary progression. Not punitive evaluation: evaluation that rewards the best.
• Real school autonomy: schools must be able to hire, experiment, and differentiate their curriculum, with clear accountability for the results.
• Eliminate structural teacher insecurity: there are currently 200,000 temporary teachers. DDS proposes regular competitions with direct hiring and an end to the endless ranking system.

8.3 University and research

Italy has high-quality universities, but they are systematically underfunded and have outdated governance. DDS proposes:

• Increase the university's regular funding by 40% over five years, with rewards based on research quality and graduate employability.
• Tripling of PhDs with adequate scholarships (minimum 2,000 euros per month, currently the average is 1,195 euros).
• Creation of five multidisciplinary Advanced Research Institutes modeled after those of Max Planck (Germany) or CNRS (France), focused on strategic areas: renewable energy, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, materials science, and climate science.
• Brain drain: 10-year tax incentives for Italian researchers returning from abroad (already in place, but needs to be strengthened and made more structured and secure).

 

9. INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENERGY TRANSITION

9.1 The infrastructure gap

Italy suffers from a severe infrastructure gap in the South and a growing obsolescence of infrastructure in the North. High-speed railways connect the major cities of the North well, but the South is almost completely excluded. Water infrastructure loses 42% of the water it delivers to the network. State and provincial roads are poorly maintained in many areas. Ports, despite their enormous potential (Italy is at the heart of the Mediterranean), are underutilized due to logistical shortcomings.

9.2 DDS Infrastructure Plan

• High-speed rail in Southern Italy: completion of the Naples-Reggio Calabria-Palermo corridor (via tunnel or bridge) and the Naples-Bari corridor by 2032. High-speed rail reduces travel times, increases labor mobility, and makes currently isolated areas competitive.
• Water Revolution: A ten-year plan to replace obsolete water networks. Reducing losses from 42% to 20% frees up 2 billion cubic meters of water annually, equivalent to irrigating 500,000 additional hectares.
• Port development: The port of Gioia Tauro is already the Mediterranean's main transhipment hub. DDS proposes to build a special economic zone around it with tax incentives for industrial and logistics location, creating 50,000 direct and indirect jobs by 2030.
• Real ultra-broadband: 100% FTTH (fiber to the home) coverage is expected to be achieved by 2028. Today, we're at 53%, with huge gaps between North and South and between urban and rural areas.

9.3 Energy transition

Italy imports over 80% of its energy needs, with annual expenditures of €70-90 billion abroad. This is both an economic problem (cost to families and businesses) and a strategic one (dependence on unstable or hostile countries). The transition to renewables is therefore both an environmental, economic, and geopolitical necessity.

• Target 100% renewables for electricity generation by 2040 (possible: Italy has exceptional solar, wind, and hydrogeological resources).
• Radical simplification of permits for the installation of renewable energy systems: currently, a wind farm requires a 7-12 year authorization process. DDS target: 18 months maximum.
• Renewable energy communities: Every municipality, condominium, or neighborhood can establish an energy community for self-generation and collective self-consumption. Incentivize disadvantaged areas with non-repayable grants.
• Energy efficiency in buildings: Italy's building stock is among the most energy-intensive in Europe. A plan to upgrade 500,000 homes annually (currently, about 50,000 are being upgraded), with clear, multi-year incentives (not the chaotic Superbonus with its constant backtracking).
• Green hydrogen: €5 billion public investment over five years to develop the hydrogen supply chain produced from renewables, in partnership with universities and businesses. Italy has the geographic and industrial conditions to become a European hydrogen hub.

 

10. SOCIAL POLICY: EQUITY AND INVESTMENT

10.1 Poverty and inclusion

In Italy, 5.7 million people live in absolute poverty (2024), the highest figure in the last thirty years. Poverty has shifted: it no longer affects just the elderly (who are relatively protected by the pension system), but above all children (1.3 million in absolute poverty, 13.8% of all children) and young adults. A society that allows its children to grow up in poverty not only commits an injustice: it destroys its own future human capital.

10.2 Conditional Basic Income and Investment in Children

DDS proposes to abolish the fragmentation of the current welfare system (over 30 different, often overlapping and inefficient measures) and replace it with:

• Active Inclusion Income (RIA): a unique benefit for families experiencing absolute poverty, provided in a combination of cash and services. It is conditional on participation in employment activation programs for working adults. It is not conditional for families with young children or severely disabled people.
• Strengthened universal child benefit: The existing single allowance must be increased by 50% for low- and low-medium incomes, and must become truly universal and adequate for childcare.
• Free nursery schools for low- and medium-income families: Nursery coverage must increase to the European target of 33% by 2026 and to 50% by 2030. Free nursery schools for families with an ISEE income of less than €30,000 encourages mothers to work.

