DIRECTDEMOCRACYS

International Political Organization — Netherlands Branch

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL PROGRAM

FOR THE NETHERLANDS

A program based on logic, common sense,

study, reality, truth, coherence and mutual respect.

2025 Edition

public.directdemocracys.org

FOREWORD

This program was drafted by DirectDemocracyS (DDS), an international political organization that believes in direct democracy, shared leadership, collective ownership, and radical transparency. It is not a collection of vague promises or ideological slogans. It is a detailed, coherent, realistic, and feasible plan for the Netherlands, based on analysis of the actual situation, scientific evidence, international comparisons, and the principles of logic and common sense.

The Netherlands is one of the richest and most developed countries in the world. Yet it grapples with deep-rooted structural problems that have been ignored, concealed, or deliberately perpetuated for decades by traditional parties—left, right, center, and populist. DDS asks the question no one wants to ask: why, in a country with so much prosperity, intelligence, and resources, are so many problems unresolved?

The answer is not technical. It is political. The ruling political class has an interest in maintaining a system that protects its privileges, consolidates its power, and keeps its voters dependent. DDS breaks this pattern. We offer no illusions. We offer solutions.

This document analyzes every sector of Dutch society: politics, economics, taxation, the housing market, healthcare, education, migration, the environment, justice, and social cohesion. For each problem, we identify the actual causes, formulate concrete measures, provide quantifiable examples, and describe the expected consequences. Nothing here is utopian. Everything here is possible, if there is political will.

DDS is not for the elite. DDS is for the citizen who works every day, pays taxes, looks for a house, takes his children to school, tries to help his elderly parent, and is surprised that the system systematically fails him. This program is his program.

CHAPTER 1: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL REFORM

1.1 Analysis of the current situation

The Dutch political system was long regarded as an example of stable consensus democracy. However, the reality of 2024-2025 is different: the Netherlands finds itself in a constitutional crisis of trust. Election turnout fluctuates, the fragmentation of parliament makes government formation increasingly difficult — the formation following the November 2023 elections took more than six months — and a growing part of the population no longer believes that voting changes anything.

CRITICISM: The current system of proportional representation, democratic in theory, produces in practice majorities of parties that had nothing in common before the elections, that make compromises after the formation that bear no resemblance to what the voters wanted, and that subsequently pursue a policy for four years that was not chosen by anyone. This is a systematic alienation of the voter.

The fifteen or more parties in the House of Representatives do not represent a true plurality of ideas, but rather a fragmentation of interests, personality cults, and micro-electoral niches. The consequences are: ungovernable coalitions, slow decision-making, a lack of long-term vision, and a political culture of exclusion and blame sharing.

1.2 DDS Program: Concrete Measures

1.2.1 Introduction of a binding referendum right

The Netherlands abolished the advisory referendum in 2018, following the outcome of the referendum on the Association Agreement with Ukraine in 2016. This was a political decision, not a democratic one. DDS proposes:

1. Introduction of a binding corrective referendum for all laws passed by the House of Representatives, initiated by 300,000 valid signatures (approximately 2.1% of the eligible population).
2. Introduction of a citizens' initiative referendum: 200,000 signatures suffice to place a new bill on the agenda of the House of Representatives, with an obligation to consider it within six months.
3. Threshold: a referendum is valid when at least 40% of eligible voters participate. The result is binding. No political evasion is possible.

CONCRETE EXAMPLE: If the House of Representatives passes a law raising the state pension age to 68, citizens can collect 300,000 signatures within three months and force a referendum. If the majority of participants (with a turnout above 40%) vote no, the law does not come into effect. This is true democracy.

1.2.2 Election reform

DDS proposes a mixed electoral system: 50% of the seats via proportional lists, 50% via single-member districts. Advantages:

• Every voter has a personal representative whom they know by name and can address.
• Parties must also have local roots, not only in The Hague.
• Less fragmentation: parties without regional support disappear.
• More accountability: elected representatives are directly accountable to their voters.