10.3 Pension system: sustainability and equity

The Italian pension system is the most expensive in Europe (16% of GDP), with overall low average pensions but extremely unequal distribution: golden pensions for those who worked under the old pay-as-you-go system and paltry pensions for young people with intermittent careers under the new contributory system.

• DDS does not propose to reduce existing pensions: respect for acquired rights is an inviolable principle.
• DDS proposes the definitive abolition of privileged early pensions (the so-called quotas or 100/102/103 quotas) that allow specific categories of people to retire at 60-62 with high pensions, passing on enormous costs to future generations.
• Guaranteed pension for young people: for those with discontinuous careers and insufficient contributions, a minimum pension of €1,000 per month is guaranteed at age 67, funded by general taxation.
• Flexible retirement: Flexible retirement options between ages 63 and 70, with actuarial adjustments to your pension (those who retire earlier receive less, those who retire later receive more). There are no obligations, but there are real incentives to stay longer if your health allows.

10.4 Housing: the right to housing

Housing prices in Italy's major cities have become unaffordable for middle- and low-income earners. The rental market is dysfunctional: limited rental housing, high prices, and unbalanced protections that create both abuse for tenants and excessive fears for landlords. DDS proposes:

• National Public Housing Plan: Construction of 200,000 public housing units over 10 years in metropolitan areas, intended for rent at controlled rents for low- and low-medium incomes.
• Rental reform: simplified contracts, state guarantees for landlords (the state guarantees rent payment in the event of tenant default), and evictions for non-payment within 90 days (rather than the current 3-5 years). These measures increase the supply of rental housing.
• Taxation of vacant properties: In large cities, properties deliberately left vacant are subject to a 100% higher IMU rate than the standard. This incentivizes the sale of empty units (estimated at 1.5 million in large cities).

 

11. JUSTICE: SPEED, CERTAINTY, FAIRNESS

11.1 The problem

The Italian civil justice system is the slowest in Europe: 1,120 days on average for a first-instance civil trial. Criminal justice is slow, uncertain, and sometimes unfair in its distribution. The judicial backlog amounts to over 3 million cases. This isn't just a simple inconvenience: it's a huge economic cost (the IMF estimates that reducing civil justice times would increase Italian GDP by 0.8-1.0% annually) and a social injustice (those with resources resist legal proceedings for years; those without resources capitulate).

11.2 DDS Proposals

• Complete digitalization of the process: the civil electronic process is already partially in place; DDS is extending it to criminal and administrative cases, with videoconference hearings for non-trial phases, a single digital file, and digital signatures for all documents.
• Increased staffing: Italy has 11 judges per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to an EU average of 21. DDS proposes increasing the number to 16 by 2030 through special competitions, simultaneously reducing the bureaucratic burden on judges.
• Reform of civil litigation: mandatory preventive mediation for cases involving less than €50,000 (already required, to be made effective and functional), and a simplified procedure for cases involving less than €10,000 (decision within 90 days by an honorary judge).
• Tax justice: Complete reform of tax courts with full-time professional judges (currently, tax judges are almost all part-time with obvious conflicts of interest). The tax backlog stands at 5 million cases.
• Prison: Italy has 61,000 inmates, compared to a capacity of 47,000. Thirty percent are awaiting trial. DDS proposes alternatives to detention for non-violent crimes, community service as a structural alternative to punishment, and investment in social reintegration (which reduces recidivism from 70% to 20% when effectively implemented).

 

12. DEMOGRAPHY AND IMMIGRATION: FACING REALITY

12.1 The demographic problem is real and urgent

Italy cannot afford to ignore its demographic crisis. With 1.20 children per woman, the Italian population is expected to decline from 60 to approximately 50 million by 2050 in the absence of immigration, resulting in a dramatic aging population. This isn't just an opinion: it's actuarial mathematics. The consequences are economic (fewer workers, fewer taxpayers, less consumption), social (welfare crisis), and cultural.