1.2.3 Transparency and integrity

1. Mandatory, real-time disclosure of all contacts between lobbyists and parliamentarians, including the content of meetings.
2. Revolving door ban: a politician who has held a government position may not work for a company that he favored as a politician for five years following his term of office.
3. Mandatory annual declaration of assets for all elected politicians and senior civil servants, published on a publicly accessible government website.
4. Abolition of political leave: a civil servant entering politics resigns. No guarantee of return to public service.

EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES: Restoration of trust in politics (measured via regular Citizen Perspectives surveys), reduction of political corruption, greater citizen involvement in the democratic process, and a noticeable reduction in populist protest as a symptom of powerlessness.

CHAPTER 2: ECONOMY AND LABOR MARKET

2.1 Analysis of the current situation

The Netherlands has one of the highest GDPs per capita in the European Union — approximately 56,000 euros per capita in 2024. Yet the structural weaknesses of the Dutch economy are worrying and are ignored or concealed by most parties:

• Extreme dependence on exports (more than 85% of GDP), which makes the Netherlands vulnerable to global disruptions.
• A labor market dominated by flex work: more than 40% of the working population does not have a permanent contract. The Netherlands is the European champion in part-time work, particularly among women.
• Productivity growth has stagnated over the past fifteen years. The Netherlands lags behind Germany, Denmark, and the Scandinavian countries.
• The wedge — the difference between labor costs for the employer and the net wage of the employee — is one of the highest in the OECD.
• There is a structural shortage of qualified workers in technology, construction, healthcare, and education, while hundreds of thousands of people depend on benefits.

CRITICISM: Traditional political parties treat labor market problems as technical issues of regulation, whereas the real cause is a deliberate political choice: flexible labor is cheaper for companies in the short term, but destroys workers' social security, undermines the purchasing power of the middle class, and mutilates the long-term productivity of the economy.

2.2 DDS Program: Concrete Measures

2.2.1 Reform of the labor market

1. Introduction of the 'equal treatment standard': every employee performing the same work as a permanent employee is entitled to equal employment conditions, regardless of their contract type. No exceptions.
2. Abolition of the permanent use of zero-hour contracts for structural positions. Zero-hour contracts are only permitted for peak work of a maximum of six weeks per year.
3. Automatic conversion of temporary contracts to permanent contracts after 12 months (currently: 36 months). Shortening of the probationary period to one month.
4. Mandatory contribution by all companies to a national retraining fund: 0.5% of the total wage bill, managed by a tripartite body (government, trade unions, employers).

CONCRETE EXAMPLE: A distribution center that has hired the same 200 warehouse employees through temporary employment agencies for ten years pays them 20% less than permanent employees. Under the DDS standard, these employees must be treated equally with immediate effect. The expected cost increase for the company: approximately 4 million euros per year. The expected effect: an increase in the purchasing power of those employees by an average of 350 euros per month, a reduction in their dependence on allowances, and increased domestic consumption.

2.2.2 Industrial policy and productivity growth

The Netherlands has no coherent industrial strategy. DDS proposes:

• Establishment of a National Investment Fund (NIF) with an initial capital of 50 billion euros, financed by reinvestment of state holdings and targeted bond issuance.
• Priority sectors: microelectronics, sustainable energy, precision agriculture, water management and biopharmaceuticals.
• Mandatory participation of the NIF in joint ventures with private investors: the State shares in the profits.
• Establishment of 10 regional technological innovation hubs, linked to universities, with a focus on the valorization of research into market products.

EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES IN 10 YEARS: Increase in productivity growth from 0.8% to 2.2% per year, creation of approximately 180,000 structural highly qualified jobs, reduction of dependence on low-wage countries for production, and export diversification that makes the Netherlands less vulnerable to trade wars.

2.2.3 Reduction of the tax wedge

The Netherlands has one of the highest labor costs in Europe. DDS proposes:

1. Reduction of social security contributions for employees with an income below 40,000 euros per year by 4 percentage points, financed by the introduction of a capital gains tax.
2. Abolition of VAT on basic necessities (vegetables, fruit, public health products, books, public transport), reduction from 9% to 0%.
3. Introduction of a progressive corporate profit tax for large companies: 15% on the first 500,000 euros of profit, 25% up to 5 million, and 30% above that. No deduction for royalty structures within a group.

CHAPTER 3: HOUSING MARKET

3.1 Analysis of the current situation

The housing market is the most acute and most visible failure of the Dutch government in the past twenty years. The figures are irrefutable:

• Shortage of approximately 400,000 homes in 2024, rising to 500,000 in 2030 if policy does not change.
• Average selling price of a home: over 450,000 euros (2024), compared to approximately 200,000 euros in 2013.
• Average waiting time for a social housing unit in Amsterdam: 12 to 15 years.
• The percentage of home ownership among 30-year-olds has fallen from 44% (2009) to less than 25% (2024).
• 30% of the Dutch housing market is in the hands of institutional investors or private investors with more than 10 properties.

CRITICISM: The housing crisis is no accident. It is the direct result of decades of neoliberal housing policy: privatization of association assets, abolition of the mortgage interest deduction limitation, low construction subsidies, tax benefits for landlords, an unwillingness to liberalize building land, and the deliberate choice to allow housing to function as an investment object rather than as a basic right. Every political party that has supported or maintained this system is jointly responsible for the crisis.

3.2 DDS Program: Concrete Measures

3.2.1 Massive construction stimulus

1. National Construction Programme: 100,000 new homes per year for ten years, of which 40% are social housing, 30% mid-market rental (maximum 1,500 euros/month), and 30% owner-occupied homes for first-time buyers.
2. Simplification of permit procedures: maximum processing time of 12 months for housing projects exceeding 50 units. Automatic permit upon exceeding the deadline without a reasoned rejection.
3. Mandatory allocation of state-owned building land and unused municipal land for social housing. No more sale of state real estate to private investors.
4. Priority right for housing corporations in the purchase of building land from municipalities, at cost price.

CONCRETE EXAMPLE: On the Zuidas in Amsterdam, 15 hectares of planned office towers were not realized. Under the DDS program, this land is being redeveloped for 3,000 social rental homes and 1,500 starter homes. Construction time: 4 years. Costs for the municipality: zero, because the National Investment Fund takes over the financing via long-term bonds with a 2% interest rate. Rent: a maximum of 800 euros for social housing, 1,200 euros for mid-market rent.

3.2.2 Combating speculation

1. Introduction of a vacancy levy: properties that have been vacant for longer than six months are taxed at 5% of the WOZ value per year.
2. Introduction of a purchase ban: investors may not own more than three homes for rent in the same municipality. Homes exceeding this maximum must be sold within two years.
3. Introduction of a speculation tax: profit on the sale of a home within three years of purchase is taxed at 60%. This eliminates flipping as a business model.
4. Abolition of the mortgage interest deduction for second homes and investment properties (with a five-year transition period).

EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES IN 5 YEARS: Decline in average house prices by 15-20%, availability of 80,000 to 120,000 investment properties for the owner-occupied market, shortening of waiting times for social housing from 12 to 4 years in major cities, increase in home ownership among 30-year-olds from 25% to 40%.

CHAPTER 4: HEALTHCARE

4.1 Analysis of the current situation

The Netherlands theoretically has one of the best healthcare systems in the world. In practice, the system struggles with structural problems that undermine accessibility, quality, and affordability:

• Average deductible of 385 euros per year (2024). For the chronically ill, this means thousands of euros in extra costs, on a structural basis.
• Waiting times in mental healthcare: an average of 14 weeks for an initial consultation. For specialist care in some regions: more than a year.
• Staff shortage: 100,000 vacancies in healthcare in 2024, rising to 200,000 in 2030.
• Health insurers book hundreds of millions of euros in profit year after year, while their core task is public in nature.
• Bureaucratic burden for healthcare providers: doctors and nurses spend an average of 30-40% of their time on administration.