12.2 Real (not symbolic) pro-natalist policies

Decades of symbolic birthrate policies have failed. The countries with the highest birthrates in Europe (France, Sweden, Denmark) have not handed out symbolic bonuses: they have built welfare systems that make it practically possible to have children without sacrificing career and income. DDS proposes:

• Free universal public nursery schools for children aged 0-3 (investment: additional €6-8 billion per year).
• 6 months of parental leave for each parent, paid at 100% for the first 3 months and at 80% for the following 3, non-transferable between parents (encourages shared care).
• Substantial tax deductions for dependent children: up to €6,000 per year per child, starting at the third child.
• First-time homebuyer incentives for under-35s with children.

12.3 Immigration: rational management

Immigration is essential for the Italian economy both in the short term (workers in underserved sectors) and the long term (demographic sustainability). But unmanaged immigration creates real problems: pressure on services, social tensions, and the exploitation of migrants themselves. DDS rejects both the demagogic approach of a "total ban" (impossible and economically suicidal) and the approach of indiscriminate acceptance without integration.

• Demand-driven legal immigration: a transparent and efficient work visa system based on actual labor market needs. Annual quotas by sector, defined with social partners, are increased or decreased based on actual data.
• Integration is a condition, not a bonus: those who arrive legally receive language support, civic orientation, and access to services. Those who violate the rules are quickly expelled (currently, the enforcement of expulsions is extremely low due to legal and logistical issues; DDS proposes specific bilateral agreements to make repatriations effective).
• Combating gangmastering and exploitation: Increase penalties for those who exploit migrant labor; joint responsibility across the supply chain for respecting labor rights.
• A one-time extraordinary amnesty for those who have been in Italy for at least five years with criminally irreproachable conduct and documented employment, followed by a structural reform of the ordinary regularization processes, which are currently labyrinthine and ineffective.

 

13. ENVIRONMENT: PROTECTION AND OPPORTUNITIES

13.1 Fragile Italy

Italy is one of the European countries most exposed to climate change: drought risk in Southern Italy, increasingly frequent floods in the North, rising sea levels threatening the coasts (42% of the Italian coastline is at risk), and hydrogeological instability affecting 82% of municipalities. Extreme events cost Italy an average of €3-5 billion annually in damages, with peaks much higher.

13.2 DDS proposals for the environment

• National Climate Adaptation Plan: Land safety with a €5 billion annual investment for 10 years in reforestation, hydrogeological management, river restoration, flood barriers, and sustainable coastal management. These investments have a proven ROI: every euro spent on prevention saves €5-7 in damages.
• Circular economy: target of recycling and reusing 70% of waste by 2030 (currently 51%). Italy has a strong foundation in industrial recycling; expand the model.
• Sustainable agriculture: incentive system for organic and regenerative farming, reduction of pesticide use by 50% by 2030, protection of agricultural biodiversity.
• Stop land consumption: ban new urban development on undeveloped land (with certified exceptions), prioritizing the regeneration of existing urban areas. Italy loses 70 km² of fertile soil each year.
• Progressive carbon tax: introducing a carbon price for emissions not covered by the European ETS, with the full revenue returned to citizens as a climate dividend (every adult receives the same annual share). This is progressive because those who consume less energy pay less but receive the same dividend.

 

14. FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE

14.1 Italy's geopolitical position

Italy is a leading Mediterranean country, a founding member of the EU and NATO, and the world's seventh-largest economy. Yet its foreign policy voice is often weak, inconsistent, and ineffective, due to a combination of government instability and a lack of strategic coherence. DDS advocates a foreign policy based on clear values, well-defined national interests, and an active role in multilateral institutions.

14.2 Europe

DDS is staunchly pro-European not out of dogma but out of rational self-interest: alone, no European nation can compete with the US, China, or other emerging giants in the geopolitical and economic dynamics of the 21st century. But DDS's pro-Europeanism is critical: the EU must be reformed towards greater democracy (reducing the power of national governments and increasing the power of the European Parliament), greater solidarity (a larger EU budget with its own fiscal capacity), and greater decision-making efficiency (abolishing unanimity in foreign and fiscal policy).

Italy must be a key player in EU reform, not a spectator. It must build alliances with countries with similar interests (France, Spain, Greece) and not simply complain about German rules.

14.3 Defense

DDS proposes increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP (NATO's target; currently, we're at 1.5%) but, at the same time, radically reforming the armed forces: reducing the number of senior ranks (Italy currently has more generals than Germany), increasing investment in technology, cyber defense, and intelligence capabilities; and actively participating in the construction of a common European defense that will reduce costs for each member state in the long term.