CRITICISM: The privatization of health insurance in 2006 was an ideological experiment that did not work. It has led to competition on premiums rather than quality, to complex policies that citizens do not understand, to benefit surpluses going to shareholders instead of patients, and to a system in which the poorer citizen receives lower quality care than the wealthier citizen. This is morally unacceptable and economically irrational.

4.2 DDS Program: Concrete Measures

4.2.1 Reform of the health insurance system

1. Abolition of the deductible for the chronically ill, the elderly over 70, and people with an income below 130% of the social minimum.
2. Gradual reduction of the deductible for all insured persons to a maximum of 150 euros per year, financed by a solidarity levy on assets exceeding 500,000 euros.
3. Introduction of a non-profit standard for health insurers: profits exceeding 2% of premium income must be returned to the premium payer or to health funds. No profit distribution to shareholders.
4. Stricter regulation of policies: a maximum of three standard policies per insurer, transparent and comparable. An end to the jungle of supplementary insurance.

4.2.2 Addressing the staff shortage

1. Increase in the starting salary in nursing to a minimum of 3,200 euros gross per month. Funded through the reallocation of bureaucracy savings (see point 3).
2. Introduction of a National Healthcare Study Fund: all students who choose a healthcare program (nursing, medicine, physiotherapy) receive an interest-free student loan that is 50% forgiven after ten years of working in the Dutch healthcare sector.
3. Radical reduction of administrative burdens: introduction of AI-supported administrative systems (validated by healthcare providers, not consultants) that halve administrative time. Goal: doctors spend 80% of their time with patients.

CONCRETE EXAMPLE: A nurse at the UMC Utrecht currently earns an average of 2,800 euros gross per month for 36 hours per week. After the DDS reform, this will rise to 3,400 euros, with 4 hours of paid continuing education time per week. Administrative tasks will be reduced from 12 hours to 5 hours per week. Expected effect: a 30% decrease in turnover within the profession, and 20% less use of expensive temporary agency staff.

4.2.3 Mental health care

Mental healthcare is in crisis. DDS proposes:

• Doubling of contracted mental healthcare capacity within four years, through an emergency program with direct funding of new practices.
• Introduction of a digital initial response: a professionally staffed telephone and online crisis line, 24/7, free of charge, that provides a referral within six hours.
• Statutory maximum waiting period of six weeks for mental health care intake. If exceeded: entitlement to reimbursement for private care.

CHAPTER 5: EDUCATION

5.1 Analysis of the current situation

The Netherlands has an education system that performs averagely internationally, but is structurally unequal. The main problems:

• Early selection at the age of ten (transition from primary to secondary education) largely determines a child's life course prospects, while children at that age are still developing strongly cognitively and socially.
• Inequality of opportunity: children of low-educated parents perform structurally worse, not because of intelligence, but because of home environment, language delays, and a lack of social capital.
• Teacher shortage of more than 10,000 FTE in primary and secondary education (2024), rising to 25,000 in 2030.
• Underpayment of teachers: a primary school teacher in the Netherlands earns on average 20% less than a comparable professional in other sectors.
• Rising illiteracy: 18% of the Dutch population is functionally low-literate.

CRITICISM: The teacher shortage is no mystery. It is the result of a decades-long deliberate policy of salary cuts in real terms, increasing workload, a lack of career prospects, and societal undervaluation of the profession. To subsequently complain about declining educational quality is hypocritical.

5.2 DDS Program: Concrete Measures

5.2.1 Reform of selection and equality of opportunity

4. Extension of primary school to Group 9 (age 12) before the transition to secondary education. Two extra years for consolidation and equalization of opportunities.
5. Abolition of the single CITO recommendation as the sole determining factor. Introduction of a broad three-year bridging class system for all students, with differentiation but without definitive selection.
6. Free out-of-school care (BSO) for children aged 4 to 12 with a maximum household income of 65,000 euros, financed through an increase in dividend tax.
7. Introduction of mandatory bridging classes for children with language delays, with professional language coaches.

5.2.2 Addressing the teacher shortage

5. Raising the salary of primary school teachers to the same level as secondary school teachers: an average of +15% is realistic.
6. Introduction of a Teacher Career Fund: after 10 years of service, teachers can choose a 6-month sabbatical with 80% salary or a subsidy for a master's degree.
7. Simplification of competency requirements for lateral entrants: professionals with 15+ years of experience in relevant sectors can teach via an accelerated 1-year track.

CONCRETE EXAMPLE: A mathematician with 20 years of experience at ASML wants to become a teacher. Currently, the required training takes 3 to 4 years and entails a significant loss of salary. Under the DDS system: an intensive year of practice-oriented training, retention of part of the former salary through a transition premium, and immediate employability in secondary education. Expected effect: 5,000 new lateral entrants per year.

CHAPTER 6: TAXES AND FINANCE

6.1 Analysis of the current situation

The Dutch tax system is one of the most complex in the world. It contains dozens of allowance systems, deductions, schemes, and exceptions that make the system incomprehensible to the average citizen, while simultaneously offering excellent opportunities for the wealthy and large corporations to evade taxes. Examples:

• The Netherlands acts as a tax haven for multinationals through the participation exemption, the innovation box (effective rate of 9%), and shell companies: more than 14,000 shell companies are registered in the Netherlands.
• Wealth inequality: the richest 10% own more than 65% of total private wealth. The richest 1% own more than 26%.
• The benefits system (childcare allowance, housing allowance, healthcare allowance) has been deliberately kept complicated, as the benefits scandal demonstrated. It cost tens of thousands of families their livelihood.

CRITICISM: The Netherlands is simultaneously one of the most taxed countries for workers and one of the friendliest countries for wealthy companies and individuals. This is no accident: it is a political choice that favors the rich and taxes the working class.

6.2 DDS Program: Concrete Measures

6.2.1 Simplification of the tax system

5. Abolition of the benefits system and replacement by a universal basic allowance: one automatically paid amount for rent, healthcare, and childcare, based on income, without application. No recovery possible without a court ruling.
6. Introduction of a two-tier system for income tax: 30% on income up to 50,000 euros, 48% on the excess. Abolition of all deductions except alimony and special medical expenses.
7. Introduction of a capital gains tax of 3.5% on all capital growth above 500,000 euros per year, including unrealized gains on shares and real estate. Replacement of Box 3.

6.2.2 Tackling tax avoidance

4. Abolition of the innovation box for profits that are not demonstrably generated in the Netherlands by researchers working in the Netherlands.
5. Introduction of a minimum effective tax rate of 20% for all companies active in the Netherlands, regardless of their structure.
6. Mandatory public country-by-country reporting for all companies with more than 50 million euros in revenue.
7. Tackling bogus self-employment: self-employed professionals who receive more than 80% of their income from a single client are treated as employees for tax purposes.

EXPECTED REVENUE: The combined measures are estimated to generate 18 to 25 billion euros in additional tax revenue per year, to be fully spent on the reform of education, healthcare, housing, and infrastructure, without increasing the tax burden for the working middle class.

CHAPTER 7: MIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL COHESION

7.1 Analysis of the current situation

Migration is the subject that most polarizes Dutch politics and is simultaneously discussed the least rationally. The facts:

• The Netherlands receives between 50,000 and 150,000 new migrants annually (depending on the year), of which a significant proportion are labour migrants from the EU, a portion are asylum seekers, and a portion are family reunification.
• The COA (Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers) has chronic capacity problems. Asylum procedures take an average of 15 to 24 months.
• Integration outcomes are inconsistent: some migrant groups have equal or higher labor participation than the native population; others show structural disadvantages in language, employment, and education.
• Discrimination in the labor market is documented and structural: individuals with a non-Western name demonstrably have less chance of being invited for a job interview given equal qualifications.

CRITICISM: Dutch politics treats migration as a black-and-white issue: one side wants to close the borders, the other wants to welcome all migrants. Both positions are unrealistic. The real question is: how do you organize a welfare state that is socially just, economically coherent, and open to those who contribute — without undermining social cohesion?