14.4 Mediterranean and Africa

Italy has a natural area of influence in the Mediterranean and Africa that it has never exploited strategically. DDS proposes a real Mattei Plan for Africa (not the current propagandistic version): concrete investments in infrastructure, energy, and training in African countries, created not out of abstract generosity but for strategic interests: reducing irregular migration flows, creating markets for Italian companies, and ensuring stable and diversified energy supplies.

 

— PART III — IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES —

15. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: PRIORITY AND SEQUENCE

15.1 The principle of sequence

Reforms influence each other. The order of implementation is crucial. DDS doesn't propose doing everything at once: it proposes proceeding by priority, respecting interdependencies, and being honest about the real timeframe. None of the reforms described produces results in six months. Some require 10-15 years to unfold. Saying this isn't pessimistic: it's respect for the citizens' intelligence.

Phase	Period	Main priorities	Necessary condition
1 — Foundations	Years 1-2	Electoral reform, tax evasion fight, public administration digitalization, and bureaucracy cuts	Stable parliamentary majority
2 — Acceleration	Years 3-5	Tax reform, labor market, healthcare, education	Phase 1 results verified
3 — Consolidation	Years 6-8	Major infrastructure, pension reform, active foreign policy	Growth > 1.5% per year
4 — Maturity	Years 9-10	Constitutional reforms, European integration, debt reduction	Political and institutional stability
Long term	Years 10-15	Demographic targets, carbon neutrality, debt reduction < 100% GDP	Programmatic continuity

15.2 The main risks and how to deal with them

DDS is honest about the risks. Structural reforms always generate resistance, transition costs, and sometimes short-term negative effects before producing medium- to long-term benefits. The main risks of the DDS program are:

• Political resistance: The reforms affect organized interests. Existing parties, professional corporations, trade unions, major tax evaders, and vested interests will do everything they can to block them. Countermeasure: build a broad base of support, communicate transparently the benefits to the majority, and use propositional referendums as a tool for democratic pressure.
• Market confidence crisis: a phase of intense reform could create volatility in the spread. Countermeasure: sequence reforms, starting with those that improve fiscal sustainability, maintain the European anchor, and communicate a credible and verifiable plan to the markets.
• Employment transition costs: Some reforms (bureaucratization, organizational restructuring) lead to short-term unemployment in the public sector. Countermeasures: redeployment plans, voluntary early retirement, and retraining.
• Reform fatigue: the risk that the reformist coalition will crumble under pressure. Countermeasure: transparent governance, ongoing civic participation, and quarterly public reporting on results.

 

16. EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES: SCENARIOS COMPARED

16.1 Scenario A: Continuity (no reform)

If Italy continues on its current trajectory, without significant structural reforms, the consequences over the next 10 years are highly likely:

• Average GDP growth of 0.3-0.5% per year, with the gap with other European countries widening.
• Public debt rising to 145-150% of GDP, with the risk of a sovereign debt crisis in the event of an external shock.
• Further deterioration of public services (health, education, transport) due to insufficient funding.
• Accelerating youth and skilled emigration.
• Demographic aging without adequate compensation policies.
• Increase in inequality and relative poverty.
• Italy's loss of geopolitical weight in Europe and the world.

16.2 Scenario B: DDS Reforms — Realistic Projection

With the implementation of the DDS program in the time and manner described, the realistic (not optimistic) projections are:

Indicator	Situation 2025	Projection 2030	Projection 2035
Average annual GDP growth	0.5%	1.4%	1.8%
Debt / GDP	137%	130%	118%
Youth unemployment	20.3%	14%	10%
Estimated tax evasion	~100 billion	~65 billion	~40 billion
Health expenditure / GDP	6.9%	7.5%	8.0%
Education Spending / GDP	4.1%	4.8%	5.5%
Renewables on electricity production	42%	68%	85%
Fertility rate (projection)	1.20	1.35	1.50
Corruption Index (Position)	42°	32°	25°

NOTE ON THE PROJECTION METHOD These projections are based on econometric models that combine the estimated impact of each reform (data from academic literature and international comparisons) and assume an international context free of exceptional shocks. They are central projections: reforms could produce better results (optimistic scenario) or worse results (pessimistic scenario with delays and resistance). DDS is committed to monitoring and publicly communicating the gap between projections and actual results on a semi-annual basis.