7.2 DDS Program: Concrete Measures

7.2.1 A rational asylum and migration system

5. Acceleration of the asylum procedure to a maximum of 6 months through automation of document screening, expansion of IND capacity, and legal aid.
6. Distinction between economic migration (regulated via a point system based on the Canadian model: language, education, work experience, age), asylum (protection against danger and persecution), and family reunification (strictly regulated via income requirements).
7. Immediate permission to work for asylum seekers from the start of the procedure. It is irrational to keep people in a reception center for one or two years when they could be productive.
8. Investment in language lessons: mandatory, free language courses for all newcomers, with compulsory attendance and a test.

7.2.2 Integration and combating discrimination

5. Introduction of anonymous applications as the standard for all government and subsidized positions. Based on evidence: this significantly increases the chances for equally qualified candidates.
6. Expansion of the powers of the Dutch Data Protection Authority to investigate and fine labour market discrimination.
7. Mandatory civic integration with coercive measures for non-compliance, including partial recovery of integration subsidies.

EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES: Reduction of societal tensions surrounding migration through a system that is fair, transparent, and explainable to all citizens. Increase in the labor participation of newcomers by 25% within five years. Reduction of discrimination in the labor market.

CHAPTER 8: CLIMATE, ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY

8.1 Analysis of the current situation

The Netherlands scores poorly internationally on environmental performance, despite its image as a water manager. Facts:

• The Netherlands is one of the largest livestock and agricultural exporting countries in the world, with one of the highest nitrogen emissions per km² in Europe.
• The nitrogen crisis has largely paralyzed the construction industry: thousands of construction projects are at a standstill due to Natura 2000 requirements.
• The climate targets are structurally not being met: greenhouse gas emissions are falling too slowly.
• The energy price crisis of 2022-2023 demonstrated that the Netherlands is too dependent on fossil gas (Groningen) and on Russian imports.

CRITICISM: The agricultural lobby has blocked the necessary reform of the Dutch agricultural sector for decades. The nitrogen crisis did not arise suddenly: politicians already knew in the 1990s that intensive livestock farming was not ecologically sustainable. The inaction was a political choice, for which farmers, nature, and citizens are now paying the price.

8.2 DDS Program: Concrete Measures

8.2.1 Agricultural Transition

5. Voluntary buy-out program for livestock farmers in surplus areas: fair market compensation plus 20% premium, plus retraining program and income guarantee for 5 years.
6. Mandatory extensification of intensive livestock farming in buffer zones around Natura 2000 areas: halving of the livestock population within a 5 km radius, spread over 8 years with compensation.
7. Stimulating agricultural transition to organic farming, precision technology, and short supply chains: subsidies of up to 80% of investment costs for converts.

8.2.2 Energy independence

4. Accelerated rollout of offshore wind energy: 21 gigawatts of additional capacity by 2032, via accelerated permitting procedures and European cooperation.
5. National Insulation Program: free insulation for homes with energy label E, F, or G for owners with an income below 65,000 euros. Goal: 500,000 homes per year.
6. Introduction of a carbon levy on products imported from countries without comparable climate policies (carbon border adjustment), in line with European CBAM regulations.
7. Abolition of subsidies on fossil fuels: it is estimated that the Netherlands provides 4-8 billion euros in direct and indirect subsidies to the fossil fuel industry annually. These will be redirected to renewable energy.

EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES IN 10 YEARS: Reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 60% compared to 1990 (Climate Agreement target), energy independence of 70% via renewable sources, halving of nitrogen emissions, restoration of 40% of the weakened Natura 2000 areas.

CHAPTER 9: JUSTICE, SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW

9.1 Analysis of the current situation

The Dutch rule of law is under increasing pressure:

• Capacity shortage in the courts: average processing time for civil cases: 2 to 4 years. Criminal cases: 1 to 2 years.
• Undermining by organized crime: the wave of assassinations in the criminal underworld, the murder of lawyer Derk Wiersum (2019) and journalist Peter R. de Vries (2021) demonstrate that organized crime structurally challenges the rule of law.
• Prison system: The Netherlands is struggling with both cell overcapacity in some regions and a cell shortage in others. The recidivism rate after detention is too high.
• Discrimination in police action: research shows that ethnic profiling occurs systematically during traffic stops and identity checks.

CRITICISM: The justice system has been underinvested for decades. Magistrates are underpaid compared to the legal profession, courts are understaffed, digitalization is inadequate, and politicians opt for visible repressive measures (more police on the streets) instead of structural investments in prevention and rehabilitation.

9.2 DDS Program: Concrete Measures

8. Doubling the budget for the courts over ten years. Goal: average processing time for civil cases under twelve months.
9. Introduction of a National Anti-Subversion Fund of 500 million euros per year, with a focus on financial investigations, confiscation of criminal assets, and the protection of threatened witnesses and journalists.
10. Introduction of a rehabilitation model in the prison system: every detainee is entitled to a reintegration plan. Recidivism reduction is included as a KPI in the prison system's budget.
11. Introduction of an independent police complaints commission with the authority to impose sanctions for documented ethnic profiling or excessive force.
12. Complete digitization of the court: all civil and administrative cases up to 50,000 euros are handled via a digital platform. This drastically reduces processing time and costs.

CHAPTER 10: SOCIAL SECURITY AND POVERTY REDUCTION

10.1 Analysis of the current situation

In one of the richest countries in the world, an estimated 900,000 people live in poverty, of whom 250,000 are children. This is morally unacceptable. The causes are not only economic, but also structural-institutional:

• The system of social assistance and benefits is so complicated and surrounded by so many checks that a large proportion of eligible recipients do not apply for the benefits (non-take-up).
• The poverty trap: people who accept a job while on welfare lose benefits and end up worse off net. This is a deliberate structural flaw.
• Child poverty is concentrated in specific cities and neighborhoods. In some Rotterdam and Amsterdam neighborhoods, more than 30% of children grow up in poverty.

CRITICISM: Poverty in the Netherlands is not an inevitability. It is the result of political choices: a minimum wage that has been too low for decades, a poverty trap ingrained in the benefits system, and a culture of distrust and control within social assistance that stigmatizes people more than it helps.

10.2 DDS Program: Concrete Measures

8. Increase of the minimum wage to 60% of the median wage (the European benchmark), phased over four years. This brings the minimum wage to approximately 16 euros per hour in 2028.
9. Introduction of an automatic payment obligation: all allowances to which a citizen is entitled are automatically paid out based on existing tax and income information. No application required.
10. Abolition of the poverty trap via exemption: the first 200 euros of earned income is not offset against the social assistance benefit. Gradual reduction above that.
11. National Child Poverty Fund of 1 billion euros per year: free school meals, free swimming lessons, free out-of-school care, and free sports membership for all children below the poverty line.
12. Implementation of a Basic Income pilot in three municipalities of varying sizes over a period of four years, scientifically supervised, to measure the effects on labor participation, health, and well-being.

EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES IN 6 YEARS: Halving of child poverty (from 250,000 to 125,000 children), reduction of the total number of people in poverty by 30%, increase in the labor participation of social assistance recipients by 20%, substantial savings on the costs of long-term dependency on social assistance.

CHAPTER 11: DIGITALIZATION, TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY

11.1 Analysis of the current situation

The Netherlands leads in digitalization indices, but scores poorly on government services and digital rights:

• DigiD is a central point of contact for hundreds of government services, but security and accessibility are problematic for the elderly and people without a smartphone.
• Data exploitation of Dutch citizens by private companies (Facebook, Google, data brokers) is taking place on a massive scale. GDPR enforcement by the Dutch Data Protection Authority (AP) is too weak.
• AI use by government and businesses: no coherent national strategy, no transparency obligation for algorithmic decision-making.