 

17. THE DDS METHOD: HOW TO GOVERN DIFFERENTLY

17.1 Real, not simulated, participation

The DDS system relies on micro-groups of five people as the basic unit of political participation. Applied to Italy, this means: every municipal district, every neighborhood, every professional community can organize itself into micro-DDS groups that develop proposals from the bottom up, aggregate them towards higher-level structures, and participate in defining the program in a genuine, not merely decorative, way.

This is not a mechanism of symbolic consultation (like traditional online forums where opinions are collected and then ignored): it is a mechanism of binding participation, where decisions made at higher levels must be justified with respect to input from lower levels.

17.2 Verifiable merit

In DDS, those who assume responsibility must have the skills to exercise them and are accountable for their results. The Meritocratic Points system creates a verifiable record of each member's contributions, balancing seniority, quality of contribution, and demonstrated ability. Applied to Italian governance, this means: no appointments based on political loyalty to technical positions; every appointment to public office must be accompanied by a verifiable skills profile; every public official has measurable objectives and is publicly accountable for their results.

17.3 Total transparency

DDS operates under the principle that everything related to the management of public power and resources must be public and accessible. Applied to Italy: full open data on all public budgets in machine-readable format; real-time transparency on all public contracts; mandatory publication of all public body documents within 24 hours of adoption; and a general right of civic access without the need to justify the request.

17.4 Mutual respect as a principle of governance

Mutual respect in DDS isn't rhetoric: it's an operational rule. In Italian governance, it means: respect for citizens' rights in bureaucratic procedures (public offices exist to serve citizens, not the other way around); respect for public sector workers as professionals, not as bureaucrats to be humiliated; respect for minorities in majority decisions; respect for winners by losers (acceptance of the democratic outcome); respect for future generations in budgetary decisions (not passing the debt on to children).

 

18. HOW IS THE DDS PROGRAM FINANCED?

Every ambitious program must answer the question: where is the money coming from? DDS does so transparently.

Source of funding	Estimated operating profit (billion €/year)	Production times	Certainty
Tax evasion recovery	30-50	3-7 years	High (with appropriate tools)
Structural Spending Review	15-25	2-5 years	Medium-High
Abolition of unproductive tax breaks	20-30	1-3 years	High
Reduction of political-institutional costs	4-6	2-4 years	High
Carbon tax (net, after dividend)	8-12	2-4 years	Average
Health efficiency (waste reduction)	5-8	3-6 years	Average
TOTAL sources	82-131	—	—
Program costs (additional investments)	60-90	Gradual	—
ANNUAL NET BALANCE UNDER FULL SOLID STATEMENT	+22 / +41 billion	From 2030	Average

The transition is not painless: in the first two to three years, some reforms require investment before generating savings. DDS envisages a transitional financing gap of €5–10 billion annually for the first three years, covered by long-term debt issuance (not increasing the structural deficit) and by using available European funds (NRRP and structural funds, of which Italy uses only 60–70% of the available resources).

 

— CONCLUSION —

19. THE ITALY WE WANT: A CONCRETE VISION

Italy is not a country doomed to decline. It is a country that has forgotten how to harness its extraordinary resources: the creativity of its entrepreneurs, the talent of its researchers and artists, the beauty of a unique landscape, the depth of a millennia-old culture, the strength of a network of local communities and human connections that no statistic fully captures.

The DDS program doesn't promise miracles. It promises honesty, method, consistency, and respect. It promises to tell the truth even when it's uncomfortable, to propose solutions even when they're complex, to admit mistakes when they're made, and to correct course when the data shows something isn't working.

The Italy of 2035, if this program is implemented, will not be perfect. It will be better: more equitable, more efficient, more honest, more competitive, more participatory. A country where the son of a worker from the South has the same opportunities as the son of a professional from the North. A country where starting a business takes days, not years. A country where healthcare works for those without money, not just for those with it. A country where young people find reasons to stay and contribute, rather than reasons to leave and build their lives elsewhere.

This is not a dream: it is a goal that can be achieved with intelligence, determination, and mutual respect.

DIRECTDEMOCRACYS — OUR COMMITMENT DirectDemocracyS is committed to publicly monitoring the implementation of each point of this program, to transparently communicating results and deviations from objectives, to correcting proposals that reality proves inadequate, and to involving its members and Italian citizens at every stage of the process. Direct democracy is not an electoral mechanism: it is a way of living together, with respect, competence, and mutual responsibility.

DirectDemocracyS

directdemocracys.org

May 2025 — Version 1.0