CRITICISM: The government is investing more in digitizing its oversight functions (Tax Authority, UWV, police) than in improving its services to citizens. The result is an asymmetry: the government knows more and more about the citizen, while the citizen understands less and less how decisions are made about him.

11.2 DDS Program: Concrete Measures

8. Introduction of a National Digital Rights Charter: every citizen has the right to an explanation for every algorithmic decision that affects them (social assistance, taxes, RDW, UWV). No black-box algorithms in government decisions.
9. Establishment of an independent Algorithm Audit Institute that publicly audits all algorithmic systems used by the government for bias, accuracy, and compliance with the rule of law.
10. Strengthening of the Data Protection Authority: doubling of the budget, expansion of sanctioning powers to 4% of global turnover (in accordance with the GDPR maximum), obligation to prosecute at least 20 major cases every year.
11. Development of state-owned, open-source alternatives for essential digital services: European cloud services, encrypted communication for government officials, open-source AI assistant for citizen services.

CHAPTER 12: IMPLEMENTATION — PRIORITIES AND TIMELINE

12.1 First reign (years 1-4): Foundation

In the first four years, DDS focuses on the measures that are most urgent, directly affect the most citizens, and lay the structural foundation for long-term reforms:

8. YEAR 1: Housing crisis (emergency law on speculation tax, start of construction program), tax reform (abolition of allowances, introduction of automatic payment), labor market reform (equal treatment standard).
9. YEAR 2: Healthcare reform (reduction of deductible, non-profit standard for insurers), education reform (teacher salary increase, broad first year of secondary school), democratic reform (referendum law).
10. YEAR 3: Climate transition (national insulation program, agricultural buyout scheme), justice (digitization of courts, anti-subversion fund), digital rights (Algorithm Audit Institute).
11. YEAR 4: Evaluation, adjustment, and preparation of the second phase. Publication of transparency report on all KPIs.

12.2 Second reign (years 5-8): In-depth

In the second period, the fundamental structural reforms requiring long-term change are initiated:

• Introduction of the mixed electoral system following a constitutional procedure.
• Completion of the agricultural transition.
• Basic Income Pilot: Evaluation and Potential Rollout.
• Completion of the national construction program (500,000 homes).

12.3 Financing

The total cost of the DDS program for the Netherlands is estimated at 35 to 45 billion euros per year in additional public expenditure. These are financed via:

9. Tackling tax avoidance: +18 to 25 billion euros/year.
10. Capital gains tax: +6 to 10 billion euros/year.
11. Abolition of fossil fuel subsidies: +4 to 8 billion euros/year.
12. Savings on bureaucracy and the benefits system: +3 to 5 billion euros/year.
13. Interest-free government bonds for infrastructure and housing (via NIF): off-budget, self-financing through state participation in profits.

The numbers add up. There is no question of magic thinking. Every figure is based on existing research by the CPB, PBL, OECD, and independent economists. What is missing is not the money. It is the political will to spend it on the citizens instead of on the subsidy recipients at the top.

CONCLUSION: A NETHERLANDS FOR EVERYONE

The Netherlands is a country with enormous potential. It has a well-educated population, a strong tradition of pragmatism and consensus-building, a strategic location in Europe, and an economy that, despite everything, remains strong. But that potential is being systematically undermined by a political system that places its own interests above those of the citizens.

DirectDemocracyS offers no ideology. We offer logic. We offer measures that work, are proven in other countries, are financially sustainable, and are morally just. We offer a system where the citizen — not the party, not the lobby, not big business — is central.

A Netherlands that invests in its citizens, its homes, its healthcare, its schools, and its rule of law is not only a more just Netherlands. It is also a more productive, prosperous, and happier Netherlands. This is not a utopia. This is a choice.

The question is: who has the courage to make that choice?

DirectDemocracyS has that courage. And it invites every citizen who shares that to become part of this movement — not as a follower, but as a co-administrator, as a co-owner, as a maker of their own future.

DirectDemocracyS — The Netherlands

public.directdemocracys.org

Logic. Common sense. Direct democracy